PROGRESS

2020–2021

Progress

Durham University History Society Journal 2020-2021

Journal Team

CONTENTS

America

The World

PRESIDENTS' ADDRESS

Fellow historians,

It's been a challenging time for all this academic year, though as academics continually like to reaffirm, the pandemic has been a classic example of living through history, both in the societal changes wrought by various restrictions and the seismic developments within fields of medicine. It is often said that times of greatest difficulty lead to periods of innovation, and above all, progress. It is this that defines this edition of our annual journal, and within these pages, Durham students have written challenging pieces which cover a variety of issues tied to the broad concept of progress.

The following essays are the result of hours of work by Durham historians, and we thank each and every one of them for putting in the time to not only write these pieces, but also allow us to publish them for all to see. Our editorial team, led by George Burnett, have done a fantastic job reading and selecting the various essays in order to produce a final catalogue of work, and we would like to take this opportunity to thank George and the team for their fantastic work.

The society as a whole has had a difficult year, though we can take pride in the fact that despite restrictions on social events like our usual ball, or the confinement of our annual programme to Zoom, the society is still flourishing. Marlo Avidon put together a stunningly diverse and interesting selection of talks this year, showcasing not only Durham academics' research, but also inviting academics from other UK institutions who spoke on topics ranging from Byzantine medicine to the significance of the London Cross Bones Graveyard. For her outstanding work, building on her planning for last year's conference on "death, disease and medicine" (ironically cancelled due to the onset of a pandemic), Marlo was nominated by the Students Union for an exceptional commitment award, an acknowledgment from the Students Union which she fully deserves.

Our conference for 2021, organised by our president-elect, Lamesha Ruddock, also received a well-deserved nomination for outstanding event, and was a fantastic series of discussions on the importance of "Revolution, Rebellion and Resistance" throughout history. The talks paid particular attention to the experiences of African diaspora communities and included contributions from pioneering historians including Professor Hakim Adi, the first historian of African heritage to be granted a history professorship in Britain.

Finally, we must thank the rest of our executive committee, who have all adapted to the challenges of this year in a variety of inspiring ways. To our new members also, we apologise for the fact that we could not provide all of the events we hoped, though we look forward to next year, when our new committee can not only build another outstanding programme but also extend the society into new and exciting directions. We wish you all the best not simply in your historical pursuits at Durham, but in all your future endeavours.

Oscar Duffy and Aisha Sembhi,
Presidents of DUHS 2020-21

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Dear all,

It's been an odd year for the History Society journal, as indeed it was last year. We have conducted the entire process online via emails, Google Forms and spreadsheets, and the team has felt a little dislocated because of this.

Nevertheless, the final product remains excellent, an engaging and sophisticated journal which is both relevant and innovative. This is testament to the talent and rigorous effort of my wonderful editing team: Olivia Bennison, Katrina Fenton, Maddie Whitaker, Jemima Jones, Nick Peachey, Ida Widing, Noé Vagner-Clevenot, Grace Marshall and Madeleine Hartland. It is also testament to the thoughtful and well-researched essays submitted by our contributors. Without these people's help, this journal would not have been possible. I would also like to give special thanks to Anna Wanstall for her patient explanation of InDesign to this complete novice - without you, this journal would look a lot worse than it does now.

The journal is populated by a variety of essays on a broad range of topics. This year's theme is "Progress", and our contributors have interpreted it in a variety of ways, covering a wide temporal, geographical and topical spectrum. This year, I have decided to arrange the journal geographically, as I have realised in putting it together just how broad the geographical scope of our contributions is.

We first turn to Britain, an understandable focus for any Durham University historian. Beth Mckenzie begins the journal by furthering our understanding of gender with her assessment of transgender individuals and their treatment in society in Post-War Britain, a time of great debate in the historiography. Anne Herbert-Ortega then gives insight into English poverty at the turn of the twentieth century and the importance of social researchers like Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree in affecting the popular debate on the reasons behind impoverishment. She is closely followed by Henry G. Miller, who takes us on a more philosophical path by interrogating the relationship between leading utilitarian theorists and democracy and outlining how it was more complicated than many scholars have assumed. Melanie Perrin also interrogates the relationship between two groups, the groups in this case being queer communities and their 'normative' counterparts in Interwar Britain. She gives great insight into this complex relationship, exploring a period often overlooked in the relevant historiography. Elena Russo then takes us into the realm of architectural history with her piece which explores the uniqueness of Nicholas Hawksmoor's work at the turn of the eighteenth century. Many architectural scholars have overlooked his originality, she argues, and an appreciation of this is something which Hawksmoor deserves as an innovator in his time. To round off this section, we have the unique contribution of Beck Chamberlain Heslop, who discusses prostheses and their association with oppression in Interwar Britain. Their argument – that prostheses should not simply be seen as oppressive or freeing – is an innovative one, their topic particularly new in the modern historiography.

From Britain, we turn to Europe, beginning with the contribution of Coby Oliver Graff on the interaction between Christian and Jewish communities in early modern Spain in which he explores the prevalence of political and prejudicial motivations within anti-Jewish sentiments. Kate Chipchase follows this with a fascinating overview of the historiography of sexual politics in the Weimar Republic in which she discusses the potential sexual revolution that occurred in this brief period as well as sexual politics' perceived relationship (or

lack thereof) with the Republic's decline. The contribution of Angus Crawford then explores political structures in late medieval France and the potential fracturing of the Crown's authority at the hands of regionally powerful dukes, a refreshingly different topic expertly investigated. In a similar vein – or, at least, a similar period – we then turn to Polly Crowther's contribution, a modern take on the tenth century in Europe which moves past its tainted reputation of backwardness and regression into a characterisation of progress and change.

We then move across the pond for our third section to look towards the United States of America. Leading the charge is Dylan Cresswell's discussion of 'whiteness' in the historiography of Progressive Era US immigration, an in-depth analysis which questions whether the term and its relevant historians' contributions are truly of any use for understanding the social, racial and economic relationships of this period. Freya Reynolds then provides a similarly questioning take on the second-wave feminist movement in America, as she wonders whether the movement was truly fighting for equal rights or acting in the interests of white, middle-class women above all. This shorter section is then concluded by Ewan McCullough's exploration of the importance of communication for American presidential races in the twentieth century, his focus being on the particularly notable elections of 1948 and 1952.

In the final section, we move elsewhere in the world – primarily to Asia and Russia, but also to Australia. We begin with Russia and the work of Laura Mireanu. In a satisfying reversal of the 'Orientalising' tendency of European historiography, she demonstrates how Western culture influenced early Cold War Soviet culture and acted as an 'Other' against which it could define itself. Emma Chai takes a different path, looking to Soviet religious policy in the modern era and discussing the relationship between Church and State therein. The Church was not the State-led façade many assume it to have been, she suggests, and religion in turn seems to have been driven more by popular faith than by Soviet propaganda. Moving further east, we come to Toby Donegan-Cross's contribution concerning Meiji Japan and the beginnings of the modern Japanese national identity. He explores the anxieties and questions inherent in its formation as well as the difficulty of the Western perspective in the historiography of the topic. Following on is Hazel Laurenson's essay which gives insight into ideological power in Chosŏn Korea, in which she goes against the scholarly grain by suggesting that Confucianism may not have been as prominent a reason for inequality as many assume. We then go south to Australia with Rohit Kumar's contribution. He takes us into the realm of Art History with his exploration of the recent refashioning and repurposing of western photography by Australian Aboriginal artists, a trend which has both empowered and revitalised Aboriginal art in the Postmodern era. Thus, we come to the final essay in the journal, a more general historiographical overview by Lorna Cosgrave of the modern metropolis and its increasingly interdisciplinary historiography. As she illustrates, the field has grown substantially since its inception in the works of Georg Simmel, arguably surpassing the historical discipline in its complexity.

As you can see, then, this journal contains an eclectic assortment of ideas and perspectives which should broaden the reader's historical horizons in some way. I hope that you find something of interest to you within it. A journal is nothing without readers, so thank you for taking the time to read this piece of work into which I have dedicated a large amount of my time in this most peculiar of years. It has certainly been a labour of love.

George Burnett,
Journal Editor '20-'21

BRITAIN

Beth Mckenzie

Transgender Identities in Post-War Britain: Progression or Regression?

When Colonel Barker was put on trial in 1929, the court took issue with his 'masquerading' as a man - in other words, with the supposed incongruence between Barker's gender performance and physical body.[1] Yet, by the time of the Christine Jorgensen craze of the 1950s, pathological rhetoric of transsexualism appeared to provide explanations for such cross-gender behaviour, most essentially through the conceptual separation of sex and gender. The prominence of figures like Jorgensen in medical research and the press appeared to reflect the progression of post-war Western society's towards more liberal views of sex and gender. But this was not necessarily the case, particularly in the USA. This essay argues that the visibility of transgender identity following World War II should be associated with a new emphasis on traditional gender roles, albeit one which followed a period of revisionism and change in medical approaches to sex and gender. As such, this approach seeks

to challenge the conventional narrative of the 'sexual revolution' of the 1960s. To these ends, we will trace discursive change within trans identity in medical and psychiatric discourse, as well as in media and the press. Such an argument will be shaped by a careful approach to language: 'transgender' and its related terms will be used as an umbrella term to discuss individuals who pursued or underwent sex-change surgeries, cross-dressers, drag queens and others who appeared to flout contemporary rules of gender presentation. Although asymmetrical with current definitions, the term encourages the inclusion of wide and various identities which were grouped as 'other' and allows an interrogation of the space between histories now understood as transgender and those of homosexuality.

By the 1940s, sexologists were using the term 'psychological sex' to distinguish between the sex of the mind and the sex of the body.[2] But as medical and psychiatric

discourse became more concerned with transgender identities, the concept of 'gender' emerged, understood as entirely separate from sex, 'located above' rather than 'below the belt'.[3] Psychological concepts of gender in the U.S. overtook the Danish model of human bisexuality which argued trans women had male anatomy and female chromosomes.[4] Doctors such as David O. Cauldwell claimed that transgender behaviours emerged from 'poor hereditary background and a highly unfavourable childhood environment'.[5] In short, (trans)gender went from being a condition of the body to a condition of the mind. In the context of post-war anxieties about masculinity, these discussions were taken as an opportunity to reinforce normative gender roles.

Discussion of 'transvestism' in American medical and psychiatric journals was often patronising and patients were treated as delusional exhibitionists. In 'Psychopathia Transexualis', Cauldwell belittled his subject 'Earl' by openly mocking their male presentation and the idea that sex-change surgery would end their torment.[6] It is worth quoting one passage at length:

> She kept on in her effort to affect a masculine voice. (It never sounded in the least masculine.) She delighted in ultra-loud (and severely tawdry) socks and ties. Men's shoes she wore were far too large for her and made walking difficult. Her hair was conventional masculine trim. She was narcissistic and revel[l]ed in just seeing and feeling herself (as much when alone as otherwise) in the role of a male. She admired herself probably as much as the original Narcissus.[7]

Here, not only is Earl presented as mentally ill, but their experience is reduced to a self-involved, attention-seeking stunt. Cauldwell's preoccupation with Earl's physical traits is indicative of the post-war understanding that, whilst gender was

psychological, it could be read upon the body. Voice, clothes, and hair were all indicators of gender. Despite personally distinguishing between transsexuals and homosexuals, Cauldwell goes on to describe Earl's 'homosexual "crush"' and apparent 'seduction' of women as part of a 'pseudo-homosexual' fantasy.[8] Such implicit connections reflect the continuation of prejudiced notions of transgender's ties to homosexuality in spite of new medical concepts. The post-war era is generally seen as the emergence of a more liberal attitude towards sexual matters due to the Kinsey moment and other medical breakthroughs.[9] Cauldwell indeed wished to help, not condemn, Earl and advocated that doctors 'rehabilitate the few who fall by the wayside'.[10] Danish doctors, too, were inclined to carry out the wishes of their patients with sex-change surgeries, something Jorgensen often emphasised to the press.[11] But even if they considered patients' '"purpose of life"', surgeons and psychiatrists alike still spoke of transgenderism as a disease that ultimately required treatment.[12] The post-war framing of transgender identities as medically or psychologically abnormal reinforced narratives of cisgender normativity by default, and heteronormativity by extension.

Reinforcement of traditional gender roles was seen most explicitly through active attempts to 'recondition' trans people and, particularly in the U.S., dissuade them from surgeries. The Gender Identity Research Clinic (GRIC) earned its professional reputation for its attempts to get 'sissy' boys to perform conventional masculinity.[13] In his 1948 book *Everyday Sex Problems,* Norman Haire disputed claims that surgeries were available on request.[14] The contentious legal status of such procedures was probably a point of concern for these doctors but, considering no one in the U.S. was prosecuted for sex-change surgery, it is more likely that hesitation lay in general understanding of transgender as a mental

illness that could be treated.[15] However, even doctors who advocated for surgeries showed concern that they would be viewed as a quick fix. Danish parliament member Dr. Viggo Starcke told U.S. reporters 'Don't let prospective Christines come to Copenhagen any longer'.[16] In the press, medical professionals implied that surgery was only required in rare cases. In Britain, Picture Post's six-page, autobiographical feature on Roberta Cowell's surgical transition was prefaced with the justification that sexologists and gynaecologists alike claimed her 'femininity had a substantial physical basis'.[17] Medical consensus, not Cowell's own gender identity, made surgery acceptable.[18] Although transgender people were by no means puppets of the medically-minded press, doctors' gatekeeping of sex-change surgeries gave the medical profession disproportionate control over the rights of trans people to their bodies and gender identity. Where gay and lesbian identifying people may have been able to later reject pathological depictions of homosexuality, similar challenges by transgender individuals seeking surgery would obliterate their chances of surgical transition. Jorgensen, for instance, wrote to some acquaintances that she would undergo what she thought to be an unnecessary psychological evaluation by doctors in Copenhagen in order to get the surgery she required: 'to satisfy their minds as to the course of action, I shall just do as they say'.[19] Such masking of trans identity production through medical discourse indicates that there is more to be uncovered about how transgender people of the past viewed their own gender identity. Nevertheless, transgender prominence in medical research appears to reflect an understanding that whilst 'gender' was mutable, this was only in theory. For many doctors, it was the post-war generation's duty to fix gender where it was thought to be wrongly built.

The post-war press picked up on medical notions of the transgender mental illness.

As a consequence, two stereotypes emerged. The first, the sexual deviant, fits into a long tradition branding non-normative practices of sex and gender as criminal. The 'Lavender Scare' illustrates the ways in which mid-century Americans were plagued by moral panic over homosexuality – as fears of communist intervention manifested themselves in the deceptive figure of the gay spy. Transgender identities are largely absent in such narratives; Alison Oram claims that transitions were understood as 'a magical transformation rather than a deviant sexuality'.[20] Yet, by decentring medical discourse, we can see that the contemporary cross-dresser closely parallels the Cambridge-spy type figure that was so feared. Here was an individual seen to be actively changing their appearance to pass as another person. Newspaper headlines – 'Mississippi Woman Poses as Man for 8 Years' and ''Her' Secret is Out' – emphasised notions of deception and trickery.[21] Many, like Feinberg, lived 'in constant terror as a gender outlaw'.[22] A strange tension existed in simultaneous visibility and criminalisation of trans identities. Despite her name provoking 'vicious laughter', Jorgensen demonstrated to many gender non-conforming individuals that they were not alone.[23] Louise Lawrence even created trans networks by contacting people whose arrests for cross-dressing had been reported in newspapers.[24] Thus, the 'deviant' classification of cross-dressing in the press could actually engender trans identity production. Nevertheless, however, undertones of sexual deviancy suggested rigid notions of sex and gender carried through from the pre-war era.

The transgender sexual deviant culminated in the cinematic trope of the murderous crossdresser. Robert Bloch's 1959 novel *Psycho* introduced audiences to the infamous Norman Bates, a psychotic killer who dressed as his mother to commit murders. Hitchcock's esteemed film adaptation was produced the following

year and inspired by the real killings of Wisconsin body snatcher Ed Gein. Like Gein, who supposedly 'wished… he were a woman', Bates had an unhealthy relationship with his mother, whom he dressed as upon murdering Marion Crane in the film's infamous shower scene.[25] The final image of Norman superimposed with his mother's face cements the dually gendered nature of his psychopathy. Such depictions inspired various murderous crossdressers from Warren in *Homicidal* (1961) to more recent iterations as Buffalo Bill in *Silence of the Lambs* (1991).[26] Less sinister depictions of transgender identities in film still presented cross-dressing as a form of deception. *Some Like It Hot*'s Jerry poses as Daphne, a member of an all-girl band who engages in a romance with millionaire Osgood.[27] That the audience knows Daphne's 'true' gender is played for laughs as we watch Osgood unknowingly engage in what is ultimately, in the eyes of contemporary audiences, a homosexual relationship with a female-presenting man whose beauty pales in comparison to the Golden Age pinnacle of femininity, Marilyn Monroe.[28] Furthermore, as Daphne's fellow band member Joe/Josephine falls for Monroe's character Sugar, their interactions become increasingly perverse on his end, suggesting male cross-dressers only dressed as women in order to encroach on all-female spaces.[29] Transgender identities, whilst reaching unprecedented heights of media representation, were treated as a joke, or worse a threat.

But there was an alternative to the trans sexual deviant. Emily Skidmore has identified the role of figures such as Jorgensen in the construction of the 'good transsexual', an understanding of transgender as acceptable through the embodiment of norms of white womanhood.[30] Although ostracising trans men, Skidmore's theory is supported by reportage of male-to-female transitions which emphasised their new domestic role. Cowell wrote of the joys of developing a maternal instinct and learning to work in the home.[31] A 1962 *News of the World* feature on Ashley was adorned with images of her beautifying herself with makeup, clothes and jewellery, a model of mid-century consumerist femininity.[32] A picture of her applying lipstick could even pass as a wartime beauty advertisement. Transgender narratives were manipulated by the press to fit a version of hyper-femininity that hearkened back to a seemingly bygone era. This was seen further in the contrast between reports of white trans women and trans women of colour, not even accounting for the lack of trans male representation. C. Riley Snorton has traced histories of trans identity through a racial lens to show that press coverage of figures such as Carlett and Ava Betty Brown was made to represent the impossibility of a 'black Jorgensen'.[33] Stories of white trans women were often biographical whereas coverage of many black trans people was limited to their illegal behaviours, presenting them as unsympathetic deviants. When Ava Brown was found guilty of female impersonation, the *Daily Defender* doxed her by printing her address.[34] Oram's image of press reportage on sex change as a 'magical transformation' fails to interrogate the heterosexual 'good transsexual' narrative that journalists cultivated. Jorgensen's transformation from 'ex-GI' to 'Blonde Beauty' engendered her celebrity not as a transgressive figure but a 'spectacle of medical science's supposed ability to engineer both sexuality and gender in ways that produced conventional heterosexuality'.[35] It was likely these images, not contemporary medical and legal debate, that would have lasting power in the public imagination. Post-war society, unlike the simultaneously flamboyant and conventionally masculine styles of interwar ballroom attendees, had no patience for ambiguity.[36] Trans identities in the media communicated

that transgender identification required conforming to traditional sex roles.

It was with this press-invented understanding of transgender women upholding ideas of traditional femininity that certain feminists eventually took issue. By the mid-twentieth century, anthropologists and sociologists had begun to write of 'sex roles' to refer to culturally determined behaviour of women and men.[37] Given that the female 'sex role' had historically kept women in the home and denied them the opportunity to pursue lucrative careers, feminist activists wished to reject such cultural frameworks. Noticing differences in how they were treated upon presenting as female, many trans women identified with these struggles. In her memoir, Jan Morris noted that upon her surgical transition she discovered that 'men prefer women to be less informed, less able, less talkative' and was upset with her newly 'inferior' status.[38] But as feminists and lesbian activists shifted away from 'roles' and toward androgyny, their inclusion of trans women sometimes faded.[39] Trans lesbian singer and activist Beth Elliot was ousted from the Daughters of Bilitis on the grounds that she wasn't 'really' a woman, and her later appearance at the West Coast Lesbian Feminist Conference was protested by The Gutter Dykes.[40] In her particularly vicious keynotes speech, Robin Morgan compared Elliot's transgenderism, or 'when men wear drag', to blackface, refusing to use female pronouns and suggesting trans women create a separate movement 'instead of leeching off women who have spent their entire lives as women in women's bodies'.[41] Although misrepresentative of the second-wave feminist movement as a whole, Morgan's comments indicate the contemporary tension between the new prominence of trans women and early feminist theory. Later articulated in Janice Raymond's controversial The Transsexual Empire, the roots of what would now be seen as feminist transphobia somewhat

challenge conceptions of the post-war era as one of sexual revolution.[42] Particular sects of the feminist movement were willing to revolutionise understandings of gender and sex roles for the benefit and emancipation of cisgender women, but when it came to transgender women, rather than critique the medico-legal system that ascribed patriarchal values, they reverted back to assumptions of biological determinism.

There also seemed to be aspects of trans separatism within the late-century gay liberation movements. Early homophile groups distinguished less clearly between sex and gender. In a 1950 statement from the precursor to the Mattachine Society, members labelled themselves 'androgynes', suggesting an affinity with pre-war notions of homosexuality as a third sex.[43] By the 1960s, gay men and lesbians insisted on their separation from other sexual and gender subcultures, identifying gender-normativity as a key aspect of homosexual identity.[44] A conversation between four drag queens in pioneering documentary The Queen came to the consensus that if they were offered sex-change surgery, they would not go through with it, one even claiming 'it's the last thing I would want'.[45] Certain homophile organisations implemented clothing regulations for their membership; the aforementioned Daughters of Bilitis deplored butch styles as 'the worst publicity we can get'.[46] Some transgender people also insisted on their distinctiveness from what they saw as deviant homosexuality. In the News of the World piece, April Ashley looked back on a brief stint in London's underground queer scene with 'horror', claiming she was 'lucky to escape' this strange place of 'half-men and half-women'.[47] Here, Ashley fashions herself as morally upright, arguably paralleling a scene from Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness in which protagonist Stephen looks down upon the 'invert' characters at a queer-coded Parisian bar.[48] Ashley's

comments, and their similarity to a debatably trans novel of a much earlier period, suggests that even by the post-war era, homosexuality was still viewed as immoral and unrespectable. The later exclusion of homosexual men and women from the first modern trans organization, the Foundation for Personality Expression (FPE), suggests that certain trans pioneers aligned with Ashley's views.[49] Thus, separatist notions of both trans and gay liberationists reflected that whilst views on gender may have been changing ever so slowly, sexuality was still highly contentious. It is certainly not the case that all transgender people condemned homosexuality. But the medical and journalistic presentation of transgender as less morally abject than, or even a partial remedy to, homosexuality left little room for expression of this lest trans-identifying gay liberationists wished to be doubly marginalised. Overall, it seems the presence of transgender identities, or lack thereof, amongst early liberation groups reflected a failure to capitalise on the revolutionary potential of new understandings of gender. Feminist challenges, trans separatism and fears of being associated with sexual deviancy, limited the implications of that theoretical change.

The increasing prominence of transgender identities post-WWII appeared at first to transform the essentialist definitions of gender and sexuality that Western society was built upon. If individuals could 'change' their sex, then what made a man a man, and a woman a woman? By the late 1940s, such questions were increasingly being addressed face-on. The sexes were denaturalized and re-solidified as two separate categories: 'fixed' sex and 'mutable' gender. Nevertheless, transgender identities were often used as pawns in medical, journalistic and cultural discourses to reflect societal standards of masculine and feminine presentation. Particularly in the U.S., trans bodies were politicised amidst post-war anxieties surrounding masculinity and the perceived threat of homosexuality. At the same time, amongst mid-century activists, discussions of trans identity were accompanied by separatism, exposing the failure of second-wave feminists to truly abandon theories of biological determinism and the deviancy of homosexuality. As such, the presence of transgender identities in the post-war Western world was reflective of a reversion to traditional gender roles as much as it was a transformation of discursive understandings of sex and gender. Transgender presence had the potential to incite sexual revolution by upturning fixed notions of men and women. However, when interviewed about Cowell's sex-change in 1956, Colonel Barker's declaration that he 'suffered no 'tendency' to become a 'man'' was met by a society hellbent on categorising him into one side of the newly reinstated gender binary.[50]

References

[1] J. Vernon, '"For Some Queer Reason": The Trials and Tribulations of Colonel Barker's Masquerade in Interwar Britain', *Signs*, 26:1 (2000), p. 37.

[2] J. Meyerowitz, *How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States* (Cambridge, MT, 2002), pp. 111-112.

[3] H. Benjamin, *The Transsexual Phenomenon* (New York, 1966), p. 3.

[4] Meyerowitz, *How Sex Changed*, p. 102.

[5] D. O. Cauldwell, 'Psychopathia Transexualis', in S. Stryker and S. Whittle (eds.), *The Transgender Studies Reader* (New York, 2006), p. 40.

[6] Ibid., p. 42.

[7] Ibid., p. 43.

[8] Meyerowitz, *How Sex Changed*, pp. 42-43; Cauldwell, 'Psychopathia Transexualis', pp. 41-43.

[9] R. Ekins and D. King, 'Pioneers of Transgendering: The Popular Sexology of David O. Cauldwell', *The International Journal of Transgenderism*, 5:2 (2001), available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/cauldwell/cauldwell_01.htm [Accessed 5 May 2021].

[10] Cauldwell, 'Psychopathia Transexualis', p. 44.

[11] Meyerowitz, *How Sex Changed*, p. 109.

[12] C. Hamburger, G. K. Stürup, and E. Dahl-Iversen, 'Transvestism: Hormonal, Psychiatric,

8

[12] and Surgical Treatment', *Journal of American Psychiatry*, 152:5 (1953), p. 392.

[13] Meyerowitz, *How Sex Changed*, p. 126.

[20] Oram, *Her Husband Was a Woman!*, p. 155.

[21] Snorton, *Black on Both Sides*, p. 166; R. East, "Her' Secret is Out', *The Sunday People* (19 November 1961), p.10.

[22] L. Feinberg, *Transgender Warriors: Making History from Joan of Arc to RuPaul* (Boston, 1996), p. 12.

[23] Ibid., p. 6.

[24] S. Stryker, *Transgender History* (Berkeley, 2008), p. 44.

[25] 'House of Horror Stuns the Nation', *Life*, 43:23 (2 December 1957), p. 27; *Psycho*. Dir. Alfred Hitchcock. Perfs. Anthony Perkins, Janet Leigh. Film. Paramount Pictures, 1960.

[26] R. Bell-Metereau, *Transgender Cinema* (New Brunswick, 2019), pp. 21-22.

[27] Ibid., p. 20.

[28] *Some Like it Hot* (1959), Dir Billy Wilder. Perfs. Marilyn Monroe, Tony Curtis, Jack Lemon, United Artists.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Snorton, *Black on Both Sides*, p. 141.

[31] 'Roberta Cowell's Own Story', p. 13.

[32] A. Ashley, 'My Strange Life', *News of the World* (6 May 1962), pp. 2-3.

[33] Snorton, *Black on Both Sides*, p. 166.

[34] Ibid., p. 164.

[35] 'Ex-GI Becomes Blonde Beauty', *New York Daily News* (1 December 1952); S. Stryker, 'We Who Are Sexy: Christine Jorgensen's Transsexual Whiteness in the Postcolonial Philippines', *Social Semiotics*, 19:1 (2009), p. 81.

[36] M. Houlbrook, "Lady Austin's Camp Boys': Constituting the Queer Subject in 1930s London', *Gender and History*, 14:1 (2002), p. 49.

[37] J. Meyerowitz, 'A History of "Gender"', *The American Historical Review*, 113:5 (December 2008), p. 1354.

[38] J. Morris, *Conundrum* (New York, 1974), p. 149.

[39] Stryker, *Transgender History*, p. 100.

[40] Ibid., p. 103.

[41] R. Morgan, 'Lesbianism and Feminism: Synonyms or Contradictions?', *Lesbian Tide*, 2:10/11 (May-June 1973), p. 32.

[42] S. Whittle, 'Where Did We Go Wrong? Feminism and Trans Theory – Two Teams on the Same Side?', in S. Stryker and S. Whittle (eds.), *The Transgender Studies Reader* (New York, 2006), pp. 195-196.

[43] 'International Bachelors Fraternal Orders for Peace & Social Dignity' (1950).

[44] D. Valentine, *Imagining Transgender: An Ethnography of a Category* (Durham, NC, 2007), pp. 42-43.

[45] *The Queen* (1968), dir. Frank Simon. Doc. Grove Press.

[46] Valentine, *Imagining Transgender*, p. 46.

[47] Ashley, 'My Strange Life', p. 3.

[48] R. Hall, *The Well of Loneliness: Wordsworth Classics Edition* (Hertfordshire, 2014), pp. 352-353.

[49] Stryker, *Transgender History*, p. 55.

[50] Vernon, "For Some Queer Reason"', pp. 57-58.

Anne Herbert-Ortega
Investigating English Poverty

The work carried out by social investigators from 1870 to 1914 did a great deal to reveal the causes and extent of poverty in this period, but simultaneously fuelled greater division in public attitudes. The increased activity of social researchers seeking to find a way to remedy widespread poverty and irreligiosity such as Booth, Rowntree, Lady Bell and those working for the Charity Organisation Society certainly gathered a great deal of original evidence providing new insight into the extent of poverty and how working-class households survived. Booth and Rowntree used a methodology focusing on quantitative data, while qualitative methods were favoured by the Charity Organisation Society. Partly due to this split in methodology, their work engendered conflicting results, and further complicated public discourse around the fundamental causes of poverty: as the debate went, were the poor driven to poverty through structural failings or were they simply poor by choice?

The work of some social investigators in this period, especially Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree, provided convincing evidence to the public that poverty in England was far more extreme than previously thought in geographic spread and severity. In compiling *Life and Labour of the People in London* (1889-1903), Booth conducted research so detailed and extensive that it would be hard to question the accuracy of his startling conclusions. First, he demonstrated that more people were living in poverty than previously thought. Although he was not the first to indicate that poverty levels in London were very high, as the Social Democrat Federation's 1885 report suggested that 25% of London's working class were living in 'extreme poverty', Booth's conclusion that 30% of Londoners were living in poverty highlighted and took further the severity of poverty in London. Rowntree's poverty line meanwhile highlighted the severity of poverty in working-class households, showing how desperate those in 'primary' poverty were – they had no choice but to suffer.[1] Second, Booth's reports of high levels of poverty in South London were

a challenge to the contemporary view of East London as the established poor part of London. Booth's methodology made his social investigation uniquely powerful, as earlier, smaller studies with similar findings had been dismissed, their small sample size meaning that they were not taken seriously as representative studies.[2] Due to the gravity of his conclusions and his robust methodology, his report became widely referenced, particularly the figure of 30% poverty in London, adding to the contemporary understanding of the extent of poverty.[3]

More importantly perhaps, Rowntree's conclusion that 27.84% of York's inhabitants were living in poverty indicated that the problem of high levels of poverty was not exclusive to London.[4] The proximity of Rowntree's figure to Booth's one of 30% for London suggested that this level of poverty was typical of English towns/cities, and Rowntree consequently argued that 25-30% of town populations in the UK were living in poverty.[5] The originality of this conclusion is evident in the shock following Rowntree's publication of his first York study, when the *Pall Mall Gazette* described York as a 'quiet well-to-do place' nothing like London, and therefore incapable of having a similarly high level of poverty.[6] *Poverty: A Study of Town Life* was startling to the public – their difficulty in conceiving that there was immense suffering despite the UK's prosperity indicates how significantly Rowntree's social investigation in York contributed to better understanding the extent of poverty throughout the nation.[7] His research shifted perceptions of poverty away from the idea that London was an exceptional case, showing that it was in fact part of a larger problem of an urbanized nation.[8]

Similarly, the work of social investigators demonstrated that the typical Edwardian notion that rural poverty was much less significant than its urban equivalent was misplaced. Rowntree and Kendall's 1913 *How the Labourer Lives: A Study of the Rural Labour Problem* provided a picture of the reality of poverty amongst the rural working population, down to family budgets and detailed descriptions of living conditions. This challenged the mainstream Edwardian assumption of rural life as idyllic and demonstrated that the poor living conditions created by overcrowding and unsanitary housing were not unique to urban areas.[9] In this respect as well, therefore, social investigators were critical in challenging common perceptions of the spread and severity of poverty.

Social investigators in this period also added to some extent to understanding of the causes of poverty, although the ambiguity of their conclusions perhaps contributed to the perpetuation of the Victorian and Edwardian perceptions of the poor as generally 'undeserving'. The view that the poor made choices that kept them that way was commonly held in the 1880s. This can be seen in how, following Booth's speech in 1887 to the Royal Statistical Society on the living standards of inhabitants of Tower Hamlets, the statistician Leone Levi responded by asking 'who was a poor man?', implying that the poverty of the inhabitants of Tower Hamlets was through choices in lifestyle.[10] Booth and Rowntree challenged this view however, as both concluded that insufficient wages were the most significant cause of poverty. Rowntree, for example, found that of those living in 'primary' poverty, 51.96% of households had a chief breadwinner who was employed but received low wages.[11] This confirmed Booth's discovery that low wages were the main cause of poverty.

While these conclusions concerning the causes of poverty being published and circulated, however, they did not seem to greatly improve wider understanding of the causes of poverty, as the 1904 Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration presented the conclusion that poverty could be explained by behavioural - not structural - causes. To an extent, we could attribute this to methodological flaws.

Booth and Rowntree's social investigations certainly contained a degree of ambiguity due to their mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods: using qualitative data, they recorded poverty that could not be evidenced through calculation of income versus minimum expenditure but could be observed by visitors to a household.

Rowntree's label of 'secondary' poverty for this category was particularly problematic. Rowntree explained that he drew a distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' poverty in order to demonstrate to critics that poverty was caused at least to a certain extent by low income, indicating a structural problem of insufficient wages.[13] However, he lacked clarity in what these terms - particularly 'secondary' poverty - meant in practice, giving his critics grounds to disregard his findings on the significance of low wages. This may explain why Booth and Rowntree's views failed to have any visible impact on the 1904 Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, which interviewed Booth and Rowntree in person.[14] Its verdict (that the central problem was 'ignorance and neglect on the part of parents', to be solved with social education) passed over the conclusions of social investigators in favour of the Charity Organisation Society's view that the moral failings of the poor were responsible for unhealthy children.[15]

Social investigators in this period thus added greatly to understanding of poverty and working-class life, both through quantitative methods which revealed that poverty was much greater than previously thought and through qualitative research such as that of the Charity Organisation Society. Their studies painted a clearer picture of English working-class life around the turn of the century, and of the means used in poor households to survive. Despite their rigour, however, they did not shake public opinion on the fundamental causes of poverty sufficiently to alter contemporary government policy. Of course, the government not taking action in response to these new discoveries concerning poverty does not necessarily mean that opinions did not change: the impact of these studies was rather in fuelling greater dispute over the causes of poverty. Simply by questioning the standard view of writers like Bosanquet, Rowntree may have added to understanding that poverty was not solely caused by bad choices on the part of the poor, and drawn greater attention to issues such as low wages. Simultaneously, the findings of the Charity Organisation Society continued to reinforce the views of people like Helen Bosanquet and Margaret Loane that most of the poor were poor by choice, fuelling an unsettled, and unsettling, public debate on the fundamental causes of poverty.

References

[1] D. Vincent, *Poor Citizens: The State and the Poor in Twentieth-Century Britain* (Longman, 1991), p. 3.

[2] E. P. Hennock, 'The Measurement of Urban Poverty: from the Metropolis to the Nation', *Economic History Review*, 40:2 (1987), p. 212.

[3] Hennock, 'The Measurement of Urban Poverty', p. 211.

[4] Ibid., p. 1.

[5] Hennock, 'The Measurement of Urban Poverty', p. 1; Vincent, *Poor Citizens*, p. 1.

[6] *Pall Mall Gazette*, 17 December 1901, cited in Hennock, 'The Measurement of Urban Poverty', p. 213.

[7] Vincent, Poor Citizens, p. 1.

[8] Hennock, 'The Measurement of Urban Poverty', p. 208-227.

[9] G. Tate, 'Kendall, Emma Goldworth [May] (1861–1943), Writer', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.* (2018).

[10] R. McKibbin, 'Class and Poverty in Edwardian England', in *The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880-1950* (Clarendon, 1990), p. 167.

[11] S. Rowntree, *Poverty: A Study of Town Life* (1901).

[12] J. H. Veit-Wilson, 'Paradigms of Poverty: A Rehabilitation of B.S. Rowntree', J*ournal of Social Policy*, 15:1 (1986), p. 69.

[13] Vincent, *Poor Citizens*, p. 36.

[14] Ibid., p. 35.

[15] Ibid.

Henry G. Miller
Democratic Currents in Utilitarian Politics

A recurring theme within utilitarianism was the idea that the current system of government was inimical to achieving the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people in the long run and thus that reform was necessary.[1] Proposals to solve this often took the form of democratic reform. During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, some of the most pivotal figures in utilitarianism were Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and his son, John Stuart Mill. Though not the only major figures within utilitarianism during this period, these three were responsible for writing some of its most important works, especially regarding democratic reforms. The idea of a more representative form of government was a prominent one, but the extent to which it was supported fluctuated throughout the period. Foreign events, such as the French Revolution, the burgeoning democracy in the United States, and, later still, the wave of revolutions in Europe in the 1820s, both deterred and stimulated democratic thought in utilitarians. Therefore, the evidence suggests that while there was indisputably scepticism of democracy within the ranks of the utilitarians, changing views and leading figures ultimately saw the utilitarians become progressively more democratic.

Jeremy Bentham's changing views on the value of democracy significantly shaped his utilitarian teachings throughout his life. Although not the founder of utilitarianism, he was nevertheless an important figure in its early development. Much of Bentham's writing was dedicated to legal reform, but he also wrote several influential works on governmental and electoral reform, making him useful in ascertaining the extent to which the utilitarians were democrats.[2] One of his earliest works, *A Fragment on Government* (1776), explains Bentham's ideas about the interests of community and government, as well as the importance of understanding the needs of the individual in order to speak for the needs of the many.[3] This indicates that utilitarianism had inclinations towards democracy from

the very beginning. Bentham was initially supportive of the French Revolution, which he saw as a triumph of democracy.[4] This reinforced his belief that a system run by the people was feasible. Another example which illustrates that the early utilitarians were democratically oriented is the fact that Bentham held radical views on democratic reform, including ideas about female suffrage, franchise extension, and secret ballot.[5] To what extent he believed that the same was applicable to Britain at this point is, however, uncertain, which limits the efficacy of extending his views to utilitarians more broadly. Schofield argues that Bentham believed such democratic reforms were advantageous for Britain as well as France, and that both countries would benefit from the subsequent increased happiness.[6] It is known that at this time, Bentham thought the electoral system in Britain needed to change, and that franchise expansion was a key part of this.[7] This suggests that, in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, Bentham was in favour of democracy in both France and England, supporting the argument that the utilitarians did hold democratic ideals at this time.

After the French Revolution took a more radical turn in 1792, however, Bentham became more critical of the new regime and popular rule in general - he was convinced that the common people had proved themselves incapable of governing themselves.[8] For example, his 1795 work 'Nonsense Upon Stilts' criticises the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, describing it as illogical, contradictory, and, ultimately, inimical to the utilitarian core principle of greatest happiness.[9] This critique clearly indicates that Bentham had lost faith in the people's ability to govern themselves. By the end of the eighteenth century, the utilitarians had thus taken a step back from their previously strong support for democracy. Indeed, Bentham went to great lengths to distance himself from democracy in

the following decade, though he also rejected more conservative-leaning groups, deriding the arguments that both Paine and Burke made.[10] Although the utilitarians became more sceptical of democracy during the late eighteenth century, then, they were still in favour of limited reform. The evidence suggests that it was primarily the dramatic events of the French Revolution that sparked utilitarian doubts about democracy.

A decade later, Bentham's opinions had somewhat mellowed, indicating a wider shift among utilitarians. He once again began to propose democratic reform within the government, his unpublished 1809 catechism on parliamentary reform signalling a renewed interest in democracy. Alongside measures to ensure that members of Parliament were sufficiently competent, he included numerous articles on electoral reform: an end to 'rotten boroughs', a secret ballot, and lowered requirements for entry to the franchise were amongst his objectives.[11] Many of these proposals aligned with his beliefs at the beginning of the period before the events of the French Revolution had dampened his enthusiasm for democracy, suggesting that time had rekindled his desire for governmental reform. Following the Napoleonic Wars, public discontent with the current system of government was on the rise. Furthermore, mass unemployment compounded by a failed harvest in 1816 saw an increase in support for political radicalism.[12] Bentham wrote two works on parliamentary reform during this period - his *Plan of Parliamentary Reform* and *Radical Reform Bill*, written in 1817 and in 1819 respectively. By this point, he had moved away from many of the restrictions of his 1809 work, resulting in far more radical propositions. He had become significantly more supportive of franchise expansion, with the only real restriction to the franchise in his new proposals being the ability to read. Bentham argued that giving people the opportunity to vote would incentivise

the upper classes to improve education amongst the lower classes. Thus, they could make more informed decisions on who to elect, ultimately improving society for all.[13] In addition, he acknowledged that it was simply unrealistic to try and deny the franchise to the working classes once franchise expansion had begun because this would only serve to antagonise them in the future. This indicates that the utilitarians had become more supportive of democracy, if only for pragmatic reasons. Across the Atlantic, the United States of America had demonstrated that despite the debacle of France's experiment with democracy, a nation could function under democratic rule, and this reassured Bentham that such hopes were not beyond reach for Britain.[14] Again, the utilitarians were evidently influenced by foreign events, and they maintained an interest in democracy during the early nineteenth century. However, the utilitarians were still cautious of widespread democratic reform, for which reason many of them considered Bentham's works too radical. For example, Bentham's attack on the monarchy as well as other institutions which he derided as 'peddling delusion', including the Church and the press, alienated many of his more moderate supporters. Such supporters were often sympathetic to reforms but remained unwilling to go as far as to condemn fundamental institutions of British society.[15] Therefore, it is important to note that the extent to which the utilitarians were becoming more democratic during this period was not necessarily as great as Bentham's works might suggest.

Bentham was, however, far from the only utilitarian to propose ideas of democratic governmental reform during the post-Napoleonic period. First associated with Bentham and the utilitarians in 1808, James Mill swiftly dedicated himself to Bentham's teachings and became a strong proponent of his ideas.[16] This was not all he contributed to utilitarianism - he also published many utilitarian works of

his own. Indeed, some historians attribute Bentham's renewed interest in democracy in the early nineteenth century to the influence of Mill. Halévy, for instance, argues that Bentham's descent into radicalism was a result of his involvement with Mill.[17] However, the extent to which this was the case is questionable, given Bentham's previous democratic leanings. Dinwiddy argues that it was not the influence of Mill, but rather his disillusionment with the judiciary system, that had caused his return to democratic reform. It is known that Bentham had a background in legal theory, and that he was dissatisfied with the current system, including the connections between lawyers and the government that had made its position unassailable. Although indisputably influential to Bentham and utilitarianism more broadly, this suggests that it was hardly Mill who convinced Bentham of the continued value of democracy.[18]

In an 1820 contribution to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* entitled 'Government', Mill described the three traditional forms of government: the democratic, the aristocratic, and the monarchic. He argued that whereas the latter two were inimical to the good of the people, a democracy in the classical sense was also unworkable. Consequently, a representative system was required.[19] Additionally, Mill discussed the long-standing superiority of the British constitution. 'English exceptionalism' was the idea that the British method of blending all three forms of government, with the monarch, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons each playing a part, was ideal, with each body performing checks on the others.[20] Mill criticised this concept, arguing that the House of Commons lacked both the power and the independence necessary to act as an effective check to the monarch and the Lords.[21] He subsequently proposed a new representative system to replace the current system within Parliament. Annual elections would ensure that those less

fit for government were removed before too much damage was done, whereas unlimited terms meant that those who proved competent were able to continue their good work.[22] This was similar to Bentham's earlier propositions, showing how democratic ideas were commonplace amongst utilitarians.

However, the form of democracy that Mill proposed was considerably more limited than that of Bentham, especially in his later works. The presence of both age and property qualification for the electorate meant that, ultimately, this would only see the franchise extended to the affluent middle classes. Only men above forty years of age who possessed a certain amount of property were eligible to vote under his system.[23] This was a calculated move on the part of Mill, designed to simultaneously appease the moderates within the ranks of the utilitarians and show that they were still intent on reform. Indeed, Loizides argues that Mill was willing to compromise his genuine and more radical views in order to make even minor progress in the fight for reform.[24] The middle classes, who desired reform but were cautious of the more wide-reaching proposals made by radicals like Henry Hunt and William Cobbett, proved a receptive audience for such ideas, showing that the utilitarian support base was still not in favour of full-fledged democracy.[25] Although Mill was more conservative than Bentham in his propositions for parliamentary reform, the fact that two leading figures within utilitarianism both believed in democratic changes signals that, by this point, democracy had gained a position of importance it had not previously held amongst utilitarians. Mill's refinement and mellowing of Bentham's radical proposals proved more palatable to the middle classes who had desired reform but were wary of the extent of Bentham's designs. Thus, the evidence suggests that while proposals for parliamentary reform were made, the rising prominence of radicals tempered the

desire for widespread democratic reform. This limits the degree to which one can consider the utilitarians democrats in the years following the Napoleonic Wars.

James Mill's son, John Stuart, also went on to become a leading proponent of utilitarianism, though his views strongly differed from those of his father. The decades following Mill's *Encyclopaedia Britannica* entry saw the rise of the utilitarian group that was later referred to as the 'philosophic radicals', as well as the growing role of John Stuart Mill as an important figure within utilitarianism. In his early decades, the younger Mill diverged significantly from the utilitarianism that Bentham and his father had set out, finding himself more drawn to Romanticism than to the ideologies he was raised to believe in.[26] This departure from Bentham's teachings initially saw him condemned by many utilitarians, which suggests that, at this point, the younger Mill's views were not indicative of utilitarians as a group.[27] The Whig historian Thomas Macaulay's piece in the *Edinburgh Review* attacking the elder Mill's 'Government' in 1829 also had an impact on John Stuart Mill.[28] Even though he did not agree with Macaulay in every aspect, Macaulay's words nevertheless affected the younger Mill, who later wrote his own critique of his father's work, challenging its central belief that electoral changes would solve the problems of government.[29] This is another example which shows that the utilitarians did not have a consensus on democratic views during this period. By the 1830s, Mill had returned to utilitarianism, citing the poems of Wordsworth in his autobiography as having restored him and positioning him to push for more radical democratic reforms than before.[30]

The philosophic radicals arose from the middle-class Benthamite radicalism that followed the repressive measures enacted by the British government with the Six Acts in 1819. Their primary goal was to reduce the influence of the aristocracy, which they

viewed as central to many of the problems that afflicted the government and Britain as a whole.[31] This was very much in line with what both Bentham and Mill had written, demonstrating that concerns over democratic reform were central for the utilitarians throughout this period. With several Members of Parliament in their ranks, the philosophic radicals were well positioned to lobby for reform from within Parliament itself.[32] Naturally, their demands were radical and reminiscent of earlier drastic utilitarian proposals, especially those outlined in Bentham's works from 1817 and 1819; the group wanted to abolish the monarchy and the House of Lords but was in favour of universal franchise and a secret ballot.[33] This suggests that in the late 1820s and 1830s, the utilitarians had become more radical in their proposals for a more democratic system of government, though their concerns had coalesced around a focus on the problem of the aristocracy. A major turning point for the utilitarians was the passing of the Great Reform Act of 1832. Although it provided many modest concessions, including limited expansion of the franchise, it was criticised for falling short of what the group had initially pushed for.[34] Ironically, the moderate concessions resembled much of what was originally proposed by Bentham in 1809.[35] This shows that the utilitarians had become increasingly democratic by the time of the implementation of the Great Reform Act.

As a result of this, the philosophic radicals turned on the Whig government, which they saw as too tied to the aristocracy to carry out meaningful reform.[36] For most of the 1830s, the philosophic radicals spoke frequently both within and outside Parliament, taking advantage of their control of the *Westminster Review*, and later, owing to John Stuart Mill's position as editor, also the London Review, to publicise and propagate their radical beliefs.[37] This shows that with the younger Mill's prominence, the utilitarians were still dedicated to democratic reform and determined to make themselves heard. However, they lacked the numbers to truly influence the Parliament, and thus, despite their vocality, they accomplished little in the way of reform.[38] By 1840, with a noticeable lack of progress in influencing wider governmental policy during the second Melbourne ministry, the group came to an end as a coherent body representing utilitarian ideals.[39] John Stuart Mill largely abandoned efforts related to parliamentary reform, focusing instead on more philosophical concerns of utilitarianism.[40] According to Corcoran, John Stuart Mill had become pessimistic about the prospect of democracy ever reaching England in the same way that it had spread across mainland Europe.[41] This suggests that the lack of progress and the fragmentation of the philosophic radicals caused the utilitarians to give up on their ideas of democracy. However, it is known that despite his departure from political writings, Mill remained a firm believer that democracy was achievable for Britain. Indeed, he still described himself as 'a Radical and Democrat for Europe, and especially England' in his 1873 autobiography, which suggests that he still believed in democracy for England.[42] In addition, Mill's *Considerations on Representative Government*, published in 1861, showed that he was still devising plans for representative government even in his later life.[43] Therefore, the evidence suggests that by the second half of the nineteenth century, the utilitarian lack of success in bringing about a more democratic system for the British government saw their focus turn to more philosophical concerns. However, this is not to say that this diminished their desire for democracy.

Although there were often significant doctrinal differences between Bentham and the elder and younger Mills, they all believed in democracy and the need to reform the current system of government.

Unwilling and unable to take advantage of the working classes, who favoured more extreme radicals, the utilitarians grew to become a group of largely middle-class radicals. The utilitarians were initially cautious but became increasingly radical in their desire for widespread democratic reform as they grew in prominence. Despite the increased attention and influence the utilitarians gained in the following decades, they still lacked the numbers to enact significant changes. Incapable of achieving their goals, their efforts as a concentrated bloc ended, with John Stuart Mill returning to the more philosophical utilitarian quandaries rather than practical reforms. Ultimately, it was only with the rise of the Liberal Party that the utilitarians saw many of the democratic reforms they had sought fulfilled. Although the utilitarians had become more democratically inclined by the end of the period, it is important to note that this was never the primary goal of their philosophy, but rather one more way to see their objectives achieved.

References

[1] J. E. Crimmins, 'Bentham and Utilitarianism in the Early Nineteenth Century', in B. Eggleston and D. Miller (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 39-40.

[2] F. Rosen, 'From Jeremy Bentham's Radical Philosophy to J. S. Mill's Philosophic Radicalism', in G. Stedman Jones and G. Clays (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 258-259.

[3] J. Bentham, *A Fragment on Government* (1776), pp. 36-38.

[4] P. Schofield, 'Jeremy Bentham, the French Revolution and Political Radicalism', *History of European Ideas*, 30:4 (2004), pp. 385-386.

[5] Ibid., pp. 388-389.

[6] P. Schofield, *Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham* (Oxford, 2006), p. 109.

[7] Schofield, 'Jeremy Bentham, the French Revolution and Political Radicalism', p. 387.

[8] P. Schofield, 'A Defence of Jeremy Bentham's Critique of Natural Rights', in X. Zhai and M. Quinn (eds.), *Bentham's Theory of Law and Public Opinion* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 211-212.

[9] J. Bentham, 'Nonsense Upon Stilts', in P. Schofield, C. Pease-Watkin and C. Blamires (eds.), *The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: Rights, Representation and Reform – Nonsense Upon Stilts and Other Writings on the French Revolution* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 322-324.

[10] Schofield, 'Jeremy Bentham, the French Revolution and Political Radicalism', p. 397.

[11] J. R. Dinwiddy, 'Bentham's Transition to Political Radicalism, 1809-10', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 36:4 (1975), pp. 690-691.

[12] E. J. Evans, The Forging of the Modern State: Early Industrial Britain 1783-1870 (London, 1983), pp. 181-182.

[13] Dinwiddy, 'Bentham's Transition to Political Radicalism, 1809-1', p. 695.

[14] H. L. A. Hart, 'Bentham and the United States of America', *The Journal of Law & Economics*, 19:3 (October 1976), pp. 561-563.

[15] A. Goldworth, 'The Sympathetic Sanction and Sinister Interest in Bentham's Utilitarianism', *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 4:1 (January 1987), pp. 71-72.

[16] B. Mazlish, 'James Mill and the Utilitarians', *Daedalus*, 97:3 (1968), pp. 1037-1038.

[17] Dinwiddy, 'Bentham's Transition to Political Radicalism, 1809-10', pp. 683-684.

[18] Schofield, *Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham*, pp. 110-111.

[19] J. Mill, 'Government', in M. Napier (ed.), *Supplement to the IV, V, and VI Editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. IV* (Edinburgh, 1824), pp. 492-493.

[20] Bentham, *A Fragment on Government*, pp. 72-74.

[21] Mill, 'Government', pp. 496-497.

[22] Ibid., p. 499.

[23] Ibid., pp. 500-501.

[24] A. Loizides, *James Mill's Utilitarian Logic and Politics* (New York, 2019), pp. 204-205.

[25] F. G. Wilson, 'Public Opinion and the Middle Class', *The Review of Politics* (1955), pp. 488-489.

[26] H. R. West, 'Mill and Utilitarianism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century', in B. Eggleston and D. Miller (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 61-62.

[27] J. Viner, 'Bentham and J. S. Mill: The Utilitarian Background', *The American Economic Review*, 39:2 (1949), p. 373.

[28] A. Loizides, 'James Mill on the Conditions of Good Government', *History of Political Thought*, 38:2 (2017), pp. 268-270.

[29] R. Harrison, 'John Stuart Mill, Mid-Victorian', in G. Stedman Jones and G. Clays (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 299-300.

[30] C. F. G. Masterman, *The Condition of England* (London, 1909), pp. 105-106.

[31] R. S. Neale, 'Class and Class-Consciousness in Early Nineteenth-Century England: Three Classes or Five?', *Victorian Studies*, 12:1 (1968), p. 8.

[32] Ibid., p. 17.

[33] R. Cranford Pratt, 'The Benthamite System of Democracy', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 21:1 (February 1955), pp. 25-26.

[34] C. Barker, *Educating Liberty: Democracy and Aristocracy in J. S. Mill's Political Thought* (Rochester, 2018), pp. 132-134.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Rosen, 'From Jeremy Bentham's Radical Philosophy to J. S. Mill's Philosophic Radicalism', p. 277.

[37] Ibid., pp. 276-277.

[38] L. Stephen, *The English Utilitarians Volume 3: John Stuart Mill* (Cambridge, 1900), pp. 31-32.

[39] Ibid., p. 39.

[40] Ibid., p. 45-46.

[41] P. Corcoran, 'John Stuart Mill's Political Pessimism', *The European Legacy.* 24:5 (2019), pp. 472-473.

[42] J. Stuart Mill, *Autobiography* (1873), p. 171.

[43] J. Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), pp. 21-22.

Melanie Perrin
Queer Visibility in Interwar Britain

Interwar Britain is a period often overlooked by historians of gay and lesbian – and later queer – histories insofar as the existence of a vibrant queer community affecting change is concerned. For many writing during a time of the AIDs epidemic, and the negative fallout from Thatcher's Section 28, the idea of a flourishing queer culture in the 1920s or 1930s simply did not fit in to a whiggish narrative of gay liberation emerging after an intense post-WWII period of reaction.[1] By separating an analysis of the prominence of queer cultures from linear narratives of progression, we can in the Interwar period find a diverse sense of 'queerness' interacting with broader society and taking steps to affect change, even if this was proven to then be short-lived by the onset of war.

This essay builds on the works of George Chauncey and Matt Houlbrook who argue for the existence of a flourishing and diverse 'gay' world during the interwar period, primarily centred around the urban metropolises of New York and London respectively.[2] The very narrative framework through which Chauncey and Houlbrook analyse these interwar queer communities, as a 'subculture', suggests that queerness remained a subtext during this period.[3] This essay looks to move beyond simply the question of the existence of these communities, and to examine instead their interaction with and visibility to broader society. It will argue that though devices of code, masquerade and double-speak were commonly employed by those who identified as queer, the dissemination of their writings and stories into broader society affirmed the visibility of some aspects of queerness within the broader public space.

Interactions between queer culture and broader society will be emphasized in the press and in media attention. Examining print publications of *Men Only* and gossip

columns in the tabloid press provides insight into not only the existence, but also the visibility, of queer authorship and readership. Similarly, looking at processes of public prosecution evinces such interactions. As Heather Love argues, we should not overlook the severe physical and psychological taxations and painful 'archives of feeling' these experiences ultimately caused to the queer community. Nevertheless, it is possible to view trial records, police proceedings and mass media attention as an affirming tool of visible queer presence.[4] By analysing the obscenity trial of *The Well of Loneliness* and the raid of the Holland Park ballroom, we can find both a consolidation of an overtly visible queer identity, and a simultaneous challenge by these queer actors who were, whether actively or unconsciously, driving for some form of change.

'Queerness' during the interwar period cannot be viewed as one straightforward category of sexual or gender identity; neither was there a consensus amongst contemporaries as to who belonged in such a category. Self-defined 'queerness' was also often at odds with the label of 'queer' given by 'normative' society to actors deemed 'effeminate' or subverting gendered norms. Those who engaged in homosexual acts and those who subverted gendered forms of expression were not always one and the same, and though this distinction was easily made by the queer community – opting for 'queer' to represent homosexual attraction, and other forms such as 'quean' for those visibly subverting gendered norms – this distinction was not made by broader society, who often used 'queer' interchangeably with other terms like 'quean', 'pansy' or 'fairy'.[5] Building on Valentine's assertion that 'gender and sexuality cannot be ontologically separated', this essay adopts a consciously broad understanding of the notion of 'queerness'.[6] Instead of discussing gay or lesbian cultures as individual entities with their own distinct chronologies, we should

seek to dismantle the works of historians such as Chauncey who have often used 'queer' synonymously with 'gay'. Indeed, Doan argues it is exactly this 'looseness' which forms the foundation of 'queerness'.[7] By focusing on one broad interwar 'queer' culture, we can then include analysis of broader 'queer moment[s]', such as the publication and obscenity trial of Radclyffe Hall's Well of Loneliness.

An analysis of mainstream print publications allow some insight into how one form of queer culture infiltrated and engaged visibly with broader society. *Men Only* is one example of a print source engaging primarily with the wider public, but nonetheless concertedly appealing to the queer consumer. Indeed, Justin Bengry argues that the ways in which this publication appealed simultaneously to both a masculine heterosexual, and a queer readership through code or double speak, was understood and acknowledged by its readership.[8]

This men's lifestyle magazine affirmed queer presence in the public space through the recognisability of its cartooned representations of some aspect of queer life, and its deliberate use of double-entendres in its content to appeal simultaneously to a heterosexual and queer audience. Regarding the former, a cartoon in the February 1936 edition depicted two fashionable men crossing the road, with tell-tale waved hair, while one responds to a visibly angry driver honking his car with 'that's sweet of you'.[9] This representation affirms a visual presence of queer life which would have been recognisable to all readers of *Men Only*, albeit limited to a 'queerness' implying sexual orientation based on performativity and gender subversion, indicated through bold fashion, make-up and grooming.

Content containing consciously queer undertones was also not difficult to find in this magazine. Its May 1937 Coronation edition, for example, featured a cartoon of two guardsmen, both complementing

Figure 1 - Godfrey Winn, 'Personality Parade: Godfrey Winn Today Asks You a Question', *The Daily Mirror* (18 June 1937), p. 11

each other's swords, held erect.[10] A sign of both sexual virility and queer desire, this cartoon could appeal to both the masculine heterosexual and queer audience. Despite use of subtext and code, this queer appeal was also not invisible to many of *Men Only*'s 'normative' readership. One female reader, perhaps not representative of the majority audience of the magazine, critiqued the titillating jokes of the magazine, adding that 'whoever likes the modern pansy, it certainly isn't women.'[11] Recognition of this queer audience therefore suggests that queerness such more than simple subtext in this respect, and with a readership of more than 100,000 in June 1937 - assumed to be significantly greater due to its pocket-book size and nude content which often circulated among social circles – one cannot dismiss *Men Only*'s influence in this visibility as insignificant.[12]

Moreover, considering the role of queer writers for mainstream audiences, suggests ways in which visibility not only existed but could effect change. Linkoff's examination of the gossip writers of the popular tabloid press found many of them to have been homosexual, or exert homosexual tendencies, which he suggests was due to their ability to cross between the 'queer' or 'other' world and 'normative' society.[13] Despite concerted effort to hide or 'mask' their sexuality from their readership, their presence as queer subjects was nonetheless visible to their employers, and could be guessed at by readers who engaged in the discourse of mystery cultivated by these writers. Some even, through their limited means, used their platforms to challenge ideas of 'normalcy' which fell in-line with modern queer agenda.

By analysing the language of these gossip columns, it becomes evident that gossip writers avoided discussion of their own sexuality, though that does not mean it was not often alluded to. Godfrey Winn, one of the most prolific gossip columnists of the interwar period, known for his 'Personality Parade' spreads in *The Daily Mirror*, was one such gossip writer who frequently hinted as his own 'secret' with which he often teased his predominantly female audience, or used as a device of relatability. His column from 18 June 1937 brings this 'secret' to the forefront of his reader's attention. Winn asks his readers 'If you died tomorrow, would you take to the grave some secret that has been like a shadow in your life for years?'[14] The repetition of 'shadow' throughout the column, accompanied by a picture of Winn staring contemplatively off to the side while his shadow looms behind him as something bigger than himself, appears to allude to his own sexuality, something he cannot

portray outright to his readers through his column. He later reassures his reader, drawing on sociological terms of 'human mechanism', that there is 'no such thing as a completely normal man or woman'.[15] Focusing merely on the language of gossip columns suggests that the sexuality or queerness of gossip columnists was only ever alluded to through the language of masks or, in Winn's case, 'shadows'.

Nonetheless, the known sexuality of these writers was far from invisible, especially among Fleet Street Circles. Lord Beaverbrook, press baron and owner of the Daily Express, among other publications, once paid the legal expenses and for press silence towards his gossip columnist Tom Driberg who had been tried for acts of 'gross indecency', suggesting that even the employers were aware of their writers' relationship to the queer world.[16] As such, we can infer that, despite their use of code and allusion, queer gossip writers did not feel the need to hide all aspects of their queer selves in their participation in mainstream media. Countering the myths of invisibility and isolation, queer gossip columnists even often helped one another into these positions – aided by their prominently upper-class Oxbridge connections. Furthermore, some such as Winn can be seen to affect their own change, as small instances of didactic purpose can sometimes be seen edging into these gossip columns. Winn's challenging of what counts as 'normal', for example, can be read as a manifestation of radical queer agenda – if subconsciously so – disrupting attempts at categorisation, an effort continued by queer theorists today. The policing of queer presence during the interwar period evinces the complex visibilities of queer communities. Though the aim of trials for obscenity or 'gross indecency' was often to stamp out or punish those who choose not to conform or to visibly articulate signs of their queerness, in reality prosecution often had the opposite effect. By looking at the media attention surrounding both the obscenity trial of Radclyffe Hall's *The Well of Loneliness*, and trials of the attended of the Holland Park Avenue Ballroom, we can see how this interactive discourse between the queer world and the 'normative' public legitimised queer presence as more than simply a hidden subtext. Radclyffe Hall's publication of *The Well of Loneliness* in 1928 spurred widespread public discussion of its 'morality', notably by critic James Douglas who wrote an article in *The Sunday Express* entitled 'A Book that must be Suppressed' calling for the book to 'at once be withdrawn.'[17] Douglas' wish was granted, and the subsequent obscenity trial saw the novel banned in Britain. However, the media attention afforded to Hall's novel ironically saw its content reach a wider audience than previously possible. Some discussions were positive in tone and acknowledged a relatability to the novel's content which countered the myths of queer isolation, affirming the presence of female queerness in a way none of its precedents could rival. Others, such as an article in *Time and Tide* magazine, declared their distaste for the book, but acknowledged that following Douglas' article 'several hundred extra copies were immediately ordered by leading libraries' before the novel was banned.[18] This article also opened discussions surrounding freedom of press, within which it was argued that 'we cannot allow our literature to be purged of all books which are unsuitable for leaving on the nursery table'.[19] As a left-wing feminist periodical associated with the Six Point Group, the opinions expressed in Time and Tide cannot be said to be representative of the majority. Nonetheless, its commentary opened up a discussion surrounding freedom of expression – which Cory argues is the most important cause for change in promoting the queer agenda.[20] Radclyffe Hall, a queer actor, was therefore the catalyst of this agitation for change, writing her novel to engage an audience as to the plight of the female invert, but it was spe-

cifically the policing of the novel's contents and subsequent media attention it drew which created what Alan Sinfield terms a 'queer moment', furthering its cause and intensifying its success in bringing visibility to this one aspect of a diverse queer culture.[21]

The police raid and subsequent trial of those attending the private ballroom at Holland Park Avenue in December 1932 also attracted mass media attention, providing mainstream insight into an otherwise private display of interwar queerness. Scores of people found themselves attracted to the courts in the hours following the raid, and many sources of popular press reported on the events.[22] Distinct connections were made between the apparent gender inversion of many of the participants and assumptions of their sexuality. The *Morning Advertiser* was quick to point out the presence of 'men dressed as women' in their headline, and the Illustrated London News identified the ballroom members as self-defined 'queenies' with 'lipsticks and powder puffs'.[23] Despite a lack of explicit discussion of the sexuality of these men, the subject was alluded to through lengthy descriptions of their subverted gender performances, and would have been understood by readers, cementing this image of a visible queer culture in the eyes of the public. Lady Austin, the host of the ballroom, reportedly defended his assertion that 'there is nothing wrong in that […] it is what we call real love man for man.'[24] This directly challenges what Chauncey terms the 'myth' of internalisation, that there was no attempt made by Austin to hide his queerness from the enforcers of the law, furthering the open visibility of this flamboyant side of queer culture.[25]

As such we can suggest that the interwar queer culture should not be dismissed simply as a subtext, but rather had aspects of complex visibility in the press in particular. By assessing language, interaction and policing of queer actors, we see engagement between the queer world and 'normative' society, in some cases challenging the existence of, or what it means, to be 'normal'. Visibility in itself can be viewed as a form of activism and process of change, and so for many queer actors, by being visible and existing outside of a mere subculture, they consciously or subconsciously enact on society forces of liberalisation, discussion and freedom of expression, all deemed critical to the queer agenda. This visibility, however, was not the only experience within what was a diverse interwar queer personhood. Most visible was the flamboyant 'quean', mostly representative of the white male working class, with some middle or upper-class members opting for both shadow and visibility as and when they chose. Nonetheless, irrespective of representation, visibility of a loose 'queerness' was a prominent feature of the Interwar metropolis, and some queer actors were able to affect change, even if this was then to be suppressed or forgotten by the onset of war.

References

[1] G. Chauncey, *Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture and the Makings of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940* (1994), p. 9.
[2] Chauncey, *Gay New York*, p. 1; M. Houlbrook, *Queer London: Perils and Pleasures in the Sexual Metropolis, 1918-1957* (Chicago, 2005), p. 3.
[3] Chauncey, *Gay New York*, p. 25.
[4] H. Love, *Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History* (Massachussets, 2007), p. 4
[5] Chauncey, *Gay New York*, pp. 15-16; Houlbrook, *Queer London*, p. 7.
[6] R. Kunzel, 'The Power of Queer History', *American Historical Review*, 123, 5 (2018), p. 1580.
[7] L. Doan, 'A Peculiarly Obscure Subject: The Missing 'Case' of the Heterosexual' in Brian Lewis (ed.) *British Queer History: New Approaches and Perspectives* (Manchester, 2013), p. 103.
[8] J. Bengry, 'Courting the Pink Pound: Men Only and the Queer Consumer, 1935-39', *History Workshop Journal*, 68 (2009), p. 123.
[9] *Men Only* (February 1936), in Bengry, 'Courting the Pink Pound', p. 132.
[10] *Men Only* (May 1937), in Bengry, 'Courting the

Pink Pound', p. 135.

[11] *Men Only* (August 1936), p. 14, in Bengry, 'Courting the Pink Pound', p. 142.

[12] Bengry, 'Courting the Pink Pound', p. 129.

[13] R. Linkoff, " 'These Young Men Who Come Down from Oxford and Write Gossip': Society Gossip, Homosexuality, and the Logic of Revelation in the Interwar Popular Press', in Lewis (ed.). *British Queer History*, p. 120.

[14] G. Winn, 'Personality Parade: Geoffrey Winn Today Asks You a Question', *The Daily Mirror* (18 June 1937), p. 11.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Linkoff, "'These Young Men'", p. 119.

[17] A. Oram and A. Turnbull, *The Lesbian History Sourcebook: Love and Sex Between Women in Britain from 1780-1970* (2001), pp. 184-186.

[18] Ibid., p. 188.

[19] Ibid., p. 189.

[20] D. W. Cory, *The Homosexual in America: A Subjective Approach* (New York, 1951).

[21] L. Doan, *Fashioning Sapphism: The Origins of a Modern Lesbian Culture* (New York, 2001), p. xii.

[22] M. Houlbrook, "Lady Austin's Camp Boys': Constituting the Queer Subject in 1930s London', *Gender and History*, 14, 1 (2002), p. 31.

[23] 'Numbered Prisoners at Old Bailey: Recorder's Stern Reproof to Men in the Dock: Improper Performances Charge', *Morning Advertiser* (21 February 1933), p. 3, in Houlbrook 'Lady Austin's Camp Boys', p. 32; 'Alleged "Scandalous Performances" at a West End House. What the Police Saw', *The Illustrated Police News* (January 19 1933), p. 2.

[24] Houlbrook, 'Lady Austin's Camp Boys', p. 35.

[25] Chauncey, *Gay New York*, p. 4.

Elena Russo
The Originality of Nicholas Hawksmoor

Nicholas Hawksmoor (1661-1736) was born in a yeoman farming family in Nottinghamshire. He received his early education at a grammar school nearby in Dunham, before becoming a clerk in Yorkshire. When he was eighteen, he moved to London and became the domestic clerk of Christopher Wren (1632-1723), one of the major English architects involved in the process of rebuilding London after the Great Fire of 1666.[1] Thanks to Wren, Hawksmoor entered into contact with architectural practice, often having a prominent role in helping his master with his commissions. Through the 1680s and 1690s, he assisted Wren in the construction of outstanding projects like the London City Churches, Chelsea Hospital and Winchester Palace.[2] Then, from 1699, Hawksmoor also entered into a professional partnership with John Vanbrugh (1664-1726). Castle Howard (1700–12) and Blenheim Palace (1705–16) were created during this time.[3] Hawksmoor gained valuable experience in both these pairings and began to accept his own commissions -- including several London churches commissioned in 1712, notably St Alfege's in Greenwich and St. Anne's in Limehouse.[4] However, he has generally been criticised as unoriginal, lacking imagination in comparison with Wren and Vanbrugh.[5] This essay will explore the question of uniqueness in Hawksmoor's approach to architecture. Firstly, this essay will analyse why he was considered a secondary figure in English architecture. Secondly, Hawksmoor's approach to Classical models will be examined and compared to his contemporaries' view on this topic. Finally, the other sources that influenced Hawksmoor's architectonic expression will be explored.

Hawksmoor was an established personality in English architecture, but he was often seen as less original than his peers. Because Hawksmoor worked for Wren in his early career, it is actually difficult

to define the exact contribution he made towards Wren's creations. Contemporaries and scholars have generally been inclined to attribute design ideas directly to Wren, diminishing Hawksmoor's role. Even Easton Neston, a house in Northamptonshire (1685-1700) which is conventionally seen to demarcate the end of Hawksmoor's apprenticeship, has been the centre of a debated attribution. William Fermor (1648-1711), first Baron Leominster, had initially commissioned the building to Wren, who designed the side wings, but Wren largely delegated the project to Hawksmoor, who completed the main central building.[6] Despite both architects having worked on this mansion, Hawksmoor is commonly considered the main artist. He certainly viewed himself as such, defining this project as one of his 'owne children'. [7]

Another aspect that has underwritten this underrated vision of Hawksmoor is that, in nearly sixty years of activities, he did not obtain any relevant and lucrative place in the Office of Works.[8] The reasons for this are based mainly on Hawksmoor's personality and social status, rather than his supposed artistic ability. First of all, Hawksmoor was a modest person who deliberately avoided the limelight. Maynwaring, a prominent agent, actually described him to the Duchess of Marlborough, patron of Blenheim Palace, as a man of 'modesty and merit' who needed to be pushed to find opportunities 'which he is the more worthy of, because he does not seem to be very solicitous to do it for himself'.[9] In addition to this, he was not born a gentleman, as Vanbrugh was, and lacked the capacity to present himself as a great artist. As a result, most of the important commissions in their partnership were given to Vanbrugh, who attracted the favour of the aristocracy.[10] His role in their partnership has thus been underrepresented. Hawksmoor's primary misfortune, though, was arguably the emergence of a new British style based on defined Classical architectonic rule

which led to a shared 'national taste' dissonant with Hawksmoor's view. The influence of Palladian models turned the designs of Hawksmoor, and the other so-called English Baroque architects, into temporary expressions of architecture, relegating them to the status of a mere interlude between the era of Inigo Jones and the Neo-Palladian age.[11] Because of all this, Hawksmoor's originality has rarely been taken into account when discussed alongside Wren and Vanbrugh's canons, the imposition of conservative Palladian motifs in England diminishing his architectural success.

The main inspiration for Hawksmoor's works was the Classical style. His passion for antiquity was evident in his designs, from which his dedication for Classics emerged. In fact, he not only resembled classical models in his drawings, but also annotated them in Latin. For instance, in his project for redesigning Cambridge, Market Hill was denoted by the word *forum*, the King's Ditch by *vallum* and the castle by *basilica*. This was not the only case in which Hawksmoor used Latin, as in his plan for Greenwich a *circus*, a *via regia* and a temple are mentioned.[12] In his buildings, Hawksmoor also included key symbols of the English expression of Palladian architecture. Elements like the Diocletian window, the broken-based

Figures 1 and 2: N. Hawksmoor, *Elevation in Outline of the East Front of the Church of Christ Church Spitalfield*, British Library (c.1714-1720); N. Hawksmoor, *Elevation in Outline of the West Front of the Church of Christ Church Spitalfield*, British Library (c.1714-1720)

pediment and the Venetian window were not a part of the regular architectural vocabulary, but both Hawksmoor and exponents of the eighteenth-century Neo-Palladian movement were using them in their commissions.[13] Hawksmoor's project of Christ Church in Spitalfields (1714-1729), for example, presents Venetian windows, an architectonic element consisting of a central semi-circular arch flanked by flat-topped openings on either side. This structure is present both in the east (Fig.1) and west façade (Fig.2) of the church. In the west façade, the Venetian window takes the shape of a giant tetrastyle Tuscan *portico*.[14] Hawksmoor cannot be defined as a neo-Palladian because none of his buildings follow Palladian standards religiously, but he did include many classical features in them. The conscious turn to the antique as a source for architecture was a feature that characterised the English style since the age of Inigo Jones, and this aspect certainly defines Hawksmoor's approach to architecture. It does not, however, highlight the artist's uniqueness.

Figures 3 and 4: N. Hawksmoor, *Twofold Elevation and Half Plan, showing the Colonnaded and Arcaded Schemes Contrasted. (The Colonnaded Plan was Adopted)*, in G. F. Webb, 'The Letters and Drawings of Nicholas Hawksmoor relating to the Building of the Mausoleum at Castle Howard, 1726–1742', *The Volume of the Walpole Society* (1930), plate XX; A. Palladio, 'Elevation/Section of Bramante's Tempietto in S. Pietro in Montorio (Rome)', *I Quattro Libri dell'Architettura* (1570)

Though Hawksmoor's interest in classical architecture was shared by his contemporaries, his approach to the antique was clearly quite different. This is highlighted by the contemporary debate between Hawksmoor and Richard Boyle, Earl of Burlington, on Hawksmoor's design for the mausoleum at Castle Howard (Fig.3). In 1712, the construction of the house at Castle Howard ended and Lord Carlisle, the owner of the estate, decided to invest in the gardens and their architectonic ornaments. Hence, Hawksmoor was commissioned to design the Howard family's mausoleum therein.[15] The mausoleum (1728-42) is set on a high rusticated base with a double balustrade staircase leading to the main structure. It is surrounded by a Doric peristyle supporting an entablature adorned by triglyphs and plain metopes and is crowned by a clerestory and a dome.[16] It is thus an emulation of Bramante's *tempietto* at S. Pietro in Montorio (Fig.4).[17]

Hawksmoor's project was heavily criticised by Lord Burlington. The main critique he made was that the columns were positioned excessively close without following the canons set by Bramante. Hawksmoor's proportion was defined by practical reasons: the stones used in the Mausoleum were weaker and it would not have supported the upper structure if positioned more distant.[18] Hawksmoor himself explained this statics problem to his patron, writing: 'what a sad sight it would be to see the Entablement crack and settle by the large spaces of the intercolumniations, for the Entablement is the grand beauty of this magnificent structure'.[19] The fact that he had to explain this demonstrates Lord Burlington's disapproval. Not only this, but Lord Burlington also disapproved of the use of Doric orders for a circular temple because there was not a precedent in antiquity, preferring the more typical Tuscan order.[20] However, Hawksmoor did not change his original plan, stating that 'the Tuscan I am afraid will add nothing

Figures 5, 6 and 7: N. Hawksmoor, Woodstock Gate, Blenheim Palace (1720); S. Serlio, Reconstruction Arch of Titus, *Terzo Libro* (1540); J. A. du Cerceau, Reconstruction Arch of Titus, *Quoniam apud Veteres alio Stnictuiae Genere Templa Fuerunt Aedificata* (1550)

to its Grandeur'.[21] This controversy on the mausoleum design illustrates the different approach towards antiquity of both Hawksmoor and Lord Burlington, the latter's ideas representing the typical approach in English architecture.[22] On the one hand, Lord Burlington applied meticulously those canons which had been strictly identified as 'Classical' by the neo-Palladian.[23] On the other hand, Hawksmoor's attitude to the past was more imaginative than scholarly. He was not following a defined set of rules, instead basing his works on historical precedents and reflecting the need, as he expressed it, for 'some old father to stand by you'.[24] Hawksmoor's development of this unique vision of architecture derived mainly from his study of architectonic manuscripts. He never travelled outside his country so he did not have the opportunity to experience Classical architecture in person, but he did have the occasion to explore the canonical studies of architecture, notable examples being Vitruvio's *De Architectura* and Andrea Palladio's *I Quattro Libri dell'Architettura*. However, Hawksmoor did not take a reverential approach towards the canon imposed by these treaties, as many did, and his architectural models were far more extended. He was quite clearly inspired by a long tradition of bold reconstructions of antiquity, studying both sixteenth-century works like those of du Cerceau, Giambattista Montano, Pirro

Ligorio, Jacques Androuet, and Jacopo Lauro as well as eighteenth-century equivalents like the books of Bernhard Fischer von Erlach.[25] The use of these different sources is visible in his works, for instance in his triumphal arch at Blenheim Palace (1722) (Fig.5). This construction is formed by a central semi-circular keystone arch, flanked by two pairs of engaged Corinthian columns positioned over a raised structure. The columns supported an entablature, over which a smaller inscribed block is positioned. The arch was based on the Arch of Titus in Rome, strictly following the reconstruction in Serlio's *I Sette Libri dell'Architettura* (1537) (Fig.6) and du Cerceau's *Quoniam apud Veteres alio Structurae Genere Templa Fuerunt Aedificata* (1550) (Fig.7).[26] Hawksmoor's

Figures 8 and 9: J. Stuart and N. Revett, Illustration of the Tower of Andromachus (Athens), *Antiquities of Athens* Vol.1 (1808); N. Hawksmoor, I*nitial Design of St George.in-the-East*, British Library (pre-June 1714)

extensive use of books has often been critically interpreted, as many suggest he was simply copying them out of a lack of imagination. However, Hawksmoor stated in a letter to Lord Carlisle discussing 'Authors and Antiquity' that 'I don't mean that one needs to Coppy them, but to be upon the same principals'.[27] Pure emulation was clearly not his aim. Thus, this approach to architecture through a variety of books was not a replication but an enrichment because he was able to combine numerous literary models and create a unique style based on his personal view of antiquity.[28]

To Hawksmoor, Classics did not solely include the Roman heritage which his contemporaries were focusing on, but also its Greek equivalent. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Greek architecture was still relatively unknown. The Greek territory was under the Ottoman Empire and so was less accessible than the Italian territory for Europeans. For instance, the first illustration of the Parthenon, the symbol of Ancient Greece, spread in England only in 1674 through Jacob Spon's *Relation de l'Etat Présent de la Ville d'Athenes Capitalsd de la Grece*. Although Hawksmoor's understanding of 'Greek architecture' is still not clear because he tended to be vague in defining it, he certainly entered into contact with Greek models during his studies, for instance through John Struys's account of his travel

Figures 11 and 12: N. Hawksmoor, *Scheme for St. Mary in Warwick*, All Souls Oxford (c.1694); N. Hawksmoor, *Scheme for Completion of Westminster Abbey*, Westminster Archive Centre (c.1724)

through Greece.[29] Hawksmoor used Greek monuments as inspiration for his works, the Tower of Andromachus in Athens (Fig.8) being the model for Hawksmoor's first lantern design at St George in-the-East (1714). Both buildings are composed of an octagonal structure supporting a dome (Fig.9).[30] The colonnade was considered by Hawksmoor as a defining feature of Greek architecture, probably as a result of his assessment of Serlio's single engraving of a Greek building contained in the third book of his treaty (Fig.10). Serlio represented a rudimental temple structure formed by a Composit decastyle colonnade supporting an entablature over which a Composit tetrastyle held a pediment. A 'Greek colonnade' was inserted in St. George's in Bloomsbury, a church which represented the richness that Greek elements were adding to Hawksmoor's projects. The main entrance of the church is a hexastyle portico formed by Corinthian


Figure 10: S. Serlio, Engraving of a Greek building, *Terzo Libro* (1540)

Figures 13 and 14: N. Hawksmoor, *Proposed Floorplan for the Radcliffe Library in Oxford*, Ashmolean Museum (c.1712); G. Grelot, Floorplan of Suleiman's Mosque in Constantinople, *Relation Nouvelle d'un Voyage de Constantinople* (1680)

giant columns supporting a pediment. The portico is based on the Greek Temple of Bacchus in Baalbek (Lebanon). Moreover, the pyramidal structure on the steeple is influenced by Pliny the Elder's description of the mausoleum at Halicarnassus. Hawksmoor's creation of buildings 'after y' Greek manner', as he himself defined them, was certainly a way in which he added new connotations of Antiquity to his projects, expanding the definition of 'Classical influence' and demonstrating his innovative approach.[31]

Hawksmoor's approach to architecture was not based only on Latin and Greek models, as he was using sources from a much wider variety of cultures. According to him, embodiments of various cultures acted as competing models which he chose to combine for the sake of aesthetic value and specific symbolic needs. In his design, Byzantine, Arabian, Turkish and buildings from many other origins were imaginatively reconstructed and considered on an equal level with Classical buildings.[32] Thus, in Hawksmoor's projects elements unusual in English architecture appeared, such as the Pyramid (1728) in the garden of Castle Howard and the obelisk in Ripon marketplace (1702) - the first large-scale obelisk to be erected in Britain.[33] He was certainly inspired by Islamic architecture, his unexecuted designs for St Mary in Warwick (c. 1695–97) including two ogee

domes (Fig.11) and his first proposal for the completion of Westminster Abbey (c.1724) including features from mosques recognisable through minaret-like towers and an ogee dome (Fig.12). His early design for the Radcliffe Library in Oxford (c.1712) (Fig.13) was also inspired by the plan of Suleiman's mosque in Constantinople (Fig.14). Hawksmoor had probably accessed this design through the illustration of the mosque in *Relation Nouvelle d'un Voyage de Constantinople* by Guillume-Joseph Grelot (1680).[34] Both the Constantinople mosque and the Radcliffe Library are formed around an entrance space that brings with it a square environment. The chambers are divided into three sectors by columns and four thicker pilasters which, positioned in the corner of an imaginaries square, support a dome. This inspiration from eastern models is not just a scholarly assumption based upon the resemblance of shapes, as one might assume, but it was openly recognised by the architect. For instance, in his proposed plan for Westminster Bridge he employed a flat system of foundation and stated that 'Dragnet Reys did the same at Constantinople at the stately Mosque he built in the Sea'.[35] Thus, Hawksmoor drew his influences from cultures atypical for the English canons, drawing from a broader sphere of influence and, as a result, developing a broader approach for his architectonic creations.

Figures 15 and 16: N. Hawksmoor, *Gothic Early Design for the High Street Façade of All Souls in Oxford*, Worcester College Oxford (1708-09); F. Whishaw, Engraving of St Anne's Limehouse in London, *Gentleman's Magazine* (1828)

Hawksmoor also adopted Gothic motifs, the most notorious example of this being All Souls College (c.1708-30), which dominates Oxford with its pinnacles and towers. This complex has been defined as 'overly classical' by scholars because Hawksmoor favoured round-headed windows over pointed arches and maintained a consistent use of symmetry, features which are particularly visible in Hawksmoor's early design for the College (Fig.15). Moreover, in 1715 he explained his project in typical Vitruvian terms in a letter to George Clarke (1661- 1736), architect in Oxford and Fellow of All Souls College. His writing expressed Vitruvian ideas, those of harmony, order and decorum being most evident in phrases such as 'for y better Ornament', 'other Arches of y Like nature on y right hand & Left', a Reasonable uniformity and y Order and beuty of y Compartment'.[36] Hence, he was not adopting a 'pure' Gothic design, but he conceived it as an ensemble of motifs that could be combined with other different styles.

This conception was developed in his London churches' designs.[37] For instance, in St. George's Bloomsbury, a more Classical church, the Gothic taste emerged through the presence of figures of lions and unicorns - heraldic symbols of the Crown - climbing the steeple, while in St. Anne's Limehouse (Fig.16), the tower contains a stone lantern reminiscent of Gothic steeples.[38] The lantern is supported by a classical structure formed by a semi-circular arch sustained by two columns, flanked by a playful composition of pilasters.[39] This unique merging of styles has not only been observed by modern historians but was also observed by contemporaries. In the *Grub Street Journal* of 11 July 1734 for example, Batty Langley (c.1696-1751), writer on architecture, commented that 'That stile or mode after which the churches at Limenhouse and Ratcliff are built, is mean, between the Greek and Gothique architecture'.[40] Hawksmoor thus rediscovered the importance of Gothic motifs in architecture, freeing this style from the common interpretation of 'Ruins of Barbarity', as Colen Campell (1676-1729) defined it in the introduction of *Vitruvius Britannicus* (1713).[41] He gave a new interpretation to the Gothic, simultaneously connecting it with the Christian identity and elevating it to the level of the Classical style.

To conclude, Hawksmoor's uniqueness in his architectonic approach stands on the variety of influences his designs presented, which include Classical, Byzantine and Gothic elements. His inspirations came mainly from the study of books, but what made him unique is his choice of features to take from these manuscripts. His sources were actually greatly varied in comparison with the typical architectonic references adopted in English architecture. Thus, Hawksmoor's designs were based on precedents, but his buildings must not be seen as copies, because the imaginative way in which he merged differing canons created a unique architectural expression. Hawksmoor understood the greatness of Classical architectural canons, but he did not revere them in the way others did, thus allowing him to use other influences to enrich his projects and freeing his architecture from pedantic rules. Hawksmoor's resulting uniqueness was even recognised by Colen Campbel, who in the introduction of *Vitruvius Britannicus* listed Hawksmoor among those architects 'who have greatly contributed to adorn our Land with curious Labours, and are daily embellishing it more'.[42] Thanks to his architectural approach, Hawksmoor created theatrical compositions in which every little aspect was carefully studied. Little details like the contraposition of void and whole volumes in the succession of pilasters, the arch in St. Anne in Limehouse's tower, or the decorative walls in the north façade of St Mary Woolnoth build up to demonstrate the playfulness of his architectural style. He

32

played with forms and volumes, and was ultimately one of the few English architects who reached the level of Borromini and Bernini with his imagination and grace.

References

1 K. Downes, 'Nicholas Hawksmoor', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2005), available at https://www-oxforddnb-com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-12692?rskey=tMuywM&result=2 [accessed 28 January 2021].

2 J. Summerson, *Architecture in Britain, 1530-1830*, 3rd rev. ed. (London, 1958), p.157.

3 K. Downes, 'Sir John Vanbrugh', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2008), available at https://www-oxforddnb-com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-28059?rskey=EQYZNN&result=2#odnb-9780198614128-e-28059-div1-d877722e1424 [accessed 28 January 2021].

4 G. Worsley, *Classical Architecture in Britain: The Heroic Age* (New Haven, 1995), pp.59-60.

5 S. Lang, 'Vanbrugh's Theory and Hawksmoor's Buildings', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, 24:2, (1965), p.127.

6 K. Downes, 'Hawksmoor's House at Easton Neston', *Architectural History*, 30 (1987), p. 50.

7 G. F. Webb, 'The Letters and Drawings of Nicholas Hawksmoor relating to the Building of the Mausoleum at Castle Howard, 1726–1742', *The Volume of the Walpole Society* (1930), p. 126 (letter XIII).

8 Summerson, *Architecture in Britain, 1530-1830*, p.158.

9 S. Churchill Duchess of Marlborough, *Private Correspondence of the Duchess of Marlborough* vol. 1, ed. by H. Colburn, 1972, p.266 (letter written in 1709).

10 Summerson, *Architecture in Britain, 1530-1830*, p.158.

11 Hart, *Nicholas Hawksmoor: Rebuilding Ancient Wonders*, p.2.

12 Worsley, *Classical Architecture in Britain: The Heroic Age*, p.84.

13 Worsley, G., 'Nicholas Hawksmoor: a Pioneer Neo-Palladian?', *Architectural History*, 33 (1990), p. 61.

14 P. de la Ruffiniere Du Prey, *Hawksmoor's London Churches: Architecture and Theology* (Chicago, 2000), pp. 103-104.

15 Summerson, *Architecture in Britain, 1530-1830*, p.171.

16 N. Levine, 'Castle Howard and the Emergence of the Modern Architectural Subject', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, 62:3, (2003), pp. 341-342.

17 S. Smith, *The Building of Castle Howard*, p. 172.

18 Summerson, *Architecture in Britain, 1530-1830*, p.171.

19 Webb, 'The Letters and Drawings of Nicholas Hawksmoor Relating to the Building of the Mausoleum at Castle Howard 1726–1742', pp. 131-133. (letter XIX).

20 Summerson, *Architecture in Britain, 1530-1830*, p.171.

21 Webb, 'The Letters and Drawings of Nicholas Hawksmoor Relating to the Building of the Mausoleum at Castle Howard 1726–1742', pp. 133-137. (letter XX).

22 G. Worsley, 'Wren, Vanbrugh, Hawksmoor, and Archer: The Search for an English Baroque', *Studies in the History of Art*, 66, (2005), pp. 104-105.

23 Worsley, *Classical Architecture in Britain: The Heroic Age*, p.84.

24 K. Downes, *Hawksmoor*, 2nd edn (1979), p.244.

25 Worsley, 'Wren, Vanbrugh, Hawksmoor, and Archer: The Search for an English Baroque', pp. 104-105.

26 V. Hart, *Nicholas Hawksmoor: Rebuilding Ancient Wonders* (New Haven, 2002), p.124; Worsley, *Classical Architecture in Britain: The Heroic Age*, p.59.

27 Downes, *Hawksmoor*, p.244.

28 Worsley, *Classical Architecture in Britain: The Heroic Age*, p.57.

29 Hart, *Nicholas Hawksmoor: Rebuilding Ancient Wonders*, p.41.

30 Ibid., p.42.

31 Worsley, 'Wren, Vanbrugh, Hawksmoor, and Archer: The Search for an English Baroque', p.105.

32 Hart, *Nicholas Hawksmoor: Rebuilding Ancient Wonders*, p.33.

33 Hart, *Nicholas Hawksmoor: Rebuilding Ancient Wonders*, p.111; R. Barnes, *The Obelisk: A Monumental Feature in Britain* (Frontier, 2004), p. 18.

34 Hart, *Nicholas Hawksmoor: Rebuilding Ancient Wonders*, pp.37-38.

35 Hart, *Nicholas Hawksmoor: Rebuilding Ancient Wonders*, p.38.

36 Ibid,, p.60.

37 Lang, 'Vanbrugh's Theory and Hawksmoor's Buildings', pp.148-149.

38 Hart, *Nicholas Hawksmoor: Rebuilding Ancient Wonders*, p.64.

39 Ibid., p.153-154.

[40] B. Langley, *Grub Street Journal*, 237 (11 July 1734)

[41] C. Campbell , *Vitruvius Britannicus or The British Architect, The Plans, Elevations, and Sections of the Regular Buildings, both Publick and Private, in Great Britain* (1713), p.1.

[42] Ibid., p.2.

Beck Chamberlain Heslop
Prostheses and Oppression in Interwar Britain

The First World War and its aftermath was a pivotal period for the development of prosthetics in Britain. Not only did the war usher in a greater number of men surviving disabling or disfiguring wounds, it also drew public attention to these men, their injuries, and how they might be dealt with. This makes the Interwar period a rich repository for disability historians investigating the effects and meanings of prostheses, and thus this era will be the focus of my analysis. A limited number of prostheses will be considered here: artificial limbs and facial prostheses. Not only do these conform to lay understandings of prostheses (that is, an artificial substitute for a 'missing' body part), but they are also most commonly referenced in the primary literature.

This essay illuminates the problems of generalising prosthetics as either wholly oppressive or liberating, considering the question from three viewpoints and underlining how the prosthesis was a tool to which users and observers gave different meanings. First, I will consider how prostheses reinforced ableist values tying human worth to economic activity. Secondly, I will show how prostheses could constitute a protective factor, deflecting ableism away from their users. Finally, I will go on to consider how much agency an individual had in deciding whether to use a prosthetic device. These frameworks will demonstrate that although prostheses could illuminate other aspects of oppression of disabled individuals, they were not inherently oppressive in themselves.

Public discourse represented artificial limbs as a way to make their user economically productive. Within the broader capitalist framework of modernising Britain, economic productivity was used as a proxy for an individual's worth. As limb technology developed and became more widely available, productivity as value could be applied to disabled individuals to

a greater extent than before. Artificial legs and arms were touted as so advanced that they would restore a limbless individual to full economic potential. As a result, limb loss was no longer an acceptable excuse for withdrawal from the labour force.

Medical writers exalted artificial limbs as negating any excuse a disabled man might have had not to work. An article in the *British Medical Journal*, for instance, made clear that the intolerance of any man who 'relies on crutches [because] he is apt to make them an excuse for loafing, and it is obvious that he cannot use his hands for work whilst he is using them for progression'.[1] Here, the option of a prosthetic leg made using other walking aids suspicious. Publications made bold claims about the functionality of artificial legs in particular, contributing to the belief that the absence of one or both legs did not need to hinder a man's productivity. At an Edinburgh demonstration of various artificial legs, medical professionals emphasised men's ability to undertake manual labour as the key metric of success. CK was one of the many amputation success stories because with his leg, he could climb ladders and work on roofs. Similarly, the writer deemed GW's leg successful from the narrow criteria of being adequate for 'a long hard day's work'.[2] It is also notable that when Roehampton took on its first civilian cases in 1936, nearly all of them were working-age men with industrial injuries.[3]

Prostheses heightened the expectation for an amputee to return to work along the same lines as their able-bodied co-workers. In the words of Reznick, contemporaries believed prosthetic technology meant 'patients could not in fact have been more able-bodied'.[4] Thus, they were expected to work along the same lines as their able-bodied co-workers. Paul Abberley argues that one consequence of disabled oppression is that individuals may not take advantage of the 'privileges' (for lack of a better word) of their disability.[5] This is not surprising given Mary Chute's

assessment that amputees were 'useless, limbless creatures; until they returned to work.[6] Similarly damning was the headline that characterised artificial limb users as 'Maimed but Useful'.[7] The implication was that artificial limbs could restore a man's productivity and, by putting that productivity to use, he could regain the value he lost by dismemberment. Prosthetics heightened the expectation for an amputee to return to work and exerted pressure on him to do so. In the reverse, they also made non-use a less acceptable option.

However, it is important to consider the economic reality for many individuals. Even if one received compensation for acquired limb loss, living conditions were largely dependent on an individual's ability to work. While prostheses may have made the public less sympathetic to amputees exiting the workforce and created more pressure for them to return with a 'restored' body, the alternative was not necessarily less oppressive. For many amputees, the economic independence and material benefit conferred by the use of artificial limbs would have been preferable to a life dependent on begging or charity. After all, the same metric of success medical professionals used in the Edinburgh leg demonstrations was used by CK himself. Since he could do 'practically all of the work of his trade' thanks to his artificial leg, he was 'thoroughly satisfied with the stump'.[8] For CK, the stump was successful because it allowed him to wear a prosthesis and work with his father in the family trade. It is likely that for many, re-entering the workforce was not just a consequence of external pressures but also internal desires.

External forces also influenced internal desires, then. Numerous historians have pointed to how, by facilitating work, artificial limbs helped amputees reject emasculation and assert themselves as 'independent, manly citizens'.[9] Through prostheses, disabled men could rebuild a masculine identity based on

their economic productivity. Not just restoring the physical capacity to work, the prosthetics industry provided jobs to amputees within the manufacturing process. The 1919 Committee on Artificial Limbs recommended that limb-makers hire significant numbers of limbless workers, a suggestion many — including Chas. A. Blatchford & Sons — took up.[10] Specialist wards, including Alder Hey Special Military Surgical Hospital, also provided opportunities for amputees in creating and repairing artificial limbs.[11] From this view, men used prostheses to reify their masculinity through work. To dismiss all prosthetic uses as simply conceding to Chute and her ilk, then, is potentially reductive. Using a prosthesis did not simply mean becoming 'useful', but also contributed to financial security and identity (re)formation.

Ultimately, whether prostheses were used as a tool to pressure amputees back into the workforce, or whether they were deployed as a route into economic independence, the device was not economically oppressive in itself. Rather, it was the economic structure within which prostheses operated that was oppressive. The specific cultural context of Interwar Britain, in which male value was based on his productivity and individuals had to sell their own labour for survival and public approval, was the oppressive force at play. On the other hand, users could deploy prostheses to guard against prejudice - one social manifestation of oppression. The aesthetic aspect is especially salient in facial prostheses, where user experience was trumped by the visual impact on observers. They aimed not only to protect onlookers from the discomfort of seeing facial disfigurements, but also to protect the wearer from these adverse reactions from onlookers.

Despite witnessing every horrific wound possible in his time in war hospitals, nothing made Ward Muir as uncomfortable as seeing the wounds of men in the Facial Disfigurement Department of the 3rd London General Hospital.[12] He could not meet the eye of these patients for fear he 'might let the poor victim perceive what I perceived: namely, that he was hideous'.[13] It was largely the discomfort of onlookers that had the oppressive effect on an individual. Muir mused: 'could any woman come near that gargoyle without repugnance?', suggesting that 'a child would run screaming from such a sight'. In this view, users employed facial prostheses to protect themselves from the reactions of others, effectively acting as a barrier between the disfigured individual and the oppression manifested in public disgust.

Suzannah Biernoff and Katherine Feo's brief articles assert that masks were counterproductive. They speculate that uncanny masks must have drawn more negative attention than exposed disfigurements.[14] Although an interesting suggestion, it is guesswork based solely on their own interpretations of photographs of Derwent Wood's masks. Of course, the masks were not entirely imperceptible - they were static, susceptible to discolouration and chipped paint. But that does not mean they drew worse attention than an exposed disfigurement did. Prostheses users' dominant concern was avoiding negative reactions, so they would not have opted for these concealment methods if they did attract worse attention than they abated. After all, Wood saw the function of his masks as ensuring that a mutilated man's presence would 'no longer [be] a source... of sadness to his relatives and friends'.[15] This was not just the case for war wounds. One woman, disfigured by surgery removing an ulcer, wore a thick veil over her face for years. After being fitted with an artificial nose, cheeks, and mouth, she was still 'a trifle expressionless' (so did not 'pass'), but they still remade her into a woman.[16] Deploying highly visible methods of disguise, the wearer was clearly less concerned with looking 'natural' than with preventing the negative reactions specific

to their disfigurements. The 1917 Disability Schedule's categorisation of 'very severe facial disfigurement' as 100% disability indicates the extremity of social revulsion, which was pervasive enough to legitimise men exiting the workforce and public view altogether.[17] Within this context, then, individuals used prostheses to guard against oppressive prejudice. While masks might be seen as symbols of the demand to stay hidden, this instruction did not come from the prosthesis but, rather, from onlookers.

Restriction of choice is a central aspect in oppression. In the case of prostheses, people have two options available to them: to use a prosthesis, or not use a prosthesis. Of course, there is a gradient between these extremes. For example, an individual might wear their prosthesis sometimes, or they might change their mind about an initial decision. Still, at any one time, an individual chooses to wear or not wear a prosthesis. It is in those choices that we can investigate how free individuals really were to make these usage decisions in the Interwar context.

Sometimes medical professionals outright denied children with congenital limb differences a choice. One child born without a tibia was only two when he had his leg amputated and replaced with a peg leg.[18] Such instances obviously did not allow for the individual to choose, but in other cases the question of agency was more complicated. One girl born without legs, for instance, transitioned from being a non-user to a user of artificial legs in a way that appears autonomous. Having spent the first sixteen years of her life walking on her hands, she sought surgery that would alter her stumps so she could be fitted with artificial legs. Her doctor noted how she had an 'obvious wish to be fitted', an observation defended by the fact that she sought this consultation despite the reluctance of her caregiver.[19] Additionally, she requested a second surgeon who ensured the treatment did not interfere with her ability to manoeuvre using her hands when she was not wearing the prosthetic limbs.[20] On the surface, this appears to be a case where a young girl had full autonomy to make the decision to use prostheses as she wished to.

However, one must account for the social pressures that led to the girl's decision to undergo the surgery. After all, she was able to walk 'as fast as an ordinary adult; and was generally healthy. There was no medical necessity to undergo the gruelling process of straightening her limbs and teaching her how to walk on legs for the first time. Indeed, the reason she cited for wanting prosthetic legs was to walk and 'look like a normal girl in height and appearance'. The doctor's reaction to her appearance compounds the idea that without the prostheses she was abnormal, even inhuman. His descriptions relied on animal metaphors: she 'gave the impression of a rather large dog', her feet looked like 'udders' attached to her stumps, and her rough hands were like 'hooves'.[21] In contrast, wearing the prostheses transformed her into 'an ordinary individual', no longer a 'circus curiosity'.[22] Considering this was his medical description, it seems likely other people the girl interacted with had similar or worse reactions to her legless appearance. So, the narrative of this girl making a fully autonomous decision to wear prostheses is overly simplistic. On account of her visible congenital disability, she faced stigma – even dehumanisation - that was only overcome by 'normalising' her body through the use of prostheses. In this sense, prosthesis use was a manifestation of society's narrow conceptualisation of 'normal'. Though the girl did employ the artificial legs to mitigate the effects of this pressure on her, the decision for her to do so was shaped by external oppressive forces.

For many men who acquired injuries, the moment of choice is less obvious. Often, there does not seem to have been much of

a choice at all – merely an assumption that the natural next step after limb loss was replacement with an artificial one. This was especially the case for ex-servicemen who lost limbs in the Great War, who were guaranteed state funding of up to £15 for an artificial limb since the middle of the war.[23] As a result, Julie Anderson claims that every one of these men (approximately 41,050) were provided with some form of artificial limb. One of these men was Bill, a Cockney soldier who lost his leg and was moved into a war hospital when he met the orderly Ward Muir. Muir recalled a conversation he overheard between Bill and his wife, in which he gave her the news of his injury. Knowledge that he would be fitted with a prosthetic leg was a key part in how Bill coped with the loss of his leg and passed his optimism onto his wife. He joked how their son would have to become an engineer so he could 'oil the ball-bearings of me fancy leg wot I'm ter get at Roehampton'.[24] It is difficult to argue in this case that the automatic provision of a prosthetic leg was experienced as oppressive, at least for Bill. Rather, it was a psychological comfort that allowed him to imagine a future where he might even 'become a professor of roller-skating'.[25]

Personal and circumstantial characteristics also mediated agency. Among the most influential was class, which determined practical access as well as the specific social pressures a person was exposed to that influenced their individual decisions. Once again, prostheses were not oppressive in themselves, but the process of acquiring and maintaining them did reveal social pressures and barriers that constrained agency of individuals deciding to use them.

Civilians did not have the same access to prostheses as war amputees. The sense of duty and guilt that drove the rehabilitation programmes for disabled veterans did not extend to the general population. Unlike ex-servicemen, civilians were not always entitled to artificial limbs, which were considered 'additional benefits' for non-soldiers.[26] Even with some financial aid, through charities such as the Royal Surgical Aid Society the associated costs were often not covered in full.[27] Repairs, replacements, and travel for fittings could quickly mount up. A typical Blatchford leg required re-fitting within the first year, and the whole device was only expected to last seven years. These expenses were on top of the base price of the prosthesis, which could range from £10 10s for a leg fitted to a Symes amputation, to £40 for a complex arm.[28] By 1920, with the Ministry of Pensions' pressure on private manufacturers, a lightweight leg still cost an average of £30.[29] In the words of limb maker, Charles Blatchford, the limb's quality 'regulated by the price [the] patient can afford'.[30] Officers were more likely to be able to afford the best prosthetic technology, given a £100 annual wound pension on top of their retired pay. Below them, ordinary servicemen whose costs up to £15 were covered by the state.[31] Lower-class civilians ineligible for financial aid had the least access, and therefore the least agency, here.

Beyond purely financial barriers, civilian access to specialist treatment was lacking. This was improved somewhat by the 1936 Government decision to lend out the expertise of Roehampton limb-fitting surgeons for the benefit of civilians and the provinces.[32] Even so, the standard of civilian care was inferior. Nineteen-year-old amputee Ron Moore, for instance, was not given the same training and rehabilitation as his veteran counterparts. Instead, he recalled that 'Roehampton delivered one pair of legs to me; there was no advice, no help'. Unsurprisingly, this meant his 'artificial legs rubbed blisters where they joined the top of [his] legs and they often bled'.[33] Wealthy officers thus had much greater freedom of choice in prosthesis use than lower class civilians.

Occupation and economic reality constrained access to, and quality of,

prostheses and their associated care. An ill-fitting limb might be padded out DIY-style, or discarded altogether, if refitting or replacement was too expensive or onerous.[34] For civilians in particular, access to quality care was not guaranteed. Thus, it was an individual's class that constrained their agency in accessing and using a prosthetic device. This oppression, while highlighted by the process of acquiring a prosthesis, was not produced by the prosthesis itself.

The relationship between prosthetics and oppression is complex. By branding prostheses as oppressive, a double-bind is created. If a person uses a prosthesis, they are made complicit in their own oppression. On the other hand, non-use entails experiencing certain aspects of inaccessibility and stigma that might have been mitigated by the use of a prosthesis. This categorisation also imbues prostheses with an inherent meaning, not adequately recognising the relationships that individuals had with their prostheses or the social conditions that gave various meanings to prostheses and their use. This essay has only just begun to explore these problems in the context of Interwar Britain. Intersections with gender and race, the inclusion of dental prosthesis and devices such as hearing aids would expand our understanding even further and greatly contribute to the history and philosophy of disability.

References

[1] 'Provisional Artificial Limbs', *The Hospital*, 65:1689 (1918), p. 42.

[2] C. W. Cathcart, 'Demonstration of Patients Wearing Artificial Limbs for Amputations at Different Levels in the Lower Extremity: With an Explanation and Demonstration of the Type of Artificial Limb Used in Each Case', *Edinburgh Medical Journal*, 28 (1922), p. 74.

[3] J. Anderson, 'The Soul of a Nation: a Social History Of Disabled People, Physical Therapy, Rehabilitation and Sport in Britain 1918-1970', *De Montfort University PhD Thesis* (2001), p. 47.

[4] J. S. Reznick, 'Prostheses and Propaganda: Materiality and the Human Body in the Great War' in N. Saunders, *Matters of Conflict: Material Culture, Memory and the First World War* (Abingdon, 2004), p. 57.

[5] P. Abberley, 'The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability', *Disability, Handicap & Society*, 2:1 (1987), pp. 16-17.

[6] M. Chute, quoted in Reznick, 'Prostheses and Propaganda', p. 58.

[7] 'The Penny Pictorial' (1919), quoted in M. Guyatt, 'Better Legs: Artificial Limbs for British Veterans of the First World War', *Journal of Design History*, 14:4 (2001), p. 320.

[8] C. W. Cathcart, 'Demonstration of Patients Wearing Artificial Limbs for Amputations at Different Levels in the Lower Extremity: With an Explanation and Demonstration of the Type of Artificial Limb Used in Each Case', *Edinburgh Medical Journal*, 28 (1922), p. 74.

[9] C. Crawford, *Phantom Limb: Amputation, Embodiment, and Prosthetic Technology* (New York, 2014), p. 205; S. Koven, 'Remembering and Dismemberment: Crippled Children, Wounded Soldiers, and the Great War in Great Britain', *The American Historical Review*, 99:4 (1994), p. 1190. See also: J. Anderson, *War, Disability and Rehabilitation in Britain: 'Soul of a Nation'* (Manchester, 2011); and J. Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain, and the Great War* (London, 1996).

[10] C. A. Blatchford & Sons, *Best Foot Forward: Chas. A. Blatchford & Sons Ltd. (Artificial Limb Specialists) 1890-1990* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 61.

[11] Reznick, 'Prostheses and Propaganda', pp. 53-54.

[12] S. Biernoff, 'The Rhetoric of Disfigurement in First World War Britain', *Social History of Medicine*, 24:3 (2011), pp. 668;

[13] W. Muir, *Happy Hospital* (London, 1918), p. 143.

[14] Biernoff, *The Rhetoric of Disfigurement*, p. 680; Katherine Feo, 'Invisibility: Memory, Masks and Masculinities in the Great War', *Journal of Design History*, 20:1 (2007), p. 25.

[15] C. Alexander, 'Faces of War', *Smithsonian Magazine* (2007), available at: https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/faces-of-war-145799854/ [Accessed 23/01/2021].

[16] Muir, *Happy Hospital*, pp. 145-146.

[17] 'Disability Schedule' reproduced in Reveille, *1* (1918), p. 158.

[18] E. L. Evans, and N. R. Smith, 'Congenital Absence of Tibia', *Archives of Disease in Childhood*, 1:4 (1926), p. 197.

[19] R. Broomhead, 'Congenital Deformities of Legs', *British Medical Journal*, 2:4068 (1938), p. 1311.

[20] Ibid., p. 1312.

[21] Ibid., pp. 1311.

[22] Broomhead, 'Congenital Deformities of Legs', pp. 1312-1313.

[23] Blatchford & Sons, Best Foot Forward), p. 49.

[24] W. Muir, *Observations of an Orderly: Some Glimpses of Life and Work in an English War Hospital* (London, 1917), p. 195.

[25] Ibid., p. 195.

[26] Anderson, 'The Soul of a Nation', p. 43.

[27] Ibid., pp. 43-44.

[28] Blatchford & Sons, *Best Foot Forward*, p. 49.

[29] Admittedly, this was a vast improvement from the average £80 just two years prior. See Koven, 'Remembering and Dismemberment', p. 1195.

[30] C. Blatchford, quoted in Blatchford & Sons, *Best Foot Forward*, p. 39.

[31] Ibid., p. 49.

[32] 'Fitting of Artificial Limbs: Pensions Services for Civilians', *British Medical Journal*, 2:3943 (1936), pp. 254-255.

[33] Quoted in Anderson, 'The Soul of a Nation', p. 47.

[34] 'Provisional Artificial Limbs', *The Hospital*, 65:689 (1918), p. 42.

EUROPE

Coby Oliver Graff
Jewish Presence in Early Modern Spain

The fluctuating levels of fear and hostility towards Jews and *conversos* in early modern Spain had major repercussions for internal religious and political change, and for international social attitudes. The *conversos* were heavily persecuted by the Inquisition both prior to and following the Jewish expulsion in 1492. Although theoretically 'New Christians', they were targeted specifically for their supposed heretical practice of ancestral Jewish customs and Judaizing. Most historiography agrees that Ferdinand and Isabella's fear of the latter played a crucial role in starting the Inquisition - they were concerned about Jewish degradation of Catholic Spain from within and this religious fear led them to expel the Jews.[1] However, analysis of the wider Spanish population and municipalities in the mid- to late-fifteenth century suggests that power dynamics and associated anxiety - rather than religious tension - were the main factors causing hostility towards the Jews

and *conversos*. Fear of increasing Jewish presence and domination in small towns, as exemplified by the silversmiths of Morvedre, highlights the constant battle to keep Jewish wealth and influence in check.[2] The introduction of the purity of blood laws in the mid-1500s was the most significant result of anti-Semitic fears in early modern Spain. These laws incorporated and built on the genealogical concept of race, which had become increasingly prominent in common parlance.[3] The influence of these laws was magnified by the power of the Spanish Empire, especially in the Americas. Therefore, historians can understand the development of intolerance in Spain, from a religious to a genealogical basis, by analysing the gradually shifting fear of the Jewish and *converso* presence on the Iberian Peninsula.

Early modern Spain witnessed a substantial shift from the tolerance of the medieval *convivencia* towards the persecution of the *converso* population

and the expulsion of the Jews in 1492. This change in attitude coincided with and was likely a product of the 'new nobility' of *caballeros* and *hidalgos*, who aspired to seize the reins of city governance across Castile.[4] However, the presence of Jews and *conversos* remained a significant obstacle to their control. The Jewish population in Iberia had been in a state of decline since the forced mass conversions of 1391.[5] Nevertheless, the consistent attempts by cities and towns to stamp out Jewish commercial activity indicate that they were still perceived as a continued threat to municipal authorities. The prevalence of such actions is evidenced by the repeated monarchical interventions under Ferdinand and Isabella, including their order to the city of Bilbao in 1475 to terminate commercial restrictions on Jews.[6] Furthermore, there had been increasing hostility over the increasing prosperity of the Jewish community in contrast with that of the Christians in Valencia. In 1451, the rate of tax on milled grain was increased for Jews and decreased for Christians. Although this was later changed to a head tax in 1457, King Juan II was still forced to intervene.[7]

The relationship between Spain's Jewish inhabitants and its cities and towns was characterised by economic conflict and a fear of the formers' rising power. Tax assessments from 1464 illustrate the significant and potentially domineering presence of Jewish communities and wealth within smaller municipalities and towns.[8] However, the notable lack of violence towards Jews suggests that this was a financial and political resentment rather than a religious and personal one. Instead of conflict, negotiation between the Valencian jurats and Jews in the late 1470s was employed to move towards resolving the issue of taxation and local debt to the Crown, with expulsion likely not considered a practical or favourable solution.[9] This shows that there was a small but significant degree of toleration

towards Jews and *conversos* in mid-fifteenth-century Spain, and that they were often actively favoured by the Spanish monarchs.

Torquemada's Inquisition was established to target Jewish converts to Christianity. The Inquisition exacerbated and exploited already prevalent suspicion and animosity towards Jewish converts with accusations that these *conversos* remained Jewish in all but name. Following their visit to Seville, Ferdinand and Isabella's consent and backing given to the establishment of the Inquisition in 1478 underscored the rising fear of the perceived religious threat by the conversos to the Catholic state.[10] The Castilian subsistence crisis of 1465-73 had culminated in the widespread massacre of *conversos* in Andalusian towns. However, the principal reason behind this slaughter was likely financial and social jealousy, with religion at most a secondary component.[11] Many *conversos* had managed to elevate their status to part of the ruling elites in individual localities. In Toledo, despite expulsion from key financial offices in 1449, they had regained power in urban government, which they maintained until the Inquisition.[12] Thus, the additional suspicion of their continued practice of Judaism made them easy targets within the 'wider urban struggle' between town oligarchies and the general population.[13]

That said, the widespread fears about *conversos* did contain a significant religious component. *Conversos* were consistently attacked for having converted only to improve their station in society, and for supposedly continuing to adhere to the practices of Judaism behind closed doors. The tailor Gonzalo García, for example, was reported to have stated that *conversos* like him were 'captives', where Alonso de San Clementine's wife declared that the Easter story was invented 'to do harm to the Jews'.[14] Regardless of whether these statements were fabricated, the fact they were recorded clearly indicates that this type of anti-Christian sentiment was what

the Inquisitors feared finding in *conversos*' statements. Despite the evident religious aspects, it is important to note that popular desire to initiate a complete Jewish expulsion seems to have been virtually non-existent at the time of the monarchs' establishment of the Inquisition. They continued intervening in Jewish *aljamas* into the early 1490s, demanding fair distribution of taxes at Guadalajara in 1491, and appointed 'Rabbi Mayr' as prospective tax official for Toledo from 1492 to 1494.[15] However, Ferdinand and Isabella acceded to Torquemada's request for separation of Jews and Christians, expelling all Jews in the hope that this would solve the issue of *conversos*' heresies.[16] This apprehension of the negative impact of Jewish religious practices on Christianity explains both clerical and royal animosity towards the *conversos*; they feared Catholic Spain would become infected from the inside.

Attitudes towards the *conversos* in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reveal an uncertain and inconsistent societal approach towards the issue of religious tolerance in early modern Spain. Indeed, the lack of fear in secular and religious politics towards the crypto-Jewish population in the 1500s is particularly striking. In 1532, the Castilian Cortes at council in Segovia issued a plea for the curtailment of 'discrimination against people of Jewish origin'.[17] For the Inquisition, the issues of Jewish heritage and Judaizing seemed relatively insignificant, considering that the latter is completely absent from trial records of the Alumbrados of Toledo in the late 1520s.[18] Henry Kamen even claims this period saw an increasingly tolerant society.[19] However, it is more plausible that this newfound tolerance was simply a repercussion of the Inquisition's new focus on Protestantism and the Counter-Reformation in Spain. Approximately ninety percent of new cases in Catalonia were brought against 'Old Christians', those with no Jewish or Muslim heritage.[20] Additionally, three out of four of the Alumbrados were executed for some level of adherence to 'Lutheranism' rather than for any kind of Jewish ties.[21] Therefore, the decreasing antagonism towards Jews and *conversos* shows the intensifying efforts to stem the impact of the Reformation in Spain, rather than increasing religious tolerance.

Nevertheless, the sixteenth century also witnessed increasing anti-Jewish propaganda and legislation, underlined by the conspiracy theory of a Jewish plot with Constantinople and the introduction of purity of blood laws. Letters purportedly sent in 1492 from Spanish Jews requesting Ottoman aid, although likely forgeries, formed the substantive evidence for this theory. These letters quickly became widely published and accepted across Iberia in the first half of the seventeenth century and were used by priest and historian Baltasar Porreno to justify the contentious statutes of blood purity.[22] The success of this theory and its ready acceptance by renowned clerics and laymen demonstrated a continued fear of the potential threats of Jews and *conversos* to Spanish society. The purity of blood laws reveal to historians a shifting attitude to Judaism. The newfound fear and disgust of Jewish blood, which was claimed to 'possess corrupt judges', indicated a novel concept of 'strict biological determinism' in Catholic Spain which was to have major colonial repercussions.[23]

The treatment and legal separation of the *conversos* in early modern Spain demonstrate a significant development in Western racist thought and action as well, the Spanish purity of blood laws further influencing similar laws in colonial America. Indeed, Inquisitorial offices established in Mexico in 1569 and Lima in 1610 prohibited settlers who could not prove three generations of Catholic baptism, effectively banning Jewish *conversos*.[24] These laws were established to protect the perceived purity of Spanish Catholicism from infection by a Jewish lineage. Fear

of such 'infection' helped generate a new pseudo-biological concept. In contrast to the easily distinguishable black African slaves, Jews had no discernible features. Therefore, Inquisitors turned to genealogy and consequently contributed to the introduction of racial categorization of religion.[25] The term '*raza*', part of an evolving Castilian vocabulary, was used to describe an amalgamation of culture and race from the early fifteenth century. It was equally transferable to use for animals. Sebastián de Covarrubias' 1611 dictionary, written two years after the expulsion of moriscos from Iberia, defined *raza* as 'the caste of purebred horses … marked by a brand', and 'in [human] lineages' as 'meant negatively, as in having some race of … Jew'.[26] It is apparent that *raza* had not only a biological implication, but also highlighted the distinct and alien nature of the Jewish race in the Catholic Iberian Peninsula. The fear that Jewish blood was a contaminant which could 'destroy the world', as described by one Portuguese writer in 1623, illustrates the fear and suspicion towards the Jewish and *converso* population.[27] This reinforced a sincerity of belief in the widely purported Jewish conspiracy to control Christendom, and actually links Christian and colonial attitudes to Jews with similar ones to black Africans through biological separation. Ethiopian blackness was described as the 'natural infection of blood' and Christians were legally separated from the 'negro' in a way not dissimilar to their separation from the Jews.[28]

The nature of Spanish concerns about Jewish presence changed considerably over the course of the early modern period. The fifteenth-century secular approach to Jewish populations demonstrates a surprising continuation with the medieval *convivencia*. Despite the mass persecutions and conversions of 1391 and subsequent declining Jewish wealth and presence in cities, Judeo-Christian relations remained relatively civil. Conflicts of a political and financial nature were commonplace but there was still 'a dense web of economic independence' between wealthy families of both faiths.[29] Religious fears of the negative effect of Jews and *conversos* on the Catholic population were the primary driving force behind the Inquisition. Ferdinand and Isabella's 1492 Edict of Expulsion, which accused the Jews of attempting to 'seduce faithful Christians' is particularly telling and explains their particular hostility towards the un-Christian and Judaizing *conversos*.[30] The decrease of converso prosecutions during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation indicate that they were no longer viewed as the primary threat to Christianity. However, the rapid reappearance of Judaizers in trials from 1590 suggests that Spain had not become more tolerant but rather that the Inquisition had needed to temporarily redirect its focus as an important tool of the Catholic Counter-Reformation.[31] The lack of tolerance and increasing anxiety amongst clergy and legislators in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain is evident from the purity of blood laws and the subsequent anti-Semitic accusations of conspiracy. These laws tied in closely with the linguistic development of the concept of race, or *raza*, and the increasing fears of Jewish blood, rather than religion. Several prominent anti-*converso* writers emphasised the 'ruinous lineages' of Jews.[32] Thus, fears about the presence of Jews in early modern Spain indicate an unexpected disconnect between religious and secular attitudes in a period usually characterized as dominated by religion. They also demonstrate, however, the development of a concept of pseudo-biological racism which significantly impacted Spanish settlements and native populations in the burgeoning American colonial empires.

48

References

[1] W. Monter, *Frontiers of Heresy: The Spanish Inquisition from the Basque Lands to Sicily* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 3; H. Rawlings, *Church, Religion and Society in Early Modern Spain* (London, 2002), p. 7.

[2] M. D. Meyerson, *A Jewish Renaissance in Fifteenth-Century Spain* (New Jersey, 2004), p. 93.

[3] D. Nirenberg, 'Was There Race Before Modernity? The Example of 'Jewish' Blood in Late Medieval Spain', in M. Eliav-Feldon, B. Isaac and J. Ziegler (eds.), *The Origins of Racism in the West* (New York, 2009), pp. 248-253.

[4] N. Roth, *Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain* (Wisconsin, 1995), p. 51.

[5] J. Ray, 'Beyond Tolerance and Persecution: Reassessing our Approach to the Medieval Convivencia', *Jewish Social Studies*, 11.2 (2005), p. 6.

[6] H. Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition: An Historical Revision* (London, 1998), pp. 16-17.

[7] Meyerson, *A Jewish Renaissance in Fifteenth-Century Spain*, pp. 87-89.

[8] A. MacKay, 'Popular Movements and Pogroms in Fifteenth-Century Castile', *Past & Present*, 55 (1972), p. 38.

[9] Meyerson, *A Jewish Renaissance in Fifteenth-Century Spain*, p. 90.

[10] Rawlings, *Church, Religion and Society in Early Modern Spain*, p. 7.

[11] Ibid., p. 6.

[12] MacKay, 'Popular Movements and Pogroms in Fifteenth-Century Castile', p. 47.

[13] Ibid., p. 61.

[14] J. Edwards, 'Religious Faith and Doubt in Late Medieval Spain: Soria Circa 1450-1500', *Past & Present*, 120 (1988), pp. 8-11.

[15] Roth, *Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain*, p. 275-276.

[16] Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition*, p. 19.

[17] H. Kamen, 'Toleration and Dissent in Sixteenth-Century Spain: The Alternative Tradition', *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 19:1 (1988), p. 9.

[18] A. Gordon Kinder, 'The Reformation and Spain: Still-Birth, By-Pass or Excision?', *Reformation and Renaissance Review*, 1.1 (2015), p. 103.

[19] Kamen, 'Toleration and Dissent in Sixteenth-Century Spain', p. 10.

[20] H. Kamen, *The Phoenix and the Flame: Catalonia and the Counter Reformation* (Avon, 1993), pp. 218-219.

[21] Kinder, 'The Reformation and Spain', p. 104.

[22] F. Soyer, 'The Anti-Semitic Conspiracy Theory in Sixteenth-Century Spain and Portugal and the Origins of the Carta de los Judíos de Constantinopla: New Evidence', *Sefarad*, 17.2 (2014), p. 373.

[23] J. Friedman, 'Jewish Conversion, the Spanish Pure Blood Laws and Reformation: A Revisionist View of Racial and Religious Anti-Semitism', *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 3.1 (1987), pp. 17-18.

[24] A. Helg, 'Slave but not Citizen: Free People of Colour and Blood Purity in Colonial Spanish American Legislation', *Millars: Espai i Historia*, 42.1 (2017), pp. 80-81.

[25] Friedman, 'Jewish Conversion, the Spanish Pure Blood Laws and Reformation', p. 3.

[26] Nirenberg, 'Was There Race Before Modernity?', p. 251.

[27] Friedman, 'Jewish Conversion, the Spanish Pure Blood Laws and Reformation', p. 17.

[28] R. Collinson, *The Three Voyages of Martin Frobisher* (Cambridge, 2011), p. 56; W. D. Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro 1550-1812* (North Carolina, 1977), p. 79.

[29] Meyerson, *A Jewish Renaissance in Fifteenth-Century Spain*, p. 90.

[30] Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition*, p. 20.

[31] Monter, *Frontiers of Heresy*, p. 213.

[32] Nirenberg, 'Was There Race Before Modernity?', pp. 258-259.

Kate Chipchase
Sexual Politics in the Weimar Republic

Scholarly attitudes towards sexual politics in the Weimar Republic have seen significant shifts across the last century, as scholars used to think that sexual politics were revolutionary amidst a background of strife but have increasingly argued that the Weimar Republic's sexual politics was not actually particularly revolutionary. The twentieth-century historiography constructed a dichotic image of the republic as one of 'glitter and doom'.[1] This term, criticised by the later historian Jochen Hung, foregrounds how the 'progressive' unparalleled sexual freedom of German citizens contrasted with a wider background of crippling political and economic problems epitomised by the Great Depression. Hung criticises this "old" idea and instead argues that the republic was not as revolutionary as it seems. In order to analyse scholarly attitudes towards Weimar sexual politics, this essay will divide the historiography into two key areas of debate. First, is it correct to define this period as one of sexual revolution, and how has this answer developed within the scholarship? Second, how have opinions developed regarding the role of sexual politics in the fall of the Weimar Republic? These two debates surrounding sexual politics in the Republic illuminate significant changes within Weimar historiography with a particular division at the turn of the twenty-first century. There is a sense of progress both in the historiography and the history itself.

Historians have tended to focus on two key developments in Weimar sexual politics: the deregulation of prostitution through the Law to Combat Venereal Disease in 1927, and the growing movement to repeal Article 175 of the Penal Code and thus decriminalise homosexual relationships. Judgment regarding the impact of such reforms has, for the most part, been influenced by the widespread contemporary belief that Weimar society was undergoing a genuine sexual revolution. This belief is evident

in Isherwood's 1939 novel, *Goodbye to Berlin*, and has been strengthened by subsequent productions such as the 1972 film *Cabaret*.[2]

We should turn first to the 1927 Law to Combat Venereal Disease, a replacement for the previous system which criminalised all prostitutes apart from those registered with the state.[3] Prostitutes had been subject to harsh, controlling measures – including being forced to attend medical treatment that was often neither effective nor safe.[4] The new 1927 law legalised prostitution, and the dominant theme of historiography surrounding the reform has been one which highlights its liberating impact. Similarly, another aspect of Weimar sexual politics which has been taken as evidence of a sexual revolution is the development of opposition to Paragraph 175 of the German Penal code, which made homosexual relations between men illegal. While the law was not repealed under the Republic, it sparked a mass movement for homosexual liberation which has contributed enormously to the idea of the Republic as one of unprecedented freedom.

We should understand, however, that much of the historiography arising in the years after the republic comes from a perspective of longing and nostalgia - after the Second World War and into the Cold War. West German historians in particular tended to look back on Weimar society as a liberal haven, referring to the 'Golden Twenties'.[5] The influence of German historians like Jost Hermand and Frank Trommler who overly sentimentalise Weimar society has been international and has therefore set the precedent for global Weimar historiography, as is evident in Peter Gay's analysis of Weimar culture.[6] Gay has drawn attention in particular to the flourishing of poetry circles within the Republic, often held together by close romantic relationships between the men involved.[7] Moreover, it has been noted that whilst Paragraph 175 was never fully

abolished, Weimar newspapers reacted to the campaign as though it had been- showing a widespread belief among contemporaries that they had achieved significant sexual liberation.[8] Thus we can see that the broad trend amongst those who witnessed the republic reflect on the period as one of sexual liberty, and this has to an extent continued into more recent twenty-first century studies. Julia Roos has continued this argument, pointing to significant sexual liberation of Weimar citizens and drawing on contemporary sources to defend her argument. Roos has spoken for the revolutionary success of the 1927 deregulation of prostitution, analysing an article by Marie Elisabeth Lüders (Weimar feminist and social welfare advocate) to highlight how the law challenged patriarchal ideals. The de-regulation in particular 'abandoned the misogynist lie of women's exclusive responsibility for the spread of STDs'.[9] Hence, Roos views the reform as evidence of significant liberation, as sexual politics in the period challenged long-established social norms.

The revolutionary impact of sexual politics has been disputed by historians such as Laurie Marhoefer and Annette Timm, who have highlighted the limitations of reform. Marhoefer, by analysing the drawbacks of the 1927 law, provides a more nuanced analysis than Roos, whose focus on the voices of contemporaries like Lüders (an advocate for such reform) is likely to provide an overly positive image. Marhoefer argues that while the 1927 law provided freedom for some, this came at the price of a marginalised minority, using evidence of opposition to the law from prostitutes themselves. She has thus utilised alternative contemporary voices to provide a more complex image. Many of these women argued that they preferred to keep their homes in brothels, and that they felt forced out of a job they found preferable to domestic service.[10] Marhoefer has also disputed the idea

of homosexual emancipation in the Republic. Much like the deregulation of prostitution, some freedom was offered to the many, but at the expense of the few.[11] The development of a gay nightlife and subculture was indicative of the limitations of Weimar reforms - homosexuality was tolerated in private, and thus the formation of a subculture was a result of a lack of freedom in the public arena.[12] Moreover, in contrast to Roos' belief that the 1927 Law liberated women from patriarchal stigmas by providing advice against sexual acts more likely to spread diseases, Annette Timm sees this an intrusion of the state into the private realm.[13] To Timm, the Law is symptomatic of the state tightening the boundaries of sexual freedom by imposing state-sanctioned sexual norms.[14] Atina Grossman has echoed the arguments of Marhoefer and Timm, highlighting the restrictive nature of sexual reforms through the state's defining of female sexuality on male terms and thus negating historians' image of flourishing female sexual freedom.[15]

It is thus clear that there have been significant shifts regarding the extent to which there was a sexual revolution in the Republic. Twentieth-century historiography largely played into the image of 'glitter and doom', with unparalleled sexual freedom, but historians of more recent years have questioned the revolutionary impact of sexual politics. Twenty-first century historiography has shifted its focus onto the limits of sexual legislation, these recent changes reflecting Mark Fenemore's argument in favour of moving away from a dichotic understanding of Weimar society: as he suggests, perhaps we should avoid viewing the republic as pro-sex or anti-sex, and instead investigate the varying impacts of sexual politics.[16]

A second area of debate surrounds the role of sexual politics in the fall of the Republic. An older school of thought has seen the rise of the Nazis as a continuation of 'moral decline' under the Republic, whereas the more recent 'backlash thesis' argues this perceived promiscuity triggered a conservative reaction which the NSDAP were able to exploit in their rise to power. In opposition to both of these theories is Marhoefer's more recent argument that sexual politics were of limited importance in the fall of the Republic, instead demonstrating democratic strength. Contemporary historians Gerhard Ritter and Friedrich Mienecke have arguably set the precedent for this narrative of moral decline and sexual decadence in facilitating the rise of the Nazis. In 1948, Ritter argued that authority had been destroyed under the Republic, with the erosion of religious faith and lack of moral values providing the only environment in which the Nazis could possibly have risen to power.[17] Mienecke echoed this, stating 'Nazism presents itself as an example of degeneration in the German character'.[18] Thus, contemporary historians have attempted to rationalise Hitler's rise by arguing the Republic had created the necessary conditions. These analyses, however, are limited by the historians' clear agendas. Sebastian Ulrich suggests that this narrative of moral decline by *émigré* academics and East German historians was an attempt to validate the existence of West Germany by presenting the first democratic trial as condemned from the outset.[19] Perhaps we should also consider whether historians for whom the Nazi regime was part of their lived experience may be trying to make sense of their potential involvement within the regime.

Thus, while these contemporary historians attempted to explain the events of their lifetime with a linear model of moral decline, more recent historians have argued instead for a conservative backlash against perceived moral 'demise'. This is still a significant debate among twenty-first century historians regarding the extent to which this conservative backlash played a part in bringing down the Republic. Roos is a particularly strong advocate for the

Figure 1: P. Rupprecht (alias Fips), 'Jewish Culture: The Natural and the Unnatural', *Der Stürmer* (August 1929), available at https://re-search.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/sturm28.htm [Accessed 7 June 2021]

backlash theory, stating 'backlash against liberal prostitution reform' rallied 'antidemocratic sentiments'.[20] As mentioned previously, Roos uses contemporary voices to show widespread moral insecurity such as that of Pastor Ludwig Hoppe, who criticised the proliferation of 'drink, lewdness, and hedonism' in the Republic, as well as looking to the Prussian protests against the 1927 law.[21] Roos argues that the Nazis were able to exploit this and portray themselves as moral saviours of the nation, citing propaganda such as the weekly newspaper *Der Stürmer*. Examples from the newspaper certainly reference sexual politics. However, Marhoefer's investigation of Nazi propaganda in the years leading up to 1933, using prominent Nazi newspapers *Der Angriff* and *Völkischer Beobachte*, has found that sexual politics were rarely a primary subject of propaganda.[22] One would expect them to be prominent if sexual politics were so central to the rise of the Nazis, as proponents of the backlash theory might suggest. As Marhoefer suggests, 'if the Nazi Party did ride to power on a backlash against sexual progressivism, one would expect the Nazis themselves to be aware that they were riding on a backlash and to make propaganda that stoked it'.[23] This

is illustrated by examples like this cartoon from 1929, entitled 'Jewish culture' (Fig. 1), which shows a Jewish couple watching pornography - here promiscuity is referenced, but it is secondary to the Nazi Party's anti-Semitic agenda.

Just as Marhoefer has disputed the backlash thesis, then, prominent in recent historiography, she has also questioned altogether the longstanding assumption that sexual politics contributed significantly to the fall of the Republic. In contrast to preceding historiography, Marhoefer argues that sexual politics were evidence of democratic strength: they were certainly divisive, but the ability of the Republic to forge 'the Weimar Settlement' which appeased most political figures illustrates the functionality of the Weimar democracy.[24]

Thus, through investigating changing historiographical attitudes to sexual politics in the Weimar Republic, we can see two key areas of change. Firstly, there have been significant shifts in opinion regarding the extent to which there was a sexual revolution. Moving away from contemporary perceptions of Berlin as a place of unbridled sexual freedom, more recent scholarship has instead pointed to the restrictions of Weimar sexual reforms. Secondly, we have seen significant change regarding the role of sexual politics in the fall of the Republic. While earlier understandings linked the Weimar and Nazi periods as eras of 'moral decay', twenty-first century historiography instead sees the rise of Hitler as the result of conservative backlash against sexual reforms. Marhoefer, however, has taken a more radical stance, not only questioning the importance of a conservative backlash, but also whether sexual politics were a weakness of the republic at all. Thus, we have seen almost a complete turnaround in the historiographical attitudes to Weimar sexual politics since the twentieth century, and may see further change in the years to come.

References

[1] J. Hung (ed.), *Beyond Glitter and Doom: The Contingency of the Weimar Republic* (Munich, 2012).

[2] J. Hung, 'Beyond Glitter and Doom: The New Paradigm of Contingency in Weimar Research', in J. Hung (ed.), *Beyond Glitter and Doom: The Contingency of the Weimar Republic* (Munich, 2012), p.9.

[3] J.S. Smith, 'Prostitutes in Weimar Berlin: Moving Beyond the Victim-Whore Dichotomy' in J. Hung (ed.), *Beyond Glitter and Doom: The Contingency of the Weimar Republic* (Munich, 2012), p.136; J. Roos, *Weimar through the Lens of Gender: Prostitution Reform, Women's Emancipation, and German Democracy, 1919-1933* (Michigan, 2010), p.10.

[4] L. Marhoefer, 'Degeneration, Sexual Freedom, and the Politics of the Weimar Republic, 1918-1933', *German Studies Review*, 34:3 (2011) p.533.

[5] Hung, 'Beyond Glitter and Doom', p. 11.

[6] Ibid., p.11.

[7] P. Gay, *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (New York, 1970) p.66.

[8] Marhoefer, 'Degeneration, Sexual Freedom, and the Politics', p.538.

[9] Roos, *Weimar through the Lens of Gender*, pp. 1-4.

[10] Marhoefer, 'Degeneration, Sexual Freedom, and the Politics', pp.534-535.

[11] Ibid., p. 538.

[12] L. Marhoefer, *Sex and the Weimar Republic: German Homosexual Emancipation and the rise of the Nazis* (Toronto, 2015), p.208-209.

[13] Marhoefer, 'Degeneration, Sexual Freedom, and the Politics', p. 532.

[14] J. Evans and J. Freeland, 'Rethinking Sexual Modernity in Twentieth-Century Germany', *Social History*, 37:3 (2012), p.316.

[15] A. Grossman, 'The New Woman and the Rationalization of Sexuality in Weimar Germany' in A. Snitow, C. Stansell and S. Thompson (eds.), *Desire: The Politics of Sexuality* (London,1984), p.191.

[16] M. Fenemore, 'The Recent Historiography of Sexuality in Twentieth-Century Germany', *The Historical Journal*, 52:3 (2009), pp.763-779.

[17] L. Marhoefer, 'Did Sex Bring Down the Weimar Republic?', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute*, 65 (2019), p.60.

[18] F. Meinecke and S.B. Fay (trans.), *The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections* (Boston,1963), p.1.

[19] Hung, 'Beyond Glitter and Doom', p. 10.

[20] Roos, *Weimar through the Lens of Gender*, p.4.

[21] L. Hoppe, *Sexualler Bolshcewismus un Seine Abwehr* (Berlin, 1921), cited in Roos, *Weimar through the Lens of Gender*, p.177; Roos, *Weimar through the Lens of Gender*, p.187.

[22] L. Marhoefer, 'Did Sex Bring Down the Weimar Republic?', p.65.

[23] Ibid., p.65.

[24] Marhoefer, *Sex and the Weimar Republic*, p.10.

Angus Crawford
Principalities in Late Medieval France

France in the late Middle Ages was an eclectic and contested political space, and this complicates any explanation of the processes of state formation.[1] By reacting against historians, such as Joseph Strayer, who put forward a "decline and recovery" grand narrative of state formation in the late Middle Ages, Édouard Perroy argued in a seminal article of 1945 that small individual states were emerging in the fifteenth century which undermined, and indeed 'swallowed', the Valois Crown.[2] Many of Perroy's ideas were expanded upon by John Le Patourel who highlighted the importance of autonomous princes in the political life of this period. In Patourel's words: 'France, like Germany and Italy, passed through an "age of principalities"'.[3] Patourel's emphasis on "princely states" influenced much of the subsequent scholarship. Most clearly, it is seen in the work of Michael Jones on the duchy of Brittany and Richard Vaughan on Valois Burgundy, but the theory has been

applied extensively to include less notable "principalities" like the duchies of Bourbon, Gascony, and the lands of Gaston Fébus. Generally, these studies demonstrate princes acting increasingly independent of the French Crown by establishing their own financial and legal institutions or ideologically presenting themselves like kings. With a particular focus on Brittany, Burgundy, and Gascony, this essay will accept that princes were important political actors in the kingdom of France, and that, naturally, many leading princes sought to extend their powers in a time of political instability. However, it will also suggest that to label this period an "age of principalities" is to take too narrow a focus and not to do justice to the '"plurality of powers"' evident in the municipalities.[4] More importantly, though, princely states invariably had shallow roots and were commonly penetrated in matters of justice and royal service, as studies of figures like Olivier de Clisson and George Chastelain

would suggest. Thus, even the starkest of principalities was never fully independent of the Crown.

The notion that France was experiencing an "age of principalities" in the late Middle Ages is best supported by an analysis of the duchy of Brittany. Jones – whose thesis was supervised by Patourel – argues that Brittany became increasingly distant from the Valois Crown under the Montfort dukes, to the degree that an independent "state" was created.[5] As Jones suggests, a degree of autonomy is certainly noticeable before the Breton War of Succession (1341-1364), but it was during and after this conflict where the ideological and administrative structures which facilitated "independence" were consolidated. In this sense, he contends that there was a considerable degree of continuous "independence" between Charles de Blois and John IV. For instance, a primitive *Chambre des Comptes* is distinguishable in the 1260s and a Breton *Parlement* in the 1280s.[6] It was the immediate pressures of war, however, which made it necessary for Blois to reform the administration. The frequency of appeals for justice catalysed processes of professionalisation, which contributed to greater Breton autonomy as appeals to the *Parlement* at Paris became practically non-existent. Therefore, as Jones argues, the dukes' powers were seldom directly undermined by the king.[7]

Furthermore, the development of independent financial mechanisms under Blois and the Montforts was significant in underpinning the 'political emancipation' of the duchy from the Crown.[8] Under Blois, the introduction of the hearth tax (the *fouage*) between 1356-1358 came to be an important element of the financial apparatus of the Montfort dukes.[9] After Auray (1364), John IV's real achievement was translating the power to raise the *fouage* in wartime to peacetime as well.[10] In this regard, by the end of the fourteenth century, the Duke of Brittany could raise a substantial revenue without the requirement of royal gifts, which reinforced Montfort independence from the Valois Crown in a way not replicated by most Apanage princes.[11]

It is apparent there was a large degree of continuity between Blois and the Montfort dukes in attempts to foster a distinct Breton ideology. The fact that the Montforts followed Blois in minting coins with the *Dei gratia* clause on them is a good illustration of this.[12] Furthermore, Blois challenged ideas of royal sovereignty by sporting a royal Crown instead of a ducal *cercle*, and such expressions of sovereignty were only enhanced under the Montfort dukes.[13] Take their coronation service of 1402, for example, which for all intents and purposes was a royal one.[14] Significantly, when the Breton dukes performed homage it was typically done in an obscure fashion, sometimes standing up, which was closer to simple rather than liege homage – the latter being necessary for Peers of the Realm.[15] The dukes somewhat tenuously appealed to history to justify their assertions of sovereignty also. The Breton lawyers at Paris argued that Brittany had always been an independent kingdom since the Carolingian period.[16] The Montfort dukes' claims of *Dei gratia* were vindicated by claiming descent from Breton saint-kings Judicaël (c. 590-658) and Salomon (r. 857-879), which seemingly equalled Valois descent from the saint-king Louis IX, as well as forming a rebuttal to the attempts to canonise Blois after his death at Auray.[17]

It is undeniable, then, that over the course of our period the Breton dukes became increasingly independent of the French Crown and projected themselves much like sovereign kings. In this, Jones is accurate. However, it is possible to criticise Jones on the extent of independence which he assumes. While Jones is content to write about the validity of a "Breton state", his own analysis would also suggest that it was one which had weak foundations. During John IV's exile to England (1373-1379), for example, Brittany was under Valois

control, indicating perhaps that Breton "independence" only really blossomed in periods of royal weakness.[18]

Recently, scholars have tackled Jones' rather insular understanding of a Breton princely state and suggested that its structures were far more granular than what he contends. Erika Graham-Goering, for example, has examined Jeanne de Penthièvre, the wife of Blois, to contend that studies of princely state formation must also pay attention to important political figures around the prince. By focusing on Penthièvre, Graham-Goering demonstrates that princely rule was often more contested than Jones suggests.[19] In a similar vein, John Bell Henneman and Graeme Small highlight that Jones's conviction about a Breton state is open to question when the Crown occasionally tempted key nobles into royal service. Most notably this is manifest in the case of Olivier de Clisson (1336-1407) who served as Constable of France under Charles V between 1380 and 1392.[20] It may be surprising that Clisson entered into royal service, given that his father had been executed in 1343 for treason and, like John IV, he had been brought up at the English court during the War of Succession.[21] Nevertheless, Clisson's espousal of using more "defensive" tactics is fundamental in explaining many of the military reversals under Charles V.[22] While it would probably be erroneous to see Clisson as representative of the majority of Breton noble opinion towards the French king, it would be equally misleading to downplay his importance.[23] More so than Bertrand de Guesclin, Clisson was a leader of Breton noble networks and was one of the wealthiest lords in the west.[24] By neglecting the role of Clisson, it seems Jones fails to fully acknowledge the relevance of "dual allegiance", and the porosity of relations between Crown and duke which existed for some leading nobles.[25]

Alongside Brittany, many scholars have made a plausible case that Valois Burgundy was an autonomous "princely state" in this period. The justification of a 'Burgundian State' was first outlined by Henri Pirenne.[26] Pirenne argues that from Philip the Bold onwards the dukes were increasingly at odds with the French Crown, but that it was the major territorial acquisitions under Philip the Good which really 'accomplished' the formation of the Burgundian state.[27] For Pirenne, Philip's procurements were part of the 'long duration of the Burgundian state' which stretched back to the time of Carolingian Lotharingia.[28] However, Pirenne's account fails to convince because it comes across as teleological, and one which tries to historically justify the emergence of "modern states", especially Belgium.[29]

By eschewing Pirenne's "nationalist" baggage, Vaughan has most coherently developed Pirenne's arguments to suggest that a "Burgundian state" was forming from 1384 onwards, reaching its zenith under Philip the Good.[30] Much like their Breton counterparts, the Valois dukes established a degree of independence by founding their own administrative institutions and also making controversial ideological claims. Vaughan argues that the creation of a *Chambre des Comptes* at Dijon (1384) and Lille (1386) demonstrates Philip the Bold's intentions to centralise the administration to build the apparatus of a new state.[31] It is important not to exaggerate the importance of these institutions as markers of detachment from the Crown, as even Vaughan labels them as 'clumsy and inefficient', but they sit alongside other developments.[32] Philip the Good also established a chivalric order, The Order of the Golden Fleece, in 1430.[33] D'Arcy Boulton describes the creation of this Order as an 'instrument of unification' which encouraged Burgundian nobles and other important lords to rally around the duke instead of the king.[34] Undoubtedly, while the duke can be seen to be attempting to foster greater loyalty towards his person, he was likewise trying

to ameliorate relations with other important French nobles. This is most noticeable by the fact that the Order was bestowed upon Charles, Duke of Orléans. It almost goes without saying that Charles's father had been executed on John the Fearless's orders in 1407. The fact that Philip granted this Order to a rival prince demonstrates Philip's genuine desire to play a significant part in the political life of the kingdom.[35]

By following the influence of Johan Huizinga and Paul Bonenfant, Andrew Brown and Graeme Small have tackled Vaughan's arguments that the first three Valois Dukes were uninterested in the political life of the kingdom.[36] Brown and Small accept that Philip the Bold and his successors attempted to increase their ducal powers, but deny that it was at the expense of their supreme loyalty towards the Crown.[37] Firstly, it seems Vaughan overstates the "oppositional" nature of Philip the Bold's territorial acquisitions. The gains under Philip the Bold were mostly diplomatic and achieved through royal approval, and though Philip the Good dramatically extended his domain, the foundations for these exploits were laid by his forebears.[38] In this sense, the dukes were 'doing nothing original' by looking eastwards to expand their influence.[39] Secondly, following the Treaty of Arras (1435), the attempts made by the third Valois duke to participate in the reconquest under Charles VII illustrate an acute desire to serve the Crown.[40] The Burgundians were crucial to the recapture of Paris (1436) and played a role in the Siege of Calais (1436). However, the contribution to the latter should not be underscored given its failure and its general chaotic nature.[41] Undeniably, Philip tried to involve himself in the French body politic in diverse ways, as his proposal for a crusade in the name of the French king after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 would indicate.[42] But perhaps the best evidence that Philip the Good never 'turned his back' on the French kingdom lies in the *Chronicle* of

George Chastelain, which has typically been neglected or misunderstood by historians.[43] Rolf Strøm-Olsen and Graeme Small especially suggest that the *Chronicle* of the official historian for the last two Valois dukes undermines much of the current scholarship supporting a "Burgundian state". In Chastelain's 'Francocentric' account, while Philip the Good was an ambitious prince, he never sought to dissolve the intimate connections with the kingdom.[44] Chastelain is an important source because he can reasonably be seen as representative of the broader Burgundian noble elite. He was especially close with the key nobles Philippe Pot, the duke's premier chambellan, and the courtier Olivier de la Marche. The Pot family was renowned for its "dual service", where Philippe's grandfather had served Charles VI and the first three dukes of Burgundy.[45] Yet, an important question remains: why, then, is Chastelain seemingly negative towards the French kings? It is essential to draw a distinction between the kings and kingship in the *Chronicle*. For Strøm-Olsen, Chastelain expressed 'unflinching loyalty to the French Crown' but criticised the person of the king because of the failures to allow the duke back into royal service.[46]

Indeed, it is only up to the reign of Charles the Bold that we can really speak of a Burgundian "princely state".[47] Charles severed 'the umbilical cord' which bound his territories to France in several ways.[48] First, the last Valois duke established his own sovereign *Parlement* at Malines in 1473, which would not allow appeals to the Parisian *Parlement*. Second, unlike his predecessors, through his military reforms in the early 1470s, Charles sought to develop the Burgundian military capacity to act wholly independently of the Crown.[49] Thirdly, the concept of "dual identity", which was an important component of his predecessors' rule, was heavily condemned, as his treatment of his step-brother Anthony, the bastard of Burgundy,

epitomises.[50] Finally, it is imperative to note that Charles died attempting to expand his influence eastwards rather than westwards, as even he recognised that he was no match for the French king.[51]

Scholars who argue for an "age of principalities" typically undervalue the contested nature of princely relations with the towns, further problematising explanations of state formation.[52] Given that the territories of the Valois Dukes were the most urbanised in Europe, Burgundy serves as a germane example to explore this theme.[53] As Small demonstrates in his case-study of Tournai, while the dukes might extend their influence through episcopal appointments and economic sanctions, they could never dominate this peripheral town. The relationship was characterised much more by negotiation and concession than ducal hegemony.[54] Similarly, in Bruges, urban ceremonies went forward only with the approval of municipal leaders.[55] Notably, the dukes struggled to impose their authority on Ghent when the town revolted in 1447 following the imposition of the *gabelle*, leading to a burdensome war between 1452-53.[56] Municipal elites more frequently looked to the royal centre for influence and protection than to the princes, again underlining the limits of the "princely court" framework.[57]

Turning now to English Gascony in the fourteenth century, it is evident that even the most theoretically independent principality was undermined by external forces. Following the Treaty of Brétigny (1360), the English ruled up to a third of the kingdom, as they acquired much of the "greater Aquitaine" region.[58] The main problem for the Black Prince, who ruled on behalf of his father from 1365 onwards, was his failure to convince many of the nobles of greater Aquitaine of his justified place within the French political culture.[59] This is most famously illustrated in Gaston Fébus's (1331-1391) refusal to pay homage for Béarn to the English prince, which he claimed to rule *Dei gratia*, unlike his territories of Marsan and Gabardan for which he did reluctantly pay homage.[60] Like the principalities of Brittany and Burgundy, Aquitaine could not prevent nobles from being assimilated into royal service. In this regard, Guilhem-Sanche de Pommiers, Viscount of Pommiers, was arrested by the English for trying to rally support for the Valois cause in 1377. Like Clisson, the example of Pommiers is striking because his family had supported the English regime for over 100 years.[61]

However, the case study of Aquitaine is most fruitful in highlighting the fundamental limits of princely justice and the failures of princes to convincingly undermine the French kings' claims to be "Most Christian". Nothing exemplifies the confines of princely power better than the count of Armagnac's appeal to the *Parlement* of Paris in 1368, in response to the supposed unjust nature of the hearth tax levied by the Black Prince.[62] Even after Brétigny, it remained the case that for leading nobles in the kingdom it was essential to go to the king of France for the highest justice.[63] Aquitaine was not unique either. For all the efforts of the Breton lawyers at Paris, the Breton *Parlement* was never a sovereign body, nor was the Grand Council under the first three Valois dukes of Burgundy.[64] While Jones makes a fair point that in practice the ducal *Parlements* were rarely circumscribed, he misses the crux of the matter.[65] As David Green outlines, the very fact that a Parisian *Parlement* continued to exist encapsulates the sense that ideologically nobles were far from convinced about ducal sovereignty.[66] In this observation, we can truly see the continued importance of the idea of the "Most Christian King" in the political culture of this period. It is integral, therefore, not to place excessive political weight on the ideological trappings of different principalities. As Small puts it: 'a duke by the grace of God was not a king *Dei gratia*, let alone a Most Christian King'.[67]

Briefly, let us consider some alternative explanations to the 'mechanisms of power' besides analysis through "principalities".[68] As has been stressed, interpretations of state formation must be aware of the dynamism of political life in this period which gives adequate emphasis on the "plurality of powers". In this regard, Small, by following the influence of Raymond Cazelles, recommends a geopolitical approach which focuses on the noble political networks in the "east" and "west" of the kingdom. He argues it explains much of the political instability of this period.[69] Conversely, John Watts proposes a comparative European model which focuses on structures ('nations', 'estates', and 'classes') rather than individuals.[70] It is beyond the scope of this essay to evaluate how compelling these interpretations are, but it is clearly possible to assess the richness of political life without committing to a rather superfluous "princely state" framework.[71]

Certainly, the "age of principalities" approach has been helpful to historians of late medieval France. The French Crown in this period was not all-powerful, and the size of the state was small – both of which encouraged independent power mechanisms in a decentralised polity.[72] While not denying the supreme importance of princes as political actors, we have argued that to label this period as an "age of principalities" downplays the diversity of political life in this period. But we have also demonstrated that the princely 'centrifugal' forces need to be counterbalanced by an equally strong, if not stronger, 'centripetal' potency as seen in the towns, the phenomenon of "dual allegiance", and the failures to convincingly undermine the core ideology of a "Most Christian King".[73] In this sense, our understanding of political life must take proper account of its fluidity, which a focus on "princely states" just does not permit.

References

[1] On the diversity of France in this period, see esp. G. Small, *Late Medieval France* (Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 35-45.

[2] See esp. J. Watts, *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300-1500* (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 24, 260. Also see E. Perroy, 'Feudalism or Principalities in Fifteenth Century France', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research,* 6 (1945), pp. 184-185.

[3] J. Le Patourel, 'The King and the Princes in Fourteenth-Century France', in M. Jones (ed.), *Feudal Empires: Norman and Plantagenet* (London, 1984), p. 155.

[4] Small, *France*, p. 3. Small is alluding to Peter Lewis's phrase, 'the pluralistic nature of power distribution', for which see A. Grant, 'Murder Will Out: Kingship, Kinship and Killing in Medieval Scotland', in J. Goodare and S. Boardman (eds.), *Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300-1625* (Edinburgh, 2014) - discussion on p. 204.

[5] M. Jones, *Ducal Brittany 1364-1399: Relations with England and France During the Reign of Duke John IV* (New York, 1970), preface.

[6] M. Jones, 'The Duchy of Brittany in the Late Middle Ages', in *The Creation of Brittany: A Late Medieval State* (London, 1988), pp. 7-8; M. Jones, 'Politics, Sanctity and the Breton State: The Case of the Blessed Charles de Blois, Duke of Brittany (d. 1364)', in J. R. Maddicott and D. M. Pallister (eds.), *The Medieval State: Essays Presented to James Campbell* (London, 2000), pp. 215-216, 231.

[7] M. Jones, '"Mon Pais et Ma Nation": Breton Identity in the Fourteenth Century', in *The Creation of Brittany: A Late Medieval State* (London, 1988), p. 290; Jones, *Ducal Brittany*, p. 37.

[8] See J. Kerhervé, 'Taxation and Ducal Power in Late Medieval Brittany', *French History*, 6 (1992), p. 1.

[9] Jones, *Ducal Brittany*, pp. 26-27; Kerhervé, 'Taxation and Ducal Power', p. 3.

[10] Kerhervé, 'Taxation and Ducal Power', p. 8.

[11] Jones, *Ducal Brittany*, p. 34.

[12] Jones, *Ducal Brittany*, p. 35; G. Small, 'The Crown and the Provinces in the Fifteenth Century', in D. Potter (ed.), *France in the Later Middle Ages 1200-1500* (New York, 2003), p. 134.

[13] Jones, 'Politics, Sanctity and the Breton State', p. 231.

[14] Le Patourel, 'The King and the Princes', p. 167.

[15] M. Jones, 'The Crown and the Provinces in the Fourteenth Century', in D. Potter (ed.), *France in the Later Middle Ages 1200-1500* (New York, 2003), p. 77.

[16] M. Jones, '"Bons Bretons et Bons Francoys":

The Language of Meaning and Treason in Later Medieval France', in *The Creation of Brittany: A Late Medieval State* (London, 1988), p. 340.

[17] See esp. Jones, 'Politics, Sanctity and the Breton State', pp. 215, 231; J. Bell Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson and Political Society in France under Charles V and Charles VI* (Philadelphia, 1996), p. 63; M. Surman, '"A Holy Nation, a Peculiar People": Religion, Region and Nation in Medieval Brittany' (unpublished Durham University Undergraduate Dissertation, 2009), pp. 4, 18-21, available at: http://frenchhistorysociety.co.uk/dissertation_winners.htm [Accessed 10 Dec 2020].

[18] M. Jones, 'The Breton Nobility and their Masters from the Civil War of 1341-1364 to the Late Fifteenth Century', in *The Creation of Brittany: A Late Medieval State* (London, 1988), p. 221.

[19] E. Graham-Goering, *Princely Power in Late Medieval France: Jeanne de Penthièvre and the War for Brittany* (Cambridge, 2020), pp. 1-4, 259-260.

[20] Small, *France*, pp. 122-123.

[21] Bell Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson*, pp. 26, 28.

[22] Bell Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson*, pp. 56-58. Also see, G. Small, 'French Politics During the Hundred Years War', in A. Curry (ed.), *The Hundred Years War Revisited* (London, 2019), pp. 44-45.

[23] Jones, 'The Breton Nobility', pp. 273-274; Bell Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson*, p. 65.

[24] Bell Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson*, pp. 32, 58-60.

[25] On dual allegiance, see esp. Small, 'The Crown and the Provinces in the Fifteenth Century', p. 139. Also, of relevance is Small's similar criticism of Olivier Mattéoni for his work on the duchy of Bourbon, for which see G. Small, 'Book Review: Olivier Mattéoni Servir le Prince', *The English Historical Review,* 115 (2000), p. 951.

[26] H. Pirenne, 'The Formation and Constitution of the Burgundian State (Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries)', *The American Historical Review,* 14 (1909), p. 477.

[27] Ibid, pp. 489-490.

[28] Ibid, pp. 478, 482-489.

[29] M. Boone, 'Yet Another Failed State? The Huizinga-Pirenne Controversy on the Burgundian State Reconsidered', in P. Arnade et al (eds.), *Rereading Huizinga: Autumn of the Middle Ages, A Century Later* (Amsterdam, 2019), p. 105.

[30] R. Vaughan, *Valois Burgundy* (London, 1975), pp. 18-24. Hence the subtitle of Vaughan's biography on Philip the Good: 'The Apogee of Burgundy'; G. Small, *George Chastelain and the Shaping of Valois Burgundy: Political and Historical Culture at Court in the Fifteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 1997), p. 2.

[31] Le Patourel, 'The King and the Princes', p. 178.

[32] Vaughan, Valois Burgundy', p. 102.

[33] B. Schnerb, 'Burgundy', in C. T. Allmand (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History* (vol. 7) (Cambridge, 1998), p. 442.

[34] D'A. J. D. Boulton, 'The Order of the Golden Fleece and the Creation of Burgundian National Identity' in D'A. J. D. Boulton and J. R. Veenstra (eds.), *The Ideology of Burgundy: The Promotion of National Consciousness 1364-1565* (Leiden, 2005), pp. 25-27.

[35] See esp. Small, *France*, p. 167.

[36] On Huizinga's differing views to Pirenne about the "Burgundian state", and Bonenfant, see esp. G. Small, 'Introduction to the 2002 Edition', in R. Vaughan, *Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy* (Woodbridge, 2002), pp. xx-l; Small, *George Chastelain*, p. 4; Boone, 'Yet Another Failed State?', esp. pp. 105-118; A. Brown, *The Valois Dukes of Burgundy* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 1-3, 25-26.

[37] Small, *France*, p. 40; Brown, *Valois Dukes*, p. 6.

[38] Small, *France*, pp. 138-140. In any case, later on in his career Vaughan slightly softened his emphasis on the "Burgundian State", see R. Vaughan, 'Chasing a Sphinx', *History Today,* 37 (1987), pp. 25-26.

[39] Brown, *Valois Dukes*, p. 3; Small, *France*, p. 142.

[40] For an alternative interpretation of Burgundy's desire to play a part in the reconquest, see M. G. A. Vale, 'France at the End of the Hundred Years War (c. 1420-1461)', in C. T. Allmand, *The New Cambridge Medieval History* (vol. 7) (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 398-402.

[41] Small, *France*, p. 150. For an alternative interpretation of the duke's intentions at Calais, see Vaughan, *Valois Burgundy*, p. 152.

[42] Schnerb, 'Burgundy', p. 441; Brown, *Valois Dukes*, pp. 1, 8.

[43] Small, *France*, quote is on p. 165. Small is alluding to Vaughan's comment that Philip's 'back was turned to France'; see Vaughan, *Valois Burgundy*, pp. 34, 52.

[44] Small, *George Chastelain*, p. 3; R. Strøm-Olsen, 'George Chastelain and the Language of Burgundian Historiography', *French Studies,* 68 (2014), pp. 1-3.

[45] Small, *George Chastelain*, pp. 67-81.

[46] Strøm-Olsen, 'George Chastelain and the Language of Burgundian Historiography', pp. 2, 11-17; Small, *George Chastelain*, pp. 178-183.

[47] Small, *France*, p. 214.

[48] Ibid., p. 17.

[49] Small, 'The Crown and the Provinces in the Fifteenth Century', p. 136; Vaughan, *Valois Burgundy*, p. 81.

[50] Vaughan, *Valois Burgundy*, p. 93; Small, 'The Crown and the Provinces in the Fifteenth Century',

p. 134.

[51] Small, *France*, p. 214.

[52] Small, 'French Politics', pp. 50-51; see also Small's comments in his 'Review of Government and Political Life in England and France, c. 1300-1500', *Parliaments, Estates and Representation,* 37 (2017), pp. 91-92.

[53] Schnerb, 'Burgundy', p. 446.

[54] G. Small, 'Centre and Periphery in Later Medieval France: Tournai, 1384-1477', in C. T. Allmand (ed.), *War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France* (Liverpool, 2000), pp. 150-152.

[55] A. Brown, 'Bruges and the Burgundian "Theatre State": Charles the Bold and Our Lady of the Snow', *History*, 84 (1999), pp. 573-579.

[56] Small, 'Centre and Periphery', p. 167; Vaughan, *Valois Burgundy*, pp. 136-137.

[57] Small, 'Centre and Periphery', pp. 159, 164.

[58] D. Green, 'Lordship and Principality: Colonial Policy in Ireland and Aquitaine in the 1360s', *The Journal of British Studies*, 47 (2008), p. 11.

[59] P. Chaplais, 'The Court of Sovereignty of Guyenne (Edward III-Henry VI) and its Antecedents', in J. Hamilton and P. J. Bradley (eds.), *Documenting the Past: Essays in Medieval History presented to George Peddy Cuttino* (Woodbridge, 1989), pp. 147-148.

[60] M. W. Labarge, *Gascony, England's First Colony, 1204-1454* (London, 1980), pp. 151-154.

[61] Ibid., p. 173.

[62] Green, 'Lordship and Principality', pp. 10, 19; Labarge, *Gascony*, p. 160.

[63] Green, 'Lordship and Principality', pp. 19, 29.

[64] For the importance of lawyers at the Breton court, see Jones, '"Bons Bretons et Bons Francoys"', p. 338; Jones, '"Mon Pais et Ma Nation"', pp. 292-298.

[65] Jones, '"Bons Bretons et Bons Francoys"', p. 338.

[66] Green, 'Lordship and Principality', p. 29.

[67] Small, *France*, pp. 12-18.

[68] Graham-Goering, *Princely Power*, p. 20.

[69] Small has developed this argument in full in his *France* book, but for a brief explanation, see Small, 'French Politics', pp. 42-51. For passing engagement with Small's thesis, see J. Watts, 'Conclusion', in C. Fletcher et al (eds.), *Government and Political Life in England and France, c. 1300-1500* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 368.

[70] Watts, *Polities*, p. 420.

[71] For a more recent interpretation, which is influenced by Watts and Small (in particular), see Graham-Goering, *Princely Power*.

[72] Small, 'French Politics', p. 34.

[73] Small, *George Chastelain*, p. 162.

Polly Crowther
Reevaluating the Tenth Century

From the Renaissance into the twentieth century, the prevailing image of tenth-century western Europe was one of darkness, ignorance, violence and barbarism - an 'Age of Iron'. This characterisation has long been prevalent, but it does not leave room for an evaluation of the progressive developments of the period. It was in actuality a century of transformation. Though it was arguably still a time of great violence, this violence was firstly not the defining aspect of the period and – more importantly – such violence did not exclude the possibility of advancement and progression. In fact, one can instead look at the violence as both a product and, eventually, a cause of prosperity.

Although the traditional view of barbarism and backwardness has been both popular and persistent, it looks at too narrow a selection of sources, neglecting to take things such as material evidence into account when dismissing the tenth century as an 'Age of Iron'. It also relies largely on problematic material. The term 'Age of Iron' was first coined by Cardinal Caesar Baronius in the seventeenth century, who focused heavily, as a leader of the Catholic Reformation, on the perceived decline of the Church in this period.[1] In one regard, Baronius' arguments are premised upon problematic evidence, his discussion of 'papal pornocracies' for example being based on evidence written by an anti-papal propagandist.[2] Such claims must be regarded sceptically and have been largely dismissed in the historiography as exaggeration.

Further to this, a decline in church writing and standards would not necessarily indicate a regressive society as a whole. Although there is definitely a marked drop in the written sources at our disposal from this century, with the papal biographies and contemporary chronicles disappearing in this time, a recent shift in the type of sources that are evaluated has revealed a century still rich with culture and craftsmanship.

In his introduction to Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Hugh Trevor-Roper refers to the work as surprisingly modern; however, Gibbon's description of the tenth century as 'an age of ignorance' is arguably not so, having been potentially disproven after World War I by historiographic changes which take material evidence into account.[3] A re-evaluation of the period looking at art and artefacts from the time shows creative and ornate pieces, which would have required time, money and expertise incongruent with this idea of mindless regression and violence.

In fact, not only was there evidence of culture and wealth found in artefacts, but there are other key innovations and developments from this period which challenge the prevailing narrative of regression, including the foundations of well-established villages and towns and a religious reform movement which could be said to have reshaped religious and aristocratic women's role in society.[4] Although, as highlighted by Chris Wickham, the tenth century saw a more divided Europe, ruled by smaller, poorer aristocracies than before, within these divided states nobles began to gain more power as people and states became more centralised.[5] With the 'birth of the village', there were also technological innovations which improved farming, as people living in close proximity could share the use of more advanced equipment.[6]

The development of these urban dwellings led to religious changes, too, as parishes established themselves around the new villages and were a central part of village life.[7] Although Robert Bartlett places religious reform in the eleventh century, and it has certainly been more commonly associated with this time due to the Gregorian movement, it can be argued that the foundations for this were laid in the tenth.[8] Indeed, although not as significant as the ones to come, the reform movements in this time had wide-ranging

implications which went beyond religion itself, affecting societal understandings of status and gender. Pauline Stafford's work highlights how th[9] inclusion of female religious houses within the religiously powerful clergy upset gender roles and hierarchies in society at the time, and she goes as far as to say that monasticism offered a sort of gender equality among its adherents.[10] Stafford may be too forceful with this argument, but she is correct in observing that there were undeniable shifts in underlying power dynamics.[11] The reform disturbed gendered hierarchy as it was superseded by a religious equivalent. Clearly, the tenth century should not be viewed as void of new ideas and reform as, even though many reform movements came later, the seeds of change were sown here and some progressive ideas came into fruition.

It would be an overstatement, however, to call the tenth century 'progressive' as a whole and, while this idea of regression does not seem accurate, there has been a long historiographic debate over where to place the tenth century in the western European historical narrative. Although there is much to be said for denoting the tenth century as the twilight of the early Middle Ages, it is perhaps more convincing to align it with the beginnings of the high Middle Ages, not least because it fed directly into them in a series of changes which did not just occur overnight with the new millennium. It is worth noting that the traditional argument supported by the likes of Gibbon viewed the century as a disconnected time of darkness against which the new phase of the medieval period could look even more transformed.[12] This view aligns itself more with the former theory, and indeed the argument for placing the period at the end of the early Middle Ages certainly has merit, as there were numerous aspects of life hearkening back to the Roman era, such as the use of professional soldiers and the Roman style of dress.[13] This can be seen most clearly in the case of Otto

III, who was made emperor in 996, and sought to 'renew the ancient customs of the Romans, now mostly obliterated', as remarked by Thietmar of Merseberg, his contemporary.[14] Clearly, the Roman legacy lived on but it is certainly worth mentioning that Thietmar saw Roman influence as 'mostly obliterated'. It is also worth noting that Otto III failed.

Perhaps more persuasive is the idea that the tenth century saw the very beginnings of a new era, and to date the origin of the changes that mark the high Middle Ages, as Bartlett has done, in the middle of this century.[15] With the beginnings of the medieval town and improvements in agriculture came a revival of trade which expanded across the north west of the continent which even involved Muslim and Greek traders.[16] Educational revivals also occurred during this period and it was generally a time of change. Although, with the approach of the millennia, there is some argument as to whether contemporaries saw themselves as at the end of something, just as the millennia did not bring about God's judgement neither does it seem to have brought about a significant overhaul in medieval life.[17] Far more convincing is the idea that these changes were the product of a gradual shift from the tenth century onwards. Although it was not quite the high Middle Ages yet and some rulers continued to take inspiration from the Roman times, it seems that this was not the dark time of regression that it has been suggested in the past and was instead a time of developing ideas and the very beginnings of a new era.

Whilst I certainly disagree with the concept of the tenth century as a regressive period, there is undeniable merit to the labelling of this era as 'violent'. Such violence had a significant presence and came from both external and internal sources: the raids of Vikings, Magyars and Arabs, and the oppressive rule of the aristocracy. The Viking attacks stretched across the whole tenth century, with periodic and brutal raids that terrorised both coastal and inland towns. The violence was so feared that, between 991 and 1018, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* records an astonishing total of £136,000 being paid to the Vikings in *Danegeld* taxation.[18] Although it is likely that this is a number exaggerated by aggrieved monks, it still gives a sense of the huge amounts of money raised in the hopes of mitigating the attacks. There were also attacks from Magyars in France, while the whole Mediterranean area saw raids from Arabs. Coupled with this was the violence and oppression from the aristocracy in a system which John Howe describes as a 'culture of violence', accurately representing its intrinsic nature as a central part of life.[19] The military aristocracy, in a time when it was not expanding, sought to increase their wealth by any means necessary, targeting churches, monasteries, and even the peasantry.[20] Attacks, therefore, came from within society as well as being inflicted by foreigners outside of it, and the general social order was thrown into chaos as different competing groups tried to establish themselves in a time of greater flexibility before the order of the high Middle Ages.

Despite the obvious link between violence and regression, there is a strong argument to be made that the violence of the time in some ways was more closely tied with progress and transformation. Not only was it arguably caused by prosperity – with the Vikings needing both competent ships and good reason to risk the journeys – but the raids led to other developments. The aforementioned payments to the Vikings were the result of a new taxation system heralded by Æthelred II in the 990s which was arguably better than any system that had existed in early medieval Europe, even under the Carolingians.[21] Looking at France, despite the obvious negatives of suffering from violence and ransom payments, contact with the Magyars could be said to have positively affected the

economy.[22] Trade during this time, along with currency, was also developed, with western European trade extending to Greek and Muslim partners, and they were able to benefit from their relative prosperity.[23] The growth of castles and fortified towns in England was arguably the direct result of raiding which disproportionately affected rural communities and led to increased urbanization as people sought protection in walled towns.[24] However, despite their military origins, they also helped the development of the power of the lords, as people who were previously scattered came together as one recognizable and perhaps even cohesive body.[25]

Another interesting development during this time, again a direct result of violence, was the Peace of God movement, which was an initiative by the clergy to try and protect their rights in the face of violence under the aristocracy and, by extension, to protect the rights of other vulnerable groups such as the peasantry. Despite its limitations in terms of its practical achievements, the Peace of God movement marked a transformative shift in attitudes as the first popular movement that aimed to protect and demonstrate against the ruling elites.[26] The condemnation of this period as one of violence thus rings true. Yet, despite the understandable turmoil that this created, out of this turmoil came important developments in tenth-century society as towns, castles, taxation systems and the protection of churches and peasantry arose from the disarray.

When looking at the map of northwestern Europe in the tenth century, then, it is easy to see a picture of fragmentation, collapse and regression as Europe divided into smaller territories. However, this narrative of regression should be challenged in favour of one of transformation; the early prototypes of modern nation states as they exist today can also be seen. The tenth century can certainly be regarded as a liminal period, but also one of change in its own right as it heralded a new age

of education, urbanization and political hierarchy, and increased trade led to stronger economies and the exchanging of cultural ideas.[27] Although the difficulty in accessing sources from this time poses a serious limitation to how far this question can be answered, I would argue that the traditional view is actually more of a result of this limitation. By reviewing a wider variety of sources, and looking at what we know of the period which came after the tenth century, I would conclude that, certainly, the tenth century was violent, at times mindlessly so, but out of this violence came prosperity and innovation which ultimately laid the foundations for the new era.

References

[1] C. Baronius, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, cited in J. Howe, 'Reforging the 'Age of Iron', Part I: The Tenth Century as the End of the Ancient World?', *History Compass*, 8:8 (2010), p. 866.

[2] Howe, 'Reforging the 'Age of Iron', Part I', p. 886.

[3] H. Trevor-Roper, 'Introduction', in E. Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1994), p. xv.

[4] P. Stafford, 'Queens, Nunneries and Reforming Churchmen: Gender, Religious Status and Reform in Tenth- and Eleventh-Century England', *Past and Present*, 163 (1999), pp. 10-11.

[5] C. Wickham, *The Inheritance of Rome: A History of Europe from 400-1050* (London, 2009), p. 554.

[6] J. Howe, 'Reforging the 'Age of Iron', Part II: The Tenth Century in a New Age?', *History Compass*, 8:9 (2010), p. 1002.

[7] Ibid.

[8] R. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonisation and Cultural Change, 950-1350* (London, 1994), p. 243.

[9] Stafford, 'Queens, Nunneries and Reforming Churchmen', p. 8.

[10] Ibid, p. 10.

[11] Ibid, p. 11.

[12] Howe, 'Reforging the 'Age of Iron', p. 1000.

[13] Ibid, p. 873.

[14] Thietmar, *Chronicon*, IV, xlvii, in D. Warner (trans.), *Ottonian Germany: The Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseberg* (Manchester, 2001), p. 185; Howe, 'Reforging the 'Age of Iron'', p. 873.

[15] Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, p. 3.

[16] Howe, 'Reforging the 'Age of Iron'', p. 1003.

[17] R. Landes, A. Gow and D. Van Meter, *The*

Apocalyptic Year 1000: Religious Expectation and Social Change, 950-1050 (Oxford, 2003), p. 6.

[18] D. Rollason, *Early Medieval Europe 300-500* (Oxon, 2018), p. 160.

[19] Howe, 'Reforging the 'Age of Iron'', p. 1003.

[20] R. I. Moore, 'Postscript: The Peace of God and the Social Revolution', in T. Head and R. Landes (eds.), *The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response around the Year 1000* (Ithaca, NY, 1992), p. 310.

[21] Wickham, *The Inheritance of Rome*, p. 464.

[22] Rollason, *Early Medieval Europe*, p. 220.

[23] Howe, 'Reforging the 'Age of Iron'', p. 1003.

[24] Ibid, p. 1002.

[25] Ibid, p. 870.

[26] Moore, 'The Peace of God', p. 332.

[27] Howe, 'Reforging the 'Age of Iron'', p. 1007.

AMERICA

Dylan Cresswell

'Whiteness' and Progressive Era Immigration

Since its emergence as an analytical framework in the early 1990s, the lens of 'whiteness' has been applied to every aspect of American academia, offering new lines of questioning to a kaleidoscopic range of disciplines. At the centre of this scholarship is the assertion that American history cannot be read without discerning how race, in particular the cultivation of a distinct white racial identity, has interacted with social, cultural and political developments. As Matthew Jacobson's emphasis on an inclusive approach to race reveals, whiteness scholars have decried the treatment of racism as a distinct phenomenon, separate from the mainstream of historical developments, and have advocated for the centring of race in discussions about immigration and nativism, labour movements, class consciousness, and the construction of national identities.[1] This essay questions whether whiteness has offered a valuable analytical framework to historians of race and immigration in the Progressive Era,

or whether the breadth of its application has made the concept so ubiquitous as to lose any shape or meaning. Opening with an investigation as to why this scholarship first emerged with the work of David Roediger in the early 1990s, I consider what defines whiteness as a distinct historiographical approach and how it diverges from previous work on race, class and immigration. I will designate three key criteria by which the analytical value of whiteness can be assessed: first, whether the work of whiteness scholars has helped to better illuminate the relationship between class and racial identities; second, how far they have been able to historicise the social construction of race; third, whether they have furthered the study of immigration restrictionism by intrinsically linking nativism to whiteness. A subsequent section will explore how whiteness scholarship has evolved over time, and will be followed by an appraisal of the different approaches taken by Roediger, Robert Orsi, Noel Ignatiev,

James Barrett, Jacobson, Mae Ngai, and Thomas Guglielmo. Assessed against my three criteria, their works are central to the debate over how far whiteness scholarship has improved our understanding of the lived experiences and identities of European immigrants between 1890 and 1924.

Before discussing how far various works on whiteness have fulfilled the above criteria, it is necessary to historicise the development of different ideas in this field. Whiteness scholarship enjoyed rather a short zenith, producing a wide array of new work in the decade following Roediger's *The Wages of Whiteness* (1991), before gradually losing momentum after the publication of *International Labor and Working Class History*'s (ILWCH) influential 2001 forum, in which Eric Arnesen and his contemporaries provided a sweeping critique of the field. The brevity of the era in which whiteness dominated as an analytical framework ensures that it provides a rich tapestry of competing ideas to those studying its historiography. For each successive publication, historians have had to decide whether to continue the work of their predecessors, or depart from previous approaches in order to fill in perceived analytical gaps in the scholarship. In order to assess the value of whiteness as an historiographical approach, it is crucial to investigate the process by which it has shifted and adapted to criticism over the years. Measured against the three criteria which constitute the focal points of this inquiry, it becomes possible to identify the areas in which whiteness scholarship has adapted to become a more valuable analytical framework, and the areas in which it has failed to overcome scholarly criticism.

The shift towards race in whiteness scholarship stems from a foundational belief that race is inherently a social construct. In Arnesen's harsh critique, 'none of this is particularly new… we are all social constructionists now'.[2] After all, the 'biological certainty' of race,

which many whiteness scholars have set out to challenge, has long since faded from the prevailing current of American historiography.[3] However, in his insistence that whiteness has contributed little more than a new vocabulary to studies of immigration and nativism, Arnesen neglects to consider that recent scholarship has carried out the hugely important function of historicising the social construction of race.[4] By treating racial boundaries as porous and mutable, it has imbued subaltern peoples with an agency of their own. Their independent decisions are framed as a central component of the social construction of whiteness, impinging upon legislative and judicial policies at both local and national levels.

This approach has been particularly useful for understanding the lived experiences and identities of immigrants, with this essay focusing on those who arrived in the United States from Europe between 1890 and 1924. One might ask why a racially-focused method of history has been applied to this group, most of whom were considered 'free white persons' and therefore eligible for American citizenship under the terms of the Naturalization Act of 1790. The answer lies in the deconstruction of this assumption. Whiteness scholars have revolted against the idealised myth of the American 'melting pot', popularised in 1908 by Israel Zangwill's eponymous play and entrenched in academia by the assimilationist narrative of Oscar Handlin's *The Uprooted* (1951).[5] Jacobson's assertion that 'to write about race in American history is to exclude virtually nothing' mirrors Handlin's famous claim that 'the immigrants were American history', but with a crucial difference.[6] According to whiteness scholars, the process of naturalisation which faced southern and eastern European immigrants was not just a matter of acculturation to American society, but of 'becoming white'.[7] This shift has not evaded controversy. In the works which initiated this investigation of

immigrant whiteness, Roediger (1991) and Ignatiev (1995) were quick to assign their Irish subjects a racially ambiguous status, selectively employing evidence which relies too heavily on 'keyword literalism'. [8] More recent works have attempted to redress this. Jacobson in particular has striven to clarify how immigrants acquired their 'inbetween' status, extending his temporal scope back to the founding of the republic to explore how the language of variegated whiteness emerged during the *antebellum* era, and forced newly classified 'Celts and Slavs... Hebrews, Iberics, Mediterraneans [and] Teutons' to assert their status as 'Caucasians'.[9] The concept of 'inbetween' identities has been central to whiteness scholars' studies of immigration, keeping 'both similarity and difference at play' to show how - despite their legal recognition as whites - European immigrants were ranked as racially inferior to native-born, Anglo-Saxon Americans.[10]

Whilst this essay predominantly focuses on the southern and eastern European immigrants of the Progressive Era, it is important to understand that the study of whiteness and 'inbetween' identities is not confined to foreign arrivals. In *The Wages of Whiteness* (1991), a foundational text which established the initial parameters of whiteness scholarship, Roediger frames the need for studies of whiteness as a response to the severe social limits and racist implications of labour republicanism.[11] The timing of this publication is important in order to understand Roediger's intentions: much of the labour historiography that he confronts, namely Herbert Gutman's work, *Culture and Society in Industrializing America* (1977), was over a decade old when he wrote *The Wages of Whiteness*.[12] His decision to confront this 'stale, retrograde orthodoxy' in the late 1980s came in response to the contemporary 'Reagan Democrat' phenomenon, which saw swaths of white, blue collar workers transfer their support from the Democratic Party to a candidate who better voiced

their social conservatism.[13] Arnesen has pertinently suggested that this political realignment prompted Roediger, writing from a Marxist theoretical framework, to ask why white workers throughout American history had failed to coalesce around a united labour movement with their black counterparts.[14] This link between labour history and the emergence of whiteness scholarship calls into question its value as an analytical framework, tying it to dialectical assumptions which may have hindered its application to different working class immigrant groups.

Roediger's question is essentially an inflection of one first posed by Werner Sombart as early as 1906: 'Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?'.[15] In answering this, he defines whiteness as a wage, which rewards those able to claim it with both material and psychological compensation valuable enough to distract from the privations of nineteenth-century industrial discipline.[16] This dialectic definition of whiteness relies heavily on W.E.B. Du Bois' concept of the 'psychological wage' of whiteness (*Black Reconstruction in America*, 1935) and has drawn substantial criticism from Arnesen, who points out that the failure of white workers to unite with their black counterparts only requires explanation if one accepts the Marxist assumption of labouring class solidarity.[17] Barbara Fields is similarly sceptical of the utility of whiteness, claiming that Roediger and other whiteness scholars, who have rallied against the new labour history's romanticised view of class solidarity, have exercised a romanticism of their own in assuming solidarity amongst those considered 'white'.[18] Nevertheless, for the best part of a decade, such assumptions hardly hindered the uptake of Roediger's work as a starting point for new studies of the construction of whiteness which assess various groups' motivations to be included within it.

Why has the irruption of whiteness

scholarship into American historiography caused such significant upheaval in the study of race? By positioning white racism within broader structural debates about how the concept of a white identity has developed over time, whiteness scholars have shifted their focus from the construction of racial deviance to the construction of racial normativity. This has provided a necessary antidote to earlier works on contested racial identities, namely Michael Novak's *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*, which gave a sharp voice to the ethnic revival of the 1970s.[19] In a scathing assault on Novak's decision to prioritise 'inner conflict between one's felt personal power [ethnicity] and one's ascribed public power [whiteness]' over structural features of the political landscape, Jacobson lays out the raison d'être of whiteness scholarship.[20] In deconstructing the assumption of a transhistorical, monolithic whiteness, Jacobson and other scholars have demonstrated that while the 'unmeltable ethnics' identified by Novak have struggled to attain whiteness as a feeling of relative worth, they have benefited from their public identification as white in tangible racial power differentials. The 'inbetween' status resulting from this contradiction has provided whiteness scholars with a valuable new framework for analysing the actions of those who have found themselves in positions of racial ambiguity.[21]

When considering the broad field of literature on whiteness spawned by Roediger's seminal work, it becomes clear that *The Wages of Whiteness* is 'both over-praised and over-blamed'.[22] In truth, its thesis rests on precarious empirical foundations: the 'psychological wage' of whiteness cannot be quantified in any meaningful way, while the material rewards of whiteness were unevenly distributed.[23] However, the analytical framework proposed by Roediger and his successors seeks to address important shortcomings which bridled previous scholarship on race,

class and their interaction with immigrant identities and experiences. By assessing the ability of new scholarship to fill these analytical gaps, this essay designates three main criteria which provide a barometer of the utility of whiteness as a historiographical framework.

My first criterion questions how valuable whiteness scholarship is as a framework connecting racial and class identities. The 'racial blindspot' of labour historians prior to the 1990s was a crucial prompt for the emergence of whiteness, leaving historians searching for a framework which encompasses the complex relationship between race and class.[24] Herbert Gutman, the leading light of the new labor historians, is fiercely criticised by Ignatiev in *How the Irish Became White* (1995) for his selective use of evidence, which ignores strong racial undertones and the serial exclusion of non-white workers in the construction of an American working-class consciousness.[25] Ignatiev contends that this oversight fundamentally undermined the new labor history, reproducing the flaws of the old labor history by substituting the lived experiences of working people (including racial identities) for abstract notions of a united working class.[26] If whiteness scholarship is to qualify as a useful analytical framework for labour historians, its credentials as a 'larger unifying framework' bridging histories of vertical (race) and horizontal (class) identities must be tested.[27] Immigration is a crucial component of American labour history, having provided a steady flow of new, often unskilled, workers which both challenged and complemented the bargaining power of white workers in different situations. The question of how immigrant workers did or did not become part of the American working class, and how this was linked to their relationship with whiteness, therefore provides an interesting comparative approach to the works of Roediger, Ignatiev, Guglielmo and others.

My second criterion asks what value whiteness scholarship has contributed to the study of the social construction of race. What differentiates whiteness scholarship from previous work is that, rather than treating race as a categorisation imposed only upon non-white groups, it deconstructs the idea of a normative, monolithic whiteness, replacing it with a structural approach which emphasises the agency of historical actors in attaining whiteness for themselves and conferring or withholding it from others.[28] If whiteness is to be considered useful as a framework for analysing racial identities and race relations, historians must specify what they mean by 'agency': who could exercise it, and how did they do so? In order to explain this agency from the perspective of immigrants, key works on whiteness have frequently turned to passive voice construction. In the afterword to *How the Irish Became White*, Ignatiev laments that he 'found not one single diary, or letter, or anything of that sort in which an ordinary Irish man or woman recorded in any detail the texture of daily life and relations with the black people who were often his or her closest neighbors'.[29] A lack of available evidence written by 'inbetween' or non-white people afflicts whiteness scholarship in the same way as it does other subaltern histories, forcing historians to prioritise the recorded speech of white elites in order to construct an inflected image of how immigrants and other non-dominant groups conceived their behaviour in relation to whiteness.[30] Therefore, in order to explain how immigrants exercised agency within the framework of whiteness, historians must make the subjective decision to prioritise whiteness over other competing identities as the motivation for particular actions. The debate over whether this has helped to historicise racial identities or 'ironically… essentializes whiteness as a phenomenon that transcends and directs history' is central to assessing the utility of works which expound the relationship between race and immigrant identities.[31]

My third criterion questions whether whiteness scholarship has furthered the study of nativism by explicitly linking the movement to bar immigrants from American shores to contemporary demands for racial exclusivity. In attempting to historicise the construction of racial identities, whiteness scholars have set the traditional historiography of nativism in their sights.[32] This is a field which, prior to the emergence of whiteness scholarship, had already seen tentative attempts at explaining the intersection between anti-immigration sentiments and questions of racial identity. In 1955, John Higham suggested that the Progressive Era apogee of nativism saw an expansion of racial discourses, as the protection of Anglo-Saxon racial purity replaced the exclusion of socialists as the priority of nativists.[33] This historiographical precedent has led some critics to suggest that whiteness scholarship has contributed little more than a new vocabulary to debates about nativism. Arnesen asserts that the replacement of the early twentieth-century lexicon of 'foreign' and 'alien' threats with new terminology such as 'inbetween peoples' (Roediger and Barrett), 'provisional or probationary' whites (Jacobson) and 'off-white' (Brodkin) is 'old wine in new bottles'.[34] However, to continue to use the contemporary language employed by Higham would be to miss the fluidity of racial identities. By historicising the language used by Progressive Era nativists, whiteness scholars have revealed important correlations between the use of seemingly unprejudiced terms, such as 'foreign' and 'alien', and the proliferation of racial discourses which posited foreign arrivals as a menace to the biological integrity of the white American stock.[35] The categorisations presumed by Higham to be transhistorical, such as the national origin of immigrants, were applied unevenly according to the varying 'whiteness' of different races.[36] Nativism provides fertile ground for the expansion of whiteness

scholarship: led by Guglielmo, Jacobson, Ngai, and Barrett, whiteness scholars have redirected the history of nativism away from Higham's narrow focus on elite and legislative discourses, and towards a more holistic approach which considers the role of race in reproducing popular nativism.

How, then, has whiteness scholarship developed since Roediger's initial foray in *The Wages of Whiteness*? In 1992, Robert Orsi addressed a crucial problem which beset *The Wages of Whiteness*.[37] Transferring the lens of whiteness from the Irish, studied by Roediger, to the Italian population of New York, he found common ground in the process by which new immigrants from southern Italy acquired their whiteness. He anticipated Arnesen's later criticism of this model, realising that historians cannot ask how immigrants became white without questioning how they became non-white in the first place.[38] Recognising this, Orsi developed a framework for understanding how immigrants became 'Italian Americans' - a hybrid national and racial identity - before identifying how they consciously shed this label to become unambiguously white Americans.[39] Orsi expanded his scope to encompass the Mezzogiorno's experiences as a racially 'inbetween' people in Europe, which helped him to explain the localised agency that they exercised in differentiating themselves from the African Americans who shared their Harlem neighbourhood and often their occupations.[40] This approach defines whiteness as a means of locating different immigrant groups in the complex racial hierarchy of the early twentieth century and is more informative than Ignatiev's bifurcated diagnosis of race, demonstrating the value of applying whiteness to small-scale empirical studies.

Despite being published three years after Orsi's article, Ignatiev's book missed the opportunity to take up this new approach to whiteness, and was little more than a regressive reiteration of the arguments produced by *The Wages of Whiteness*. Rather than continuing Orsi's progress in explaining the processes by which immigrants acquired an unstable position on the colour line, Ignatiev reproduced Roediger's ill-founded assumptions of Irish non-whiteness and Marxist social relations.[41] As he admitted in an epilogue, his research suffered from a complete lack of available letters, diaries or other first-hand sources in which Irish immigrants recorded in detail their relations with African American neighbours, leaving him 'forced to reconstruct from fragments'.[42] This problem is not unique to Ignatiev's work: the lack of literacy amongst immigrants confronts whiteness scholars attempting to reconstruct their experiences with a difficult challenge. It is difficult to see how the pursuit of whiteness can be reasonably inferred as the primary motivation for the social and political activity of Irish immigrants over the course of half a century if Ignatiev could not present any evidence showing that they understood, desired and prioritised their inclusion within whiteness. In lieu of first-hand accounts, Ignatiev drew heavily upon evidence of the Irish relationship to the Democratic Party and participation in urban riots.[43] In using this evidence, Ignatiev makes a controversial assumption that Irish support for slavery and race riots was based on a conflation of whiteness and white supremacism. He neglects to consider other factors, such as the local power of urban labour bosses and political machines like Tammany Hall, artificially centring whiteness despite lacking evidence to support this. Relying largely upon polemical accounts written by WASP commentators, which can at best provide a shaky external interpretation of why Irishmen chose to join urban 'fire company' gangs or riot against African Americans in the nineteenth-century Northeast, Ignatiev's work was a disappointing contribution to the field.[44]

In 1997, Roediger and Barrett provided a

valuable template for a new approach to whiteness scholarship, shifting the field away from its roots in labour history and clearly elucidating how the framework of whiteness allows historians to study the 'inbetween' racial status of new immigrants. This marked a significant departure from Roediger's earlier work in *The Wages of Whiteness*, focusing on the particular status that new immigrants carved out within the pervasive social structure of whiteness which that book had identified.[45] Aiming to deconstruct exactly what 'in-betweenness' - a term first coined by Higham in 1955 - meant for immigrant identities, Roediger and Barrett abandoned Ignatiev's dogmatic attachment to the idea that immigrants desperately scrambled to become white by any means possible.[46] Like Ignatiev, they regarded popular culture as the primary site of racial transformation, and consulted similar sources. They assess evidence from vaudeville theatre, Hollywood films, newspapers, and novels, without trying to shoehorn it into Roediger and Ignatiev's 'becoming white' model, revealing fresh perspectives on how immigrants learned about the colour line, their place on it, and how to deploy and manipulate white supremacist images.[47] This article was crucial in disarming the divisive assimilation-to-whiteness narrative propounded by earlier works, explaining that the 'less-than-white racial status' of immigrants produced a balance between embracing whiteness and showing solidarity with other minorities.[48]

'Inbetween Peoples' and the works which followed increased the value of whiteness scholarship, moving substantially closer to explaining the historical processes by which racial identities were constructed and transformed in the Progressive Era. In 1998, Jacobson traced how the very idea of race has changed over the course of American history in a sweeping study which spans from the Naturalization Act of 1790 to the Civil Rights era.[49] His approach is highly useful, detaching whiteness from its origins in Marxist labour history and identifying it as an idea which has been sculpted by changing historical contexts, which allows him to explain why studying the new immigrants of the Progressive Era is so fruitful for whiteness historians. It was precisely their arrival that provoked the breakdown of monolithic whiteness, leading to legislative and judicial debates about whether all 'free white persons' were equally suitable for naturalisation and self-government.[50] In a 1999 article, Ngai furthered Jacobson's ideas, continuing the significant shift in whiteness scholarship away from Roediger and Ignatiev's attempts to reconstruct the popular culture of whiteness and towards an interpretation which studies official discourse as the most reliable reflection of public attitudes.[51] Ngai questioned the basic analytical units which informed the United States census, discussions over 'national origin' quotas for immigrants, and most previous studies of nativism, finding that the construction of these categorisations was heavily laden with racial considerations: 'the shift in formal language from race to national origin did not mean that race ceased to operate, but rather that it became obfuscated.'[52] Her analysis draws whiteness, oft criticised as an anachronistic concept, out into clear relief by demonstrating that 'the underlying assumptions in the construction of those categories diverged in relationship to Europeans and Asiatics… [pointing] to a racial logic that determined which people could assimilate into the nation and which people could not.'[53] By historicising racial categories which the traditional historiography of immigration had failed to scrutinise, whiteness scholars have suggested a valuable new approach to official statistics, which transcends the confines of demographic research.

Despite its obvious value, the approach taken by Jacobson and Ngai was still limited by its narrow focus on elite discourse. In a review of *Whiteness of a Different Color,* Ignatiev suggested that

Jacobson pays inadequate attention to the processes by which immigrants advocated for their whiteness and what being white meant to these newcomers.[54] To this criticism, I would add that Jacobson's approach deprives immigrants of the agency that defines whiteness as an analytical framework. The immigrants are given little scope to define their own racial identities in an authoritarian racial framework, with their ability to assimilate made fully subservient to the observations of white, native-born writers, politicians and eugenicists. While Jacobson and Ngai freed whiteness scholarship from the confines of Roediger and Ignatiev's deterministic approach, their work still left the field without a unifying research framework which could illuminate the construction of racial identities from above and below simultaneously. The lack of first-hand accounts written by immigrants, which forces historians to speculate from external sources, means that whiteness scholars may never be able to authentically reconstruct their experiences and truly verify this analytical framework.

When whiteness scholarship has strayed from theory and embraced microhistory, its value has increased. In 2004, Guglielmo embarked on a more empirical, localised study which gave him room to consider how debates over whiteness were received by both immigrants and their opponents.[55] In a study of Chicago, he conducted a block-by-block survey of relations between Italianita and their white and non-white neighbours, rising to Peter Kolchin's call for whiteness scholarship to properly embrace historical specificity.[56] His research drew upon first-hand accounts of fights, friendships, interracial co-operation, and concerted eviction campaigns to demonstrate the wide variety of outcomes that were produced within one city. The diversity of results prevented Guglielmo from drawing out meta narratives from his research. As a result of proper empirical scrutiny, whiteness fades into the background of a broader immigrant experience where regional and national Italian identities, competition for jobs and housing and other factors all variously influence immigrants' relationships with other racial groups.[57]

Guglielmo's hybrid approach creates more room for nuance within whiteness scholarship, resolving some of its key problems with the oversimplification of identities and the imposition of inappropriate categorisations. His differentiation between 'color' and 'race' helps to reconcile the legal whiteness of European immigrants with works which question this whiteness. This framework, which accounts for the variety of identities within whiteness, helps to explain how Italians could face popular prejudices against their 'dark skinned' race, with its supposed penchant for homicide, while their white 'color' and its benefits were never seriously questioned.[58] This marked a departure from Orsi and Jacobson's 'inbetween peoples' thesis, suggesting that Italians' whiteness was their greatest asset in a country where other aspects of their racial identity were challenged. To this day, Guglielmo's approach provides the most nuanced available exploration of immigrants' variegated whiteness, co-opting many of the materialist suggestions made by Arnesen in his 2001 critique of whiteness scholarship.[59] However, this approach to whiteness fundamentally undermines the concept, prioritising the colour line as the most important division in society. If this line was impermeable, as Guglielmo has argued, then surely historians ought to take Fields' advice and return to traditional understandings of race, focusing on authoritative 'racism' towards 'colored' people rather than the exercise of agency in the social construction of 'racial identities'.[60]

Since the publication of *White on Arrival,* whiteness scholarship has lost much of its momentum. Ultimately, the analytical framework of whiteness could not survive the criticisms that it endured in 2001 at

the hands of Arnesen and Eric Foner.[61] Guglielmo responded capably to their pressure to properly historicise whiteness, placing it within the context of the various identities, divisions and exigencies which motivated Progressive Era immigrants to exercise their agency. As Foner predicted, this attempt to assess whiteness more scrupulously, placing its fluctuating importance in the context of other competing racial and cultural identities, inevitably cuts whiteness down to scale and blunts its analytical edge.[62] This explains why Roediger's most recent attempt to rehabilitate whiteness scholarship, published in 2006, failed to reinvigorate the field.[63] He rejected Jacobson and Guglielmo's distinction between race and colour as anachronistic, although as historians have increasingly recognised that the right to whiteness was limited to people of European origins, there was little that was new or valuable in Roediger's defence of whiteness scholarship.[64]

Having explored the ways in which whiteness scholarship has changed over time, it is possible to assess its value as an analytical framework against my three criteria. Firstly, has whiteness answered Higham's demand for a 'larger unifying framework' which improves historians' understanding of the relationship between class and racial identities?[65] Whiteness scholars would claim this as a clear success, having presented a wealth of evidence to show that, in Brodkin's words, 'job degradation and racial darkening were linked… degraded forms of work confirmed the apparent obviousness of the racial inferiority of the workers who did it'.[66] Pejorative terms such as 'hunky', 'guinea' and 'greaser' have been located in the historical context of the workplace, with Roediger showing that these words could transcend their traditional boundaries and be applied to new racial groups who performed class or gender roles befitting of such labels.[67] Despite its analytical clarity, the value of this aspect of whiteness

scholarship is restricted by its one-sided evidential base. Roediger, Ignatiev and Barrett's early studies of whiteness in the workplace were heavily dependent on accounts written by industrial bosses: in the historical record, their voices are wholly unchallenged by immigrant workers, whose illiteracy bound them to silence. While external commentators made clear links between race and class in the immigrant experience, either scalding immigrants for undermining the 'American standard of living' or encouraging them to defend 'white men's wages', it seems that these sources have only risen to prominence as a result of whiteness scholars' keyword literalism.[68] They reveal little about how immigrants perceived their class and racial identities, and naturally tend towards notions of social hierarchy and order in the workplace.[69]

Later works of whiteness scholarship have attempted to separate the field from labour history, but this has produced a problem of its own. It is understandable that Jacobson and Ngai tried to shift the focus of whiteness away from its role in class formation and towards its role in the racialisation of immigrants: as Arnesen's criticism has proven, it is difficult to ignore assumptions of class unity when reading earlier works by Roediger and Ignatiev.[70] However, these newer works underestimate the role of class in racial identity formation. While the racial prejudices that immigrants faced masqueraded as biological, the essence of racialisation was cultural. Just as the postwar consolidation of whiteness gave the descendents of European immigrants access to new suburban neighbourhoods and employment, the initial process of becoming swarthy 'dagoes', Jewish misers or blast-furnace 'hunkies' depended upon immigrants completing degrading work which supposedly highlighted their biological unsuitability for American liberty and independence. Without more specific studies of particular workplaces, communities or labour unions, whiteness

scholarship will continue to be hindered by its inability to explain how immigrants themselves engaged with competing horizontal and vertical identities.

My second criterion questions whether whiteness scholarship has made valuable progress in historicising racial identities. With its rise as an analytical framework, the idea of race as a social construction has become historiographical orthodoxy, although it must be asked what is new in whiteness scholars' approach to this concept. Having identified that race is not innate, but rather changes its categorisations and meanings in different environments, Roediger and Barrett (1997) made an important addition to the field by exploring the sources from which new immigrants learned about race in America - a necessary step which Ignatiev and Roediger (1991) missed in their evaluation of how immigrants 'became white'. For this to have value in the study of racial identities, whiteness scholars must explain how immigrants used this knowledge to exercise agency and consciously locate themselves within a 'racialized social system'.[71] This has been done with some success, especially by Orsi and Guglielmo, but the sources available to historians studying first generation immigrants impede analysis of the motivations for their actions. Orsi, for example, evidenced his claims about the troubled relationship between Italian immigrants and African Americans with anecdotal testimonies from second- and third-generation Italian Americans, in the absence of widespread literacy amongst new immigrants.[72] This falls short as an attempt to instil authentic voices into immigration history. Studying a similar subject to Orsi, Guglielmo highlighted a crucial problem with anecdotal evidence: greenhorn memories have been filtered through several generations and there is a high chance that the language of whiteness was only retrospectively affixed to new immigrants' vernacular once Italian whiteness was consolidated in the interwar years.[73]

Whiteness scholars attempting to historicise race have encountered further problems when using contemporary evidence. A lack of authentic voices frequently compels historians to construct a reflected image of immigrant identities and experiences from the external sources describing them. This passive voice construction is highly problematic for scholars such as Roediger and Barrett: in selecting evidence which prioritises the immigrant pursuit of whiteness, they risk making whiteness a transhistorical phenomenon.[74] Barrett conceded that his description of Slavic immigrants' non-participation in the 1919 Chicago race riots as an 'abstention from whiteness' was a poor choice of words.[75] By failing to consider other motivations that the immigrants may have had for their course of action, Roediger and Barrett exposed a critical weakness in their work. By approaching evidence with a dogmatic attachment to whiteness, they failed to fulfil 'The historian's task… to examine the specific historical circumstances in which one or another element of identity comes to the fore as a motivation for political and social action'.[76] Guglielmo has come closer than others to fulfilling this task, restricting his study of whiteness to one locale to enable him to consider how it interacted with competition over jobs and housing and the acculturation to established American racial attitudes as driving factors for the breakdown in interracial relations.[77] While his framework decentralises whiteness, it provides the most nuanced approach to race relations amongst immigrants, furthering Jacobson's exploration of how racial identities varied between different regions and cities with unique demographic compositions.[78] From these readings, it becomes clear that, while whiteness provides a new and useful analytical framework for historicising race, its application to immigrant identities is hindered by the restrictive nature of

available evidence.

My third criterion for judging the analytical value of whiteness scholarship questions whether its approach, which reconstructs the narrative of immigrant exclusion around racial tenets, has significantly progressed the study of nativism. On the surface, the framework of whiteness has added important depth to the arguments first made by Higham in 1955 and is not simply 'a case of old wine in new bottles'.[79] Jacobson and Ngai have dispelled any notion that nativism was a natural product of American exceptionalism, convincingly arguing that immigrants of European origin had to become a perceived threat to white racial integrity in order for popular and official opinion to demand a departure from the previously open policy of immigrant naturalisation. However, while this is a new perspective, whiteness scholarship has not challenged one of the central assumptions of traditional immigration historiography. In building from Higham's foundations, whiteness scholars have largely reproduced the assimilationist myth, presuming that acculturation and inclusion as American citizens was the primary goal of all European immigrants. Contrary to their aim of establishing the 'inbetween' identities of this group, works on whiteness have unintentionally entrenched the firm historiographical dichotomy between immigrant communities and nativists. Guglielmo identified this problem in 2004, pointing out that coercive assimilation narratives fail to account for the sixty percent of Italian immigrants who arrived in the US between 1908 and 1923, but had no interest in becoming 'white' or becoming 'Americans' and returned home.[80] In order to produce a history of nativism which considers how temporary immigrants perceived their identities, whiteness scholars ought to embrace Getz, Raftery and Tamura's 'broker-bridger' model.[81] By adopting this more nuanced approach to assimilation, it becomes possible to explore how people with dual identities acted as intermediaries between two cultural worlds. Studying their role in interpreting American racial and cultural norms to European arrivals, and vice versa, would yield great results for whiteness scholars in their attempts to historicise the racialisation of new immigrants.

As scholarship on whiteness has embraced a more empirical approach to immigrant identities, especially in Guglielmo's work, it has become clear that it has important limitations as an analytical framework. In order to historicise race and understand how it produces certain behaviours, future whiteness scholarship ought to analyse whiteness as one of many overlapping factors which competed in the construction of immigrant identities. Guglielmo has shown that this is best done at the level of microhistory. Even with this new approach, whiteness scholarship is still constrained by its reliance upon dispersed pieces of anecdotal or apocryphal evidence. Writing with hindsight means that historians risk anachronistically elevating the relative value of whiteness in the Progressive Era, when it was yet to undergo the consolidation which made it such an important social token in the interwar years. To rectify this, whiteness scholars might be advised to adopt critical discourse analysis, an approach advocated by Thomas Ricento in 2003.[82] By studying how the word 'white' has been used in different contexts over time, whiteness scholars would come closer to understanding how immigrants viewed themselves and how overlapping factors such as class, nationality, race, and language variously contributed to the construction of their new identities. While it is not within the scope of this inquiry, it would be intriguing to see whether the integration of critical discourse analysis could transform the value of whiteness as an approach for those studying immigrants in the Progressive Era.

References

[1] Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color* (Cambridge, MA, 1998), p. 11; J. Barrett and D. Roediger, 'Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the "New Immigrant" Working Class', *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 16:3 (1997), pp. 6, 9-10; D. Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs*, 2nd ed. (New York, 2018), pp. 12, 17; M. M. Ngai, 'The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924', *Journal of American History*, 86 (1999), pp. 87-88.

[2] E. Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 60 (2001), p. 6.

[3] Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, p. 1.

[4] Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', p. 16.

[5] I. Zangwill, *Works of Israel Zangwill: The Melting-Pot* (New York, 1921); Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted*, 2nd. Ed. (Boston, 1973).

[6] Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, p. 11; Handlin, *The Uprooted*, p. 3.

[7] Roediger and Barrett, 'Inbetween Peoples', pp. 32, 34.

[8] D. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London, 1991); N. Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York, 1995); Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', p. 17.

[9] Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, p. 2.

[10] Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness*, p. 12.

[11] Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*, pp. 56-59.

[12] H. Gutman, *Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America* (New York, 1977), cited in Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*, pp. 95-97.

[13] Reed, 'Response to Eric Arnesen', p. 73.

[14] Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', p. 4.

[15] Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*, p. 12; W.E.B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America* (New York, 1998), p. 700; A. Reed, Jr., 'Response to Eric Arnesen', *ILWCH*, 60 (2001), pp. 70-71; Werner Sombart, *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?* (transl. White Plains, 1976).

[16] Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*, pp. 44-46.

[17] Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', pp. 11-12.

[18] B. Fields, 'Whiteness, Racism, and Identity', *ILWCH*, No. 60 (2001), pp. 52-53.

[19] M. Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics: Politics and Culture in American Life* (New Brunswick, 1995).

[20] Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, p. 276; Novak, 'The New Ethnicity', in *Unmeltable Ethnics: Politics and Culture in American Life*, p. 347.

[21] R. Orsi, 'The Religious Boundaries of an Inbetween People: Street Feste and the Problem of the Dark-Skinned Other in Italian Harlem, 1920-1990', *American Quarterly*, 44:3 (1992); Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White; Roediger and Barrett, 'Inbetween Peoples'; T. Guglielmo, *White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945* (New York, 2004).

[22] Roediger, 'Preface to the Third Edition', in *The Wages of Whiteness*, p. xi.

[23] Ibid., p. xi.

[24] Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White,* pp. 205-18.

[25] Ibid., p. 212,

[26] Ibid.

[27] J. Higham, 'Current Trends in the Study of Ethnicity in the United States', *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 2:1 (1982), pp. 10-11.

[28] N. Foley, *The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture* (Berkeley, 1997), pp. 5, 7.

[29] Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White,* p. 178.

[30] Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', pp. 21-22.

[31] Reed, 'Response to Eric Arnesen', p. 73.

[32] Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, pp. 42-43.

[33] J. Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (London, 2002), pp. 138-40.

[34] Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', p. 16

[35] V. Hattam, 'Whiteness: Theorizing Race, Eliding Ethnicity', *ILWCH*, 60 (2001), p. 63.

[36] Ngai, 'The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law', pp. 87-88.

[37] Orsi, 'The Religious Boundaries of an Inbetween People', pp. 313-19.

[38] Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', pp. 13, 16, 21.

[39] Orsi, 'The Religious Boundaries of an Inbetween People', pp. 313-14.

[40] Ibid., p. 316.

[41] M. Waters, 'Review: How the Irish Became White by Noel Ignatiev', *Contemporary Sociology*, 25:6 (1996), p. 750.

[42] Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*, p. 178.

[43] Ibid, p. 89.

[44] Ibid, pp. 144-69.

[45] Roediger and Barrett, 'Inbetween Peoples', pp. 3-32.

[46] Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, p. 169.

[47] M. Rogin, 'Making America Home: Racial Masquerade and Ethnic Assimilation in the Transition to Talking Pictures', *The Journal of*

American History, 79:3 (1992), p. 1053.

48 Roediger and Barrett, 'Inbetween Peoples', pp. 8, 31.

49 Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*.

50 Ibid, pp. 7-8.

51 Ngai, 'The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law'.

52 Ibid, pp. 87-88.

53 Ibid.

54 N. Ignatiev, 'Review of Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Colour: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race', *The American Historical Review*, 16:4 (2000), p. 1305.

55 Guglielmo, *White on Arrival*, pp. 44-54.

56 Guglielmo, *White on Arrival*, pp. 44-54; P. Kolchin, 'Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America,' *Journal of American History,* 89 (2002), p. 172.

57 M. P. Guterl, 'A Note on the Word White: Review of White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945 by Thomas Guglielmo', *American Quarterly*, 56:2 (2004), p. 445.

58 Guglielmo, *White on Arrival*, pp. 7-9, 26-31.

59 Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', pp. 17-18.

60 Fields, 'Whiteness, Racism and Identity', p. 49.

61 Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination'; Eric Foner, 'Response to Eric Arnesen', *ILWCH*, 60 (2001).

62 Foner, 'Response to Eric Arnesen', p. 58.

63 Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs* (New York, 2018).

64 Gary Gerstle, 'Review of Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White; The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs by David Roediger', *Labor*, 4:4 (2007), p. 119.

65 Higham, 'Current Trends in the Study of Ethnicity in the United States', pp. 10-11.

66 K. Brodkin, *How Jews Became White Folks and what that Says about Race in America* (New Brunswick, 1998), pp. 58, 63.

67 Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness*, pp. 35-56.

68 Roediger and Barrett, 'Inbetween Peoples', p. 6.

69 Reed, 'Response to Eric Arnesen', p. 72.

70 Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', pp. 11-12.

71 E. Bonilla-Silva, 'Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation', *American Sociological Review*, 62 (1996), pp. 469-70.

72 Orsi, 'The Religious Boundaries of an Inbetween People', pp. 318-19.

73 Guglielmo, *White on Arrival*, pp. 12-13.

74 Roediger and Barrett, 'Inbetween Peoples', p. 32.

75 J. Barrett, 'Whiteness Studies: Anything Here for Historians of the Working Class?', *ILWCH*, 60 (2001), pp. 34-35.

76 Foner, 'Response to Eric Arnesen', p. 58.

77 Guglielmo, *White on Arrival,* p. 56.

78 Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, p. 6.

79 Arnesen, 'Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination', p. 16.

80 Guglielmo, *White on Arrival*, p. 16.

81 L. M. Getz, J. R. Raftery and G. H. Tamura, 'Bridging Borders, Brokering Divides: Confronting the Limits of Cultural Assimilation: Introduction', *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*, 9:2 (2010), pp. 222-224.

82 T. Ricento, 'The Discursive Construction of Americanism', *Discourse and Society*, 14:5 (2003), pp. 611-637.

Freya Reynolds

'An Unfinished Crusade'?: The Gender Equality Movement, 1960-1980

If the gender equality movement of 1960-1980 was a 'crusade', then white wealthy women were certainly leading the charge, or at least appeared to be. Throughout the period, seeds were sown for discourse and action, with gender equality solidified as a legitimate societal goal, but tangible changes still disproportionately benefitted white middle-class women. Both liberal and radical movements were blighted by ideological differences and conservative resistance, but debates ultimately remained far removed from many poor and black women's lived experiences.[1] The increasing conservatism of liberal groups in the 1970s, along with the radical movements' collapse, suggest that by this point, for many mainstream feminists, the fight for equality was largely complete. The proliferation in the 1980s of intersectional activists who challenged mainstream elitism and whiteness testifies to this,

the need for separate groups intending to benefit women with differing identities indicating that they were not included in the mainstream's goals. Therefore, the 'crusade' of the 1960s was largely finished, in that it had never truly sought equality for all women, rather uplift for the few. The extent to which efforts were 'unfinished' is also relative to the goals being pursued. For moderates, access to male-dominated spaces had been achieved, at least legally, while radical leaders could turn to academia and effectively fall back on their whiteness and class. This period effectively sparked discussion and action, then, but tangible goals were limited and often only uplifted those already in power, explaining the emergence of new iterations of the movement which instead perceived how earlier efforts had ignored the needs of many.

The gender equality movement's greatest

success in this period was the weaponizing of collective frustrations, sparking discourse which took hold nationally. Organisations like the National Organisation for Women (NOW) diversified efforts, allowing feminists to relate to broader swathes of the population, unlike their predecessors' single-issue focuses.[2] War-work catalysed frustrations and undermined gender roles, before demonstrating the government's ultimate lack of commitment to advancing women's status. As William Chafe indicates, this success therefore has to be seen in the context of other progressive action of the 1960s, gaining traction as 'feminist programs spoke more directly than ever before to daily experiences of millions of women.'[3] Successes of the movement were indebted to grassroots organisations, local chapters and individuals who applied discussions to their own lives, with issues gaining national interest only as enough women were ready to engage with discourse.[4] This is encapsulated by activism in Durham, North Carolina, where a strong presence of Young Wives' support networks in previous decades indicates that frustration about women's position pre-dated the 1960s. Later, through Young Women's Christian associations, a variety of feminist causes were pursued, even if members did not identify themselves as such: workshops, abortion counselling and rape hotlines provided tangible changes to women's lives.[5] What was successful in the period was thus the codifying of issues, as national organisations provided examples of action being pursued. However, their theories were useless unless they were put into practice so the individualised nature of local movements really allowed this to occur. Therefore, it could be better to present feminism in the period as a changing culture emerging from longer trends of resistance and dissatisfaction rather than a precise movement. Otherwise, we would risk attributing too much credit to white middle-class women.[6] This conscious growth

impacted even those who did not identify as feminists, as many began to examine mundane occurrences like practical chores, pronouns choices in adverts and discussions of rape with new significance.[7] The gender equality movement's success in the period was thus in raising questions and introducing discussion as, even if it was oppositional, people were engaging with ideas of society in gendered ways they had not before.

Within radical and liberal groups, the prominence of discussion-based meetings, decentralized leadership and allowances for chapters' personal initiatives all suggest a decreasing elitism.[8] However, leadership of many groups still consisted largely of middle-class, college-educated, white women and though major campaigns may have attracted people due to their wide scope, they continued to disproportionately benefit people who mirrored this class and ethnic makeup.[9] NOW's central focus on gaining women equal access to public spheres did have tangible impacts, with campaigns to remove sex-based job adverts from papers and lifting protective labor laws. In each case, though, campaigns were more relevant and accessible to middle-class white women. The protracted period of campaigning, letter-writing and protest for each of these efforts immediately excluded poorer women from committing time to them, and outcomes were often poorly enforced.[10] Similarly, emphasis on primary sector employment opportunities indicate leaderships' disconnection from poorer people's needs, for whom working was a necessity rather than an aspiration. Campaigns focused on raising white women's status to white men's, both overstating their vulnerability to poverty and effectively campaigning to raise themselves to the oppressor's position. Emerging black feminist publications pointed to this oversight, indicating poorer women's' emphases on 'survival, while the white woman's is often aimed at *fulfilment'*.[11]

Discussions of employment also indicate the limitations of grouping the movement as one: while discourse influenced working class women's mindsets, they often set out on entirely separate campaigns.

Both working-class and liberal feminists utilised the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, but while leading feminists were lobbying and pursuing court cases, working-class women were tackling discrimination on a daily basis, often facing discrimination throughout work. NOW called for affirmative action in 1971, and did aid in local campaigns, but had shifted focus by the later 1970s towards passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Shifts in focus contrast with the continuing commitment of working-class women into the 1980s, protesting and lobbying for access to better paid 'male' jobs in construction and mining for instance. This indicates a central divide, as women in NOW's leadership were largely already financially secure, seemingly pursuing issues on principle rather than actual need, and were therefore able to put aside concerns over poor enforcement.[12] Working-class women by contrast, did not need to be radicalised or helped to 'come to terms' with their own oppression. They were living through it, and changes to employment options were less symbolic, instead being pursued because of the practical economic benefits they could offer. This indicates the subjectivity of success, therefore, as major organisations like NOW were happy to put affirmative action to the side in pursuit of symbolic, legal change, while poorer women endeavoured to see them through, indicating the influence of wealth on perceptions of how 'finished' campaigns were.

Mainstream feminists' interactions with women of colour again indicate how limited goals could be, undermining the idea that they were truly seeking equality and illustrating how they leaned more towards the societal uplift of women like themselves. Black women's experiences within the feminist movement encapsulate this, revealings many white women's misguided views of their position in society. Some feminists' assumption that 'identifying oneself as oppressed freed one from being an oppressor,' indicates their overemphasis on misogyny rather than power structures themselves.[13] Clearly, many white women felt fundamentally uncomfortable with being beneficiaries of white supremacy, emphasising shared womanhood in order to ignore this fact. This was pronounced in radical groups, whose monistic approach to oppression derived almost entirely from patriarchy, effectively side-lining racism. Radical groups like the Red Stockings suggested they could 'renounce' their white privilege, pointing to a deep naivete about racial identity, as something simply to be cast off.[14] Ideological purity was responsible for the failings of radical feminism on many levels, but on this issue specifically feminists' actions indicate an over-emphasis on theoretical divisions and a further reluctance to confront their own experiences as beneficiaries of a white supremacist system.[15] More blatant than this were the actions of radical sect Cell 16, whose members suggested women were complicit in oppression, as 'slaves' to men, raising uncomfortable parallels. How, then, did they conceive of the institution of slavery and black people's current positions?[16] Slavery itself was a glaring presence in feminist rhetoric, though black women were not, used incessantly as an analogy for women's experiences. This indicates leaders' views of themselves as raceless, presenting 'blacks' by contrast as a monolithic, ungendered group. If black women were never truly included in white women's perception of womanhood, we could say that their failure to campaign on their behalf was not unfinished, but rather that it had never really begun.

Liberal feminism did achieve tangible changes due to its moderate ethos and pursuit of reform over revolution, meaning

proponents were more likely to engage with the state.[17] In a sense, this was both a success and a failing. Legal mobilization was understood as an important first step to change, and though more rights and definitions became enshrined in law their results could be patchy. In her critique of rape reform, for example, Rose Corrigan points to 'triumphalist' feminist accounts emphasising criminal and legislative changes, arguing they obscure the continuing poor conviction rates, strain on crisis centres, and continued mistreatment of victims. These failings illustrate the limitations of co-operation with the state, as changing legislation involved forming alliances with conservative groups. This led feminists groups to become increasingly apolitical once funding was gained.[18] The issue was not the strategy of seeking legislative change, in fact, but the lack of planning beyond achievement, indicating a naive belief in state commitment to change. Failure to move beyond the first step also points to a lack of consideration for women in differing situations, poorly enacted reform of procedure likely adding to already antagonistic relationships between authorities and subjugated groups such as women of colour or prostitutes. Faith in the system to enact positive change, contrasts with black and working-class women's scepticism, again indicating that white wealthy women's position as beneficiaries of the state made them unused to confronting its fundamental inequality. State funding meant crisis centres had to forfeit arguments for rape as a gendered crime, and to some extent forfeit their feminist outlooks themselves, meaning that activism essentially ended because it moved to working within a flawed system rather than attempting to change it. NOW's diversion of funds and disbanding of rape task forces in the late 1970s indicates not just an over-emphasis on the ERA, but a simplistic desire to see things as 'complete' once legislative change had been acquired.[19] Their belief

in the efficacy of these reforms can be seen by actions far beyond the period, for instance lobbying for the Freedom of Choice act in the early 2000s to codify Roe vs. Wade. This indicates a fundamental belief in legislative change as forces for good. Once again, perceptions of success and completion differed between socio-economic and racial groups, especially within the changing economic and political climate of the 1970s. Liberal feminists' emphasis on changing rights individually rather than structurally encapsulates this, as this increasing sense of individualism leant towards the notion of giving people the tools to succeed rather than ensuring that they would do so. Therefore, views of reforms success can also be judged in a specifically American context, ideas of equality coming to mean increased opportunities rather than any significant redistribution of resources or wealth.[20]

The gender equality movement from 1960-80 thus saw a solidification of pre-existing frustrations into widespread goals of equality, with activists challenging gender norms and placing what had been a fringe movement in earlier decades into the national consciousness. Campaigns were undeniably flawed and could lack adequate provisions for those who deviated from white, middle-class experiences. However, to apply this perspective to the movement is to assume a level of self-awareness many leaders and activists did not possess. Much like early twentieth-century feminists, many women, despite their increased awareness of limitations they faced due to gender, could not free themselves from their own assumptions, be they about poor women, gay women or women of colour. Positioning either liberal or radical feminists as crusaders for the rights of all women at the time negates the fact that references to 'sisterhood' and shared identity simply obscured the continual side-lining of those with different experiences.[21] Efforts at intersectionality from the 1980s onwards have been a

different crusade entirely, led by people for whom this movement failed - but perhaps never intended - to account. To approach feminism in the 1960s and '70s with an expectation that wealthy white women would have catered for working-class and black women if anything indicates the success of the third wave in entrenching notions that feminism should account for multiple aspects of oppression where its earlier counterpart did not. The extent to which efforts are 'unfinished' is relative to the goals being pursued, with mainstream feminists overwhelmingly emphasising the needs of those like them. The legacies of these goals, and perceptions even of what feminism means, can be seen in the approaches of different movements today. Intersectional feminists continue to contend with structural inequality, its instigators blatantly seeing the period as limited in achievements for many women. Liberal feminism, though, pursues even reform in a surface-level way, the emphasis resting on individual uplift rather than any challenges to the status quo. It also seems not to recognise its failings, and continues to replicate the exclusionary campaigns of its counterpart of the 1960s and '70s.

References

[1] B. Epstein, 'The Successes and Failures of Feminism', *Journal of Women's History*, 14:2 (2002), pp. 120-124

[2] Ibid, pp. 118-121.

[3] W. Chafe, *Paradox of Change: American Women in the 20th Century* (Oxford, 1991), p. 140.

[4] S. Gilmore and K. Laughlin, 'Is It Time to Jump Ship? Historians Rethink the Waves Metaphor', *Feminist Formations*, 22:1 (2010), p. 106.

[5] M. E. Blair, '"A Dynamic Force in Our Community": Women's Clubs and Second-Wave Feminism at the Grassroots' Frontiers', *Journal of Women Studies*, 30:3 (2009), pp. 30-39.

[6] Laughlin, 'Is It Time to Jump Ship?', p. 76.

[7] Chafe, *Paradox of Change*, pp. 140-142.

[8] Ibid., p. 120.

[9] Epstein, 'Successes and Failures of Feminism', p. 120.

[10] F. Davis, *Moving the Mountain: The Women's Movement in America since 1960* (Illinois, 1999), pp. 60-65.

[11] B. Eichelberger, 'Voices on Black Feminism', *Quest: A Feminist Quarterly*, 3:4 (1977), p. 16.

[12] N. MacLean, 'The Hidden History of Affirmative Action: Working Women's Struggles in the 1970s and the Gender of Class', *Feminist Studies*, 25:1 (1999), pp. 47-59.

[13] B. Hooks, *Ain't I a Woman? Black Women and Feminism* (New York, 1981), pp. 9-12.

[14] A. Echols, *Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-75* (Minnesota, 1989), pp. 145-147.

[15] Chafe, *Paradox of Change*, p. 148.

[16] A. Echols, *Daring to Be Bad*, p. 159.

[17] M. Epure, 'The Relative Merits of Liberal, Socialist & Radical Feminism', *Journal of Research in Gender Studies,* 4:4 (2014), p.515.

[18] R. Corrigan, *Up Against a Wall: Rape Reform and the Failure of Success* (New York, 2013), pp. 9-14.

[19] Ibid., pp. 39-47.

[20] Chafe, *Paradox of Change*, p. 148.

[21] Hooks, *Black Women and Feminism*, pp. 9, 137.

Ewan McCullough
Communication and American Elections

Every four years, the American electorate takes part in one of the most important political processes in the world, the election of their president. While there are various reasons why individual candidates succeed or fail in their quest for the presidency, communication has played a constant and crucial role in determining election outcomes. As David Greenberg conceptualises it, communication is a 'way to engage, persuade, and mobilise the people in whom power ultimately resides', especially in a liberal democracy like the United States of America's where leaders must 'make their case to the public'.[1] To secure the presidency, therefore, communication is key. Furthermore, as Kathryn Brownell has highlighted, 'advances in mass-media technology have offered politicians opportunities to communicate to a growing and diversifying electorate' throughout the twentieth

century.[2] The single most important technological development in this regard was the advent of the television, which made it far more possible for candidates to appeal to voters directly.[3]

Two elections shall be used to demonstrate the important role that communication has held in determining the outcome of presidential elections. First, the 1948 election which pitted the Democrat Harry Truman against the Republican Thomas Dewey will be used to show the crucial role that communication can play in influencing the way people vote. Truman led an effective campaign by rail which exposed him directly to the voters and convinced them to vote for him, where Dewey led a listless campaign which failed to engage with the electorate. Second, the 1952 election, which saw the Republican Dwight Eisenhower beat his Democratic rival Adlai Stevenson by a landslide,

shall be used to show the effectiveness of communication through the medium of television in particular. Eisenhower successfully utilised television to convey himself as a competent candidate who understood the concerns of the electorate. Stevenson, on the other hand, failed to fully capitalise upon this new technology and suffered defeat as a result.

In 1948, Truman travelled the nation by rail to conduct a 'vigorous national campaign to win the hearts and minds of voters'.[4] The president was aware that both the press and other politicians had little faith in his ability to win, so he was determined to embark on an all-out campaign that would bring his message directly to the people.[5] In his memoirs, Truman estimated that throughout this whistle-stop tour he travelled thirty thousand miles and delivered 356 speeches, with up to fifteen million people seeing him.[6] The campaign was clearly a success because Truman beat his Republican rival by winning 303 electoral votes on 49.6 percent of the popular vote, compared to Dewey's 189 on 45.1 percent.[7] Despite this victory, there is much consensus within the historiography that this outcome was rather unexpected. David Pietrusza has portrayed the election as 'the most unlikely upset in all of American politics', while Jules Witcover viewed it as 'the most startling presidential comeback in American history'.[8] Contemporaries agreed, in fact - according to *Newsweek*, Truman achieved the 'greatest upset in American political history'.[9]

Truman's campaign saw him focus on the seventeen marginal states from the 1944 election.[10] Integral to this was his whistle-stop tour, which consisted of Truman making speeches in front of relatively small audiences from the presidential train's platform. These train-side talks were an effective form of communication due to Truman's adoption of a new extemporaneous rhetorical approach.[11] The Democratic candidate had previously struggled with delivering prepared texts, so

his change in speaking style was crucial in ensuring successful communication during the campaign.[12] According to Donald McCoy, Truman's 'prepared texts were often stilted', as he 'did not look like the statesman'.[13] Furthermore, Robert Ferrell has described the president as a 'deplorable speaker', while Robert Underhill has viewed him as 'inept at reading aloud'.[14] Contemporaries concurred, with Jonathan Daniels describing a speech he attended in April 1948 as an 'uninspired address' that 'reflected none of his human personality'.[15] In contrast, the extemporaneous addresses 'reduced these negative qualities and gave the president a more immediate presence with his audience'.[16] As Truman has highlighted himself, speaking without a prepared text 'was more effective in getting my ideas and feelings across'.[17] The president thus achieved a unique connection with the electorate, as illustrated by Jay Franklin's contribution to *Life* magazine in which he observed that Truman had a talent for 'simplifying an idea and expressing it in terms familiar to the people he addressed'.[18] Albert Baime supports this by arguing that never 'had there been a president who looked and talked so much like the average voter'.[19]

One of the key successes of the whistle-stop campaign was Truman's ability to speak directly to the people, while also making specific appeals to each audience he encountered.[20] During his train-side speeches, Truman identified local politicians and candidates, local landmarks and industries, and key issues impacting the specific town or city.[21] As Cole Brembeck puts it, the president shaped his speeches to 'fit the fears, wants, and loyalties of diverse interest groups in various parts of the country'.[22] At Trenton, Missouri, for example, Truman helped win local support by demonstrating his personal relationship with the state governor and claiming 'I have always had a warm spot in my heart for this town'.[23] Similarly, at Decatur, Illinois, the president demonstrated his

local knowledge by personally naming the Democratic candidates running for the Senate, House, and Governorship in the area.[24] The connections that Truman built up with each crowd were crucial in ensuring his success, then, with the *Kansas City Times* attributing the victory to the 'ordinary run of folks' because they 'felt he was one of them'.[25] Zachary Karabell further supports this with his conclusion that Truman's appeal came in the way he connected with people above all else.[26] Truman won the election, therefore, because his communication strategy was crucial in him winning the support of a coalition of farmers, labourers, and African Americans.[27] We see the effectiveness of this rhetorical strategy best when we focus on its impact on the support of American farmers, as the president travelled through the farm states attacking the Republican Eightieth Congress for neglecting farmers and reminding audiences that they owed their improved economic status to the Democratic Party.[28] At Chariton, Iowa, for example, Truman emphasised that Democratic agricultural policy had 'led to the greatest prosperity for the farmer that the farmer has ever had', urging his audience to not 'turn the clock back' by voting Republican.[29] In his most vehement attack, the Democratic candidate charged the Republican Congress with sticking 'a pitchfork in the farmer's back'.[30] As Allen Matusow has suggested, this strategy highlighted both the successes of the Democrats and the follies of the Republics, portraying them as ignorant in the Eightieth Congress's failure to build sufficient grain storage bins.[31] This strategy is exemplified by Truman's whistle-stop in Decatur, Illinois, where he stressed that the Republicans had 'deprived many farmers of price supports' and had 'tried to put the farmer back where he was in the 1920s'.[32] The president's communication strategy clearly resonated with farmers because he won the states of Iowa and Wisconsin due to a swing in the farm vote from 1944 to 1948.[33] Contemporary newspapers support this, with the *New York Times* attributing Truman's triumph to support from the farm states, while *Newsweek* declared that support in the rural Midwest 'clinched President Truman's victory'.[34] Following the election, even Dewey contended that 'we lost the farm vote which we had in 1944, and that lost the election'.[35]

The role of communication in 1948 is further highlighted by the failure of Dewey's rhetorical strategy. The Republican candidate was reluctant to confront Truman on both domestic and foreign affairs, so he embarked on a 'remarkably bland, uninspired campaign that confronted no issues and answered no questions'.[36] Dewey lacked the research and personality that benefited the whistle-stop campaign, essentially repeating the same speech wherever he went.[37] These speeches thus failed to win the mass support of voters like Truman's did, as Dewey was a 'notoriously lethargic campaigner' who failed to 'relate to his audiences on specific issues that concerned them'.[38] We can see this in *Newsweek*, which saw the Republican campaign as 'little more than an onerous formality', full of vague speeches that lacked eloquence.[39] *Time* magazine even complained that Dewey spoke 'solemnly' and was simply 'not electrifying'.[40] Truman's communication strategy was therefore more successful because he was an active campaigner, while Dewey's campaign stops were too few and spread over too long a period to effectively mobilise public opinion.[41] In the swing state of Ohio, for instance, the president made eleven whistle-stop speeches in one day, compared to Dewey who made just a single speech in Cleveland.[42]

There is much consensus within the historiography that the communication strategy employed by Truman was crucial in determining the outcome of the election. Steven Goldzwig has argued that 'Truman's attempts at rhetorical influence were key factors in his startling upset victory' where

Alberta Lachicotte has contended that the president's victory was an 'accomplishment he owed largely to his own fighting spirit'.[43] Similarly, Gary Donaldson has claimed that one 'cannot deny the significance of the whistle-stop campaign' where Thomas Holbrook has viewed the tour as 'instrumental to Truman's electoral college victory'.[44] Contemporaries agreed that Truman's rhetorical approach was important in his success. George Elsey, one of the whistle-stop speech writers, argued that the election victory 'resulted from thoughtful planning, bold actions, and an acute reading of the voters' minds'.[45] Furthermore, Republican Senator John Cooper asserted that the president convinced voters that the Republicans 'did not represent their interests and their aspirations'.[46] *Newsweek* was representative of the media's view with its conclusion that Truman won the election because he 'conducted a terrific campaign'.[47] The president did indeed run a terrific campaign, for he successfully communicated to voters that their only rational choice was to vote for him to remain president.

In a similar vein, Dwight Eisenhower won a landslide victory in November 1952 that brought twenty years of Democratic dominance to an end.[48] He won 442 electoral votes on 55 percent of the vote, compared to Stevenson's 89 on 44.5 percent.[49] As with the 1948 election, communication played a crucial role in determining this outcome. However, communication took a different form because 1952 was the first year in which television first played a significant role.[50] By the 1950s, there were over 18 million televisions in 39 percent of American living rooms, and this number was rapidly rising.[51] Millions of metropolitan voters in electorally important states could now be reached by this new medium, so communication attained a new level of importance.[52] As Kevin Kruse has shown, due to candidates now largely communicating with voters through television, 'the only messages that truly mattered were the ones filtered through those screens'.[53]

Eisenhower won the election, therefore, because he proved more successful at using television as a means of communication than his Democratic rival. In Susan Douglas's view, image 'was central to presidential success' by the 1950s, and Eisenhower had a very positive image indeed.[54] The former general was well-known because he was 'a war hero with a shiny reputation whose name was a household word throughout the country'.[55] Martin Plissner has emphasised the importance of people 'to whom the personal character of their presidents matters', hence why utilising television as a means of communicating Eisenhower's personal qualities was so effective.[56] The fact that he 'looked like a natural-born politician' enhanced his appeal to viewers, his greatest asset being 'his air of decency and statesmanship'.[57] Moreover, while Eisenhower was not a sophisticated speaker, he did use a rhetorical approach that ordinary voters watching on television could understand.[58] The former general's successful communication is illustrated by investigative journalist Drew Pearson observing his 'ability to make people like him and the ability to inspire confidence'.[59] The success of Eisenhower's communication strategy is best illustrated by his televised spot advertisement campaign. Rosser Reeves of the Ted Bates Company was the primary architect of the spot commercial campaign, which saw him target forty-nine key counties in twelve pivotal states.[60] The Republican campaign produced thirty-second spot adverts, entitled 'Eisenhower Answers America', in which their candidate answered questions from supposed ordinary voters in simple terms while looking directly at the camera.[61] These commercials addressed salient public issues such as taxation, Korea, the cost of living, and government corruption.[62]

The spot adverts did not aim to explore these issues in-depth, but rather publicise to a mass audience that Eisenhower was aware of the problems that concerned voters.[63] In a test of his viewers, in fact, Reeves found that only two percent of people remembered long speeches, while ninety-one percent retained the message of his spots, indicating to him that the advertisements were 'well focused messages which the audiences were able to retain'.[64] This was their purpose. In one such commercial, the former general conveyed an understanding of the adverse impact of price increases, while offering no plan for combating inflation.[65] What these Republican advertisements did, then, is they 'reached into every living room', their simple question-and-answer format helping to present Eisenhower as an honest and competent candidate.[66] In this way, the utilisation of television accentuated Eisenhower's warm and likable personality while also humanising him and simplifying his message.[67] A television campaign such as this was thus advantageous because it reached undecided voters and the spots were often memorable.[68]

Like Dewey who came before him, Stevenson suffered from unsuccessful communication within his campaign. While both parties did use television in 1952, the Republicans 'proved to be the more innovative and precedent-setting in their utilisation of the new medium', contributing in large part to their success.[69] The Democratic failure largely stemmed from television remaining a peripheral component of their campaign, which was predominantly down to Stevenson refusing to fully embrace mass media politics because he 'held fast to the view that advertising was a menace to rational society'.[70] In contrast with Eisenhower's spot advertisement strategy, the Democrats purchased half-hour slots in which to broadcast Stevenson's speeches.[71] These programmes were scheduled for late at night on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and

thus attracted few viewers.[72] These are all issues, but the main flaw in this approach was Stevenson's inability to communicate with voters like Eisenhower could. Stevenson's speeches were certainly eloquent, as shown by him being the only defeated presidential candidate to have his campaign speeches become a bestseller. However, his rhetorical delivery was poor, and his speeches were often inaccessible because he used 'high-flown verbiage that only served to distance himself from an audience of everyday Americans'.[73] Thus, the Democratic candidates' speeches were a 'poor fit for the new medium, making him seem distant if not arrogant', in contrast with Eisenhower.[74] As Jack Gould of the *New York Times* put it, there 'was an aloofness, one might say almost a loneliness, that came between him and a viewer'.[75] Thus, in the words of Kruse, Eisenhower 'mastered making his pitch in thirty seconds, but Stevenson could not make the sale in thirty minutes'.[76]

There is much evidence to suggest that Eisenhower's television-based communication strategy was instrumental in securing the Republican victory in 1952. Plissner has drawn attention to the power of television advertising to reach, and convert, a large pool of potential supporters.[77] This was especially pertinent in 1952, because this medium of communication reached much of the electorate due to a majority of voters utilising television as their primary source of campaign information.[78] The spot adverts certainly contributed to Eisenhower's victory, but the magnitude of his landslide does make it difficult to quantify their true impact.[79] Despite this, it is safe to say that the television strategy was a success because Eisenhower won thirty-nine of the forty states in which his spots were aired.[80] In addition, Kruse has argued that image was more influential than policy ideas in the 1952 campaigns, so Eisenhower's popularity certainly enhanced the effectiveness of his communication.[81] John Greene supports

this in suggesting that Eisenhower won the election because he was 'clearly the most popular American of the post-World War II period', so gained support from every segment of the public.[82]

Scholarly opinion has also recognised the effectiveness of the Republican communication strategy. Stephen Wood has concluded that the spot commercial campaign 'was a vital and successful element of an advertising based campaign strategy that resulted in the election of President Eisenhower'.[83] Similarly, Robert Gilbert has argued the Republican use of television was 'extremely effective', especially at reaching voters less interested in politics, while John Hollitz has viewed 1952 as the 'first successful attempt to "sell" a presidential candidate'.[84] While less conclusive, Herbert Simon and Frederick Stern, through in-depth data analysis, concluded that the presence of television in Iowa had a minor net effect on the 1952 election through engendering more public attention.[85] It is therefore evidently clear that Eisenhower waged a campaign that successfully utilised the medium of television as a form of communication in order to win a landslide Republican triumph.

To conclude, it has been demonstrated, through looking at the 1948 and 1952 presidential elections, that the effectiveness of a candidate's communication plays an undeniably important role in whether they achieve electoral success. As Douglas has perceptively highlighted, communications networks 'can shape, at times irrevocably and fatally, presidential destiny'.[86] This was certainly the case in both 1948 and 1952. Truman's whistle-stop tour saw him successfully convey why the electorate should vote Democrat, while Dewey's uninspiring campaign failed to achieve a connection with voters. Similarly, Eisenhower successfully utilised the medium of television to portray himself as a candidate who understood the concerns of voters where Stevenson failed to make

effective use of this new technology. While the quality of modern information may often be debatable, Americans continue to receive much of their election-related information from television, so communication will continue to play a crucial role in determining the outcome of presidential elections in this and in many other forms.[87]

References

[1] D. Greenberg, *Republic of Spin: An Inside History of the American Presidency* (New York, 2016), pp. 3-4.

[2] K. Brownell, 'The Making of the Celebrity Presidency', in B. Balogh and B. Shulman (eds.), *Recapturing the Oval Office: New Historical Approaches to the American Presidency* (Ithaca, 2015), p. 164.

[3] H. Asher, *Presidential Elections and American Politics: Voters, Candidates, and Campaigns Since 1952* (Homewood, 1976), p. 205.

[4] S. Goldzwig, *Truman's Whistle-Stop Campaign* (College Station, 2008), p. x.

[5] Ibid, p. 17.

[6] H. Truman, *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope* (Boston, 1956), p. 219.

[7] B. Heersink and B. Peterson, 'Truman Defeats Dewey: The Effect of Campaign Visits on Election Outcomes', *Electoral Studies*, 49, (2017), p. 51.

[8] D. Pietrusza, 1948: *Harry Truman's Improbable Victory and the Year That Transformed America* (New York, 2011), p. 2; J. Witcover, P*arty of the People: A History of the Democrats* (New York, 2003), p. 436.

[9] Goldzwig, *Truman's Whistle-Stop Campaign*, p. 107.

[10] A. Busch, *Truman's Triumphs: The 1948 Election and the Making of Postwar America* (Lawrence, 2012), p. 128.

[11] Goldzwig, *Truman's Whistle-Stop Campaign*, p. 18.

[12] R. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948* (New York, 1977), p. 394.

[13] D. McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (Lawrence, 1986), p. 153.

[14] R. Ferrell, *Harry S. Truman: A Life* (Columbia, 1994), p. 296; R. Underhill, *The Truman Persuasions* (Ames, 1981), p. 196.

[15] J. Daniels, *The Man of Independence* (Columbia, 1998), p. 347.

[6] Goldzwig, *Truman's Whistle-Stop Campaign*, p.

19.

[17] Truman, *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman*, Vol. 2, p. 179.

[18] J. Franklin, 'Inside Strategy of the Campaign', *Life* (November 15, 1948), p. 48.

[19] A. Baime, *Dewey Defeats Truman: The 1948 Election and the Battle for America's Soul* (New York, 2020), p. 230.

[20] E. Bogardus, 'Public Opinion and the Presidential Election of 1948', *Social Forces*, 28:1 (1949), p. 80.

[21] Goldzwig, *Truman's Whistle-Stop Campaign*, pp. 56-57.

[22] C. Brembeck, 'Harry Truman at the Whistle Stops', *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 38:1 (1952), pp. 47-8.

[23] 'September 18, 1948: Whistlestop Tour in Trenton, Missouri', *Miller Center*, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-18-1948-whistlestop-tour-trenton-missouri.

[24] H. Truman, 'Text of Harry S. Truman's Rear-Platform Remarks in Decatur, Illinois, October 12, 1948', in S. Goldzwig, *Truman's Whistle-Stop Campaign* (College Station, 2008), p. 1.

[25] Goldzwig, *Truman's Whistle-Stop Campaign*, p. 110.

[26] Z. Karabell, *The Last Campaign: How Harry Truman Won the 1948 Election* (New York, 2000), p. 214.

[27] Goldzwig, *Truman's Whistle-Stop Campaign*, p. ix.

[28] G. Donaldson, *Truman Defeats Dewey* (Lexington, 1999), p. 172; R. Divine, 'The Cold War and the Election of 1948', *The Journal of American History*, 59:1 (1972), p. 90.

[29] 'September 18, 1948: Whistlestop Tour in Chariton, Iowa', *Miller Center*, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-18-1948-whistlestop-tour-chariton-iowa.

[30] V. Dean, 'Farm Policy and Truman's 1948 Campaign', *The Historian,* 55:3 (1993), p. 510.

[31] A. Matusow, *Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 173-82.

[32] Truman, 'Text of Harry S. Truman's Rear-Platform Remarks in Decatur, Illinois, October 12, 1948', p. 3.

[33] I. Ross, 'What Happened in 1948', in A. Hamby (ed.), *Harry S Truman and the Fair Deal* (Lexington, 1974), pp. 112-15.

[34] W. Lawrence, 'An Analysis of the Final Election Figures; Farm States and the Big Cities Gave The President Crucial Support', *New York Times* (December 12, 1948), p. 7; R. Moley, 'Et Tu, Ohio', *Newsweek* (November 15, 1948), p. 100.

[35] Busch, *Truman's Triumphs*, p. 159.

[36] Donaldson, *Truman Defeats Dewey*, p. 217.

[37] Busch, *Truman's Triumphs,* p. 135.

[38] S. Topping, '"Never Argue with the Gallup Poll": Thomas Dewey, Civil Rights and the Election of 1948', *Journal of American Studies*, 38:2 (2004), p. 179; Heersink and Peterson, 'Truman Defeats Dewey: The Effect of Campaign Visits on Election Outcomes', p. 50.

[39] B. Lemelin, 'The U.S. Presidential Election of 1948: The Causes of Truman's "Astonishing" Victory', *Revue Française D'Etudes Américaines,* 87 (2001), p. 49.

[40] 'National Affairs', *Time* (October 25,1948), p. 22.

[41] T. Holbrook, 'Did the Whistle-Stop Campaign Matter?', *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35:1 (2002), pp. 60-63.

[42] Busch, *Truman's Triumphs*, p. 153.

[43] Goldzwig, *Truman's Whistle-Stop Campaign,* p. ix; A. Lachicotte, *Rebel Senator: Strom Thurmond of South Carolina* (New York, 1967), p. 58.

[44] Donaldson, *Truman Defeats Dewey,* p. 219; Holbrook, 'Did the Whistle-Stop Campaign Matter?', p. 64.

[45] G. Elsey, *An Unplanned Life: A Memoir* (Columbia, 2005), p. 158.

[46] Bogardus, 'Public Opinion and the Presidential Election of 1948', p. 81.

[47] Goldzwig, *Truman's Whistle-Stop Campaign*, p. 107.

[48] D. Greenberg, 'A New Way of Campaigning: Eisenhower, Stevenson, and the Anxieties of Television Politics', in K. Donohue (ed.), *Liberty and Justice for All?: Rethinking Politics in Cold War America* (Amherst, 2012), pp. 186-7.

[49] V. DeSantis, 'The Presidential Election of 1952', *The Review of Politics*, 15:2 (1953), p. 140.

[50] B. Abrams and R. Settle, 'The Effect of Broadcasting on Political Campaign Spending: An Empirical Investigation', *Journal of Political Economy*, 84:5 (1976), p. 1095.

[51] J. Greene, *I Like Ike: The Presidential Election of 1952* (Lawrence, 2017), p. 91.

[52] R. Gilbert, 'The Eisenhower Campaign of 1952: War Hero as Television Candidate', *Political Communication*, 3:3 (1986), p. 293.

[53] K. Kruse, '"Why Don't You Just Get an Actor?": The Advent of Television in the 1952 Campaign', in G. Davies and J. Zelizer (eds.), *America at the Ballot Box: Elections and Political History* (Philadelphia, 2015), p. 172.

[54] S. Douglas, 'Presidents and the Media', in B. Balogh and B. Shulman (eds.), *Recapturing the Oval Office: New Historical Approaches to the American Presidency* (Ithaca, 2015), p. 152.

[55] DeSantis, 'The Presidential Election of 1952', p. 148.

[56] M. Plissner, *The Control Room: How Television Calls the Shots in Presidential Elections* (New York, 1999), p. 210; S. Barkin, 'Eisenhower's Secret Strategy: Television Planning in the 1952

Campaign', *Journal of Marketing*, 20 (1986), p. 18.

[57] Greene, *I Like Ike*, p. 27; Greenberg, *Republic of Spin*, p. 277.

[58] Greene, *I Like Ike*, p. 141.

[59] T. Abell (ed.), *The Drew Pearson Diaries, 1949-1959* (New York, 1974), p. 154.

[60] N. Griese, 'Rosser Reeves and the 1952 Eisenhower TV Spot Blitz', *Journal of Advertising,* 4:4 (1975), pp. 34-35.

[61] Brownell, 'The Making of the Celebrity Presidency', pp. 165-66.

[62] Gilbert, 'War Hero as Television Candidate', p. 299.

[63] Asher, *Presidential Elections and American Politics*, p. 230.

[64] Greenberg, 'A New Way of Campaigning', p. 197; S. Wood, 'Television's First Political Spot Ad Campaign: Eisenhower Answers America', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 20:2 (1990), p. 267.

[65] D. West, *Air Wars: Television Advertising and Social Media in Election Campaigns, 1952–2016* (London, 2018), p. 41.

[66] Greenberg, *Republic of Spin*, p. 285; J. Hollitz, 'Eisenhower and the Admen: The Television "Spot" Campaign of 1952', *The Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 66:1 (1982), p. 30.

[67] Barkin, 'Eisenhower's Secret Strategy', p. 25; Hollitz, 'Eisenhower and the Admen', p. 39.

[68] Greene, *I Like Ike*, p. 146.

[69] Gilbert, 'War Hero as Television Candidate', p. 297.

[70] Greenberg, *Republic of Spin*, p. 282.

[71] Gilbert, 'War Hero as Television Candidate', pp. 297-98.

[72] Greenberg, 'A New Way of Campaigning', p. 203.

[73] Greene, *I Like Ike*, p. 66.

[74] Kruse, '"Why Don't You Just Get an Actor?"', p. 182.

[75] Jack Gould, 'Campaigns In Review: Television's Role in the Election Was Large One', *New York Times* (November 9, 1952), p. 13.

[76] Kruse, '"Why Don't You Just Get an Actor?"', p. 182

[77] Plissner, *The Control Room*, p. 199.

[78] Asher, *Presidential Elections and American Politics*, p. 223.

[79] Hollitz, 'Eisenhower and the Admen', p. 38.

[80] Griese, 'Rosser Reeves and the 1952 Eisenhower TV Spot Blitz', p. 37.

[81] Kruse, '"Why Don't You Just Get an Actor?"', p. 171.

[82] Greene, *I Like Ike*, p. 173.

[83] Wood, 'Television's First Political Spot Ad Campaign', pp. 280-81.

[84] Gilbert, 'War Hero as Television Candidate', p. 305; Hollitz, 'Eisenhower and the Admen', p. 25.

[85] H. Simon and F. Stern, 'The Effect of Television Upon Voting Behavior in Iowa in the 1952 Presidential Election', *The American Political Science Review*, 49:2 (1955), pp. 470-77.

[86] Douglas, 'Presidents and the Media', p. 143.

[87] Plissner, *The Control Room*, p. 5.

THE WORLD

Laura Mireanu
The 'West' and Early Cold War Soviet Culture & Society

The 'West' played a highly influential role in shaping Soviet culture and society. Though the importance of the West's role is undoubted, however, the precise role it served to the USSR is difficult to define. During Khrushchev's era, the Cultural Thaw brought about the democratisation of high culture and increased availability of Western products.[1] This was a shift from late Stalinism, in which the Great Patriotic War dominated cultural discourses. After March 5 1953, despite continued propaganda and censorship, Soviet citizens enjoyed increased Western cultural imports, fostering the desire for Soviet culture to keep up with Western trends. James G. Richter refers to the Cold War as a 'zero-sum game', and the soft power of cultural diplomacy and exchange can also be defined as such.[2] While cultural exchange was a bilateral process whereby Soviet culture found

an audience in the 'West', this essay will focus on an in-depth analysis of Western imports in the USSR.[3] According to Wilfried Loth, the West should be seen in terms of its pluralism, which allowed 'a multiplicity of ways of life'.[4] By contrast, the Soviet regime should be seen as a 'centralised all-powerful state'.[5] From the USSR's perspective, within the bipolar system, the 'West' represented the other: another, alternative system.[6] Sometimes, however, the regime itself was confused about how best to define the 'West'. They sometimes saw it as a symbol of cultural innovation, diversity, and experimental freedom, while other times as one of decadence.[7] Recent historiography has captured this nuance while giving Cold War culture increasing attention.[8] Moreover, while many historians like Tony Shaw and Denise Youngblood still focus solely on America when discussing the 'West' rather than

also including Western Europe, the 1991 publishing of archives enabled greater, more in-depth research examining both the role of individual agency and citizens' diverse lived experiences.[9] More emphasis has since been placed on analysing how diverse audiences responded to cultural production.[10]

Drawing on these recent historiographical trends, and making use of Western cultural imports primarily from America, but also from France and Italy, this essay argues that the role played by the 'West' was versatile, yet far-reaching. While Western cultural imports were appreciated by a variety of Soviet cohorts, and international exchange events encouraged the intermingling of cultures, there was also a limitation to the power of Western appeal. A sense of Soviet patriotism persisted as competition between the two systems intensified. Using anti-cosmopolitan campaigns and propagandist newspaper publications, Soviet authorities encouraged Soviet distinctiveness further through the vilification of the 'imagined West' in Soviets' minds. So, while the physical West was praised, the 'imagined West' remained distrusted.

Khrushchev's De-Stalinisation and Cultural Thaw enabled increased numbers of Western products to flow into the Soviet Union, and Soviet society became increasingly fascinated with these cultural imports. As Gilburd masterfully illustrates, the regime encouraged translation, allowing the widespread dissemination of Western literature.[11] This unprecedented accessibility included the translated works of Thomas Mac and Romain Rolland, as well as Hemingway.[12] The latter's style – both in writing and dress – was widely adopted by Soviet male writers and readers, turning Hemingway into a 'trendsetter'.[13] In 1955-1956, *The Old Man and the Sea*, for instance, prompted literary disputes between critics like Sergei Lvov and Vladislav Drobishevskii.[14] This is just one example highlighting the prevalence of Western literature not only amongst ordinary citizens, but also within intellectual circles. American jazz, moreover, found fans throughout the USSR, from middle-class citizens in Leningrad to lower-class individuals in Saratov, demonstrating the broad societal appeal of Western music.[15] This attraction persisted into the 1970s, as Ekaterina Dobrotvorskaya acknowledged how rock created a 'space in the present' for Soviet teenagers.[16] Looking beyond literature and music, we can consider how films (starring Audrey Hepburn) and physical products (Levi's jeans and Coca-Cola) also slowly seeped into Soviet society: not only to the youth, but also adults and married couples.[17] Growing cultural importations signified a growth in Soviet demand for Western products, which transformed 'distant Western stories and images into Soviet possessions'.[18] The increased presence of the 'West' could not but influence Soviets' lived experiences: it influenced what citizens read, watched, ate, and wore. While historiography primarily draws on examples of Americanisation, we also see the importation of Italian movies like Eduardo De Filippo's *Side Street Story* and French visual art like that of Picasso.[19] Despite there being little on Spanish, German, and British influences during the Early Cold War, we can nonetheless see the widespread presence of diverse Western art in Soviet society. This facilitated the 'Westernisation' of Soviet culture – a gradual assimilation of Western trends into Soviet life.[20]

'Westernisation' implies the transfer of Western cultural values into Soviet society, whose thoughts and expectations were influenced. For instance, the Stilyagi followed Western fashions, danced the fox-trot in *diskoteki* (ball-rooms), and read Theodore Dreiser.[21] By acknowledging the power of individual agency, Tsipursky presents a sophisticated analysis of the Soviet youths who had gradually adopted Western music and dances, seeing them as the 'core of youth sociability'.[22] Examining

Komsomol articles, many expressing worry regarding Western music, he proficiently highlights the regime's awareness of Western cultural influences on Soviet society.[23] Furthermore, while most scholarly research like William Risch's study focuses on youth culture, Tsipursky looks beyond these conveniently-distinct social groups, underlining how, for example, American jazz united adult jazz enthusiasts.[24] He also examines how rural populations, including citizens from the Bystri village in the Ivanovo regions, coquetted with Western culture, albeit to a lesser extent. Rural and disadvantaged cohorts, for instance, adopted fashionable American trends including 'narrow trousers, thick-soled shoes' and long slicked-back hair.[25] This shows how popular Western trends were and how widely they were adopted. Hence, Tsipursky's, Risch's, and Gilburd's studies paint a panoramic view of the far-reaching role Western culture played in Soviet society.[26] Khrushchev's Thaw and democratisation of high culture had a broader effect than initially apparent. Western imports, from jazz to green shirts, played a powerful role in shaping the lived experience of ordinary Soviets throughout the early Cold War.[27]

The Khrushchev era foresaw an increase in international cultural exchanges that enabled the intermingling of Westerners and Soviets, an interweaving of cultures and customs.[28] This represented a shift from Stalinist repression as Khrushchev began acknowledging the importance of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War, as Frederick Barghoorn's study of Soviet foreign policy also indicates.[29] For example, the 1957 International Youth Festival symbolised a 'departure from normal Soviet life', displaying a British jazz orchestra, art exhibitions of abstractionism rather than Soviet social realism, and Picasso's *Doves of Peace*.[30] Richard Stites accurately remarks that this festival was a 'turning-point in cultural history' in this regard.[31] This ambitious event highlighted the new opportunities that Soviets had for coming into contact with the West: they were able to interact with Western people, culture, and ideas without complete censorship. This allowed Soviet citizens to create their own perceptions of the 'West' while becoming more familiarised with what lay beyond the Iron Curtain. Yale Richmond has astutely argued that the attending 'tens of thousands of Soviet youths […] were infected' with Western 'youth styles', from 'jeans' to 'free speech'.[32] It seems difficult to disagree.

Through these international events, therefore, we see how Soviets became increasingly aware of Western cultures. This increase in contact was also facilitated by educational exchanges, which are somewhat under-explored in the current scholarship.[33] As Liping Bu remarks, educational exchange during the Cold War became increasingly important to both superpowers – thus, it should be given considerable attention. From the beginning of Khrushchev's era until 1968, over 2,000 Western Russian-language teachers travelled into the USSR for summer courses.[34] These educational exchanges permitted Western and Soviet teachers to engage in dialogue, establishing 'multilateral contacts in the fields of education, science, and culture'.[35] This in turn encouraged the exchange of intellectual findings and communication amongst scholars. Hence, we see that contact with the West influenced more than the youth and students.

Nevertheless, the Westernisation of Soviet culture and cultural exchanges should not be immediately taken as evidence that Soviet population completely idealised the West. Many remained patriotic, renouncing what they saw as capitalist values. Drawing on post-revisionist arguments, Nigel Gould-Davies stresses the political consequences of culture in the Cold War to emphasise the important role of ideology.[36] While there is no denying that ideology constituted an integral part

of the Cold War struggle, as John Lewis Gaddis has asserted, the extent to which both superpowers successfully managed to spread their political ideology through culture is not so clear-cut as Davies would like to suggest.[37] While both Western (mostly American) and Soviet authorities tried to spread their political system through cultural exports, it was not always successful. America might have tried to sell the American Dream through movies such as *Roman Holiday*; yet, Soviet citizens seem to have only leisurely engaged with such films without their pride for socialism necessarily diminishing.[38] Here, Tsipursky's interviews prove particularly insightful, as they allow us to consider individualised opinions and enable us to draw pertinent conclusions. His primary sources reveal that, generally, Soviet citizens did not perceive the West as superior. Ex-Soviet Lev Figlin, during his interview, stated that while he admired American jazz culture, he had 'no interest in adopting American ideology'.[39] Hence, we see that the popularity of physical Western culture did not translate into idealisation of an 'imagined West'.

Political dissidence caused by the appeal of Western imports should also not be over-exaggerated. James von Geldern argues that Western poetic readings in Mayakovsky Square laid the foundation for future organised dissidence.[40] While his point is not entirely groundless, the link he makes is rather superficial. He does not present the other factors that might have played a more significant role in the dissidence, such as the regime's failure to modernise its economic structure.[41] He also does not mention the poorly-planned nature of the opposition. For instance, in the documentary They Chose Freedom, former dissident Vladimir Bukovsky admitted that dissidence in Mayakovsky Square was of a relatively small scale.[42] Hence, the movement's ability to counter the entire regime remained limited. After all, the Soviet regime remained in power

until 1991. On the other hand, Juliane Fürst separates cultural appeal from dissidence when she argues that apathy rather than political dissidence fuelled the *Stilyagi*.[43] Karpova also counters the idea that *Stilyagi* were proto-dissidents, drawing attention to their importance in the study of fashion rather than politics.[44] Fürst and Karpova capture the nuances in people's reactions and responses to the 'West', therefore pertinently explaining why the *Stilyagi* were never directly associated with any major dissident movement. Walter Laqueur argues that the youth were preoccupied with 'the pursuit of personal interests', implying the aforementioned apathy and a desire to succeed within the regime's perimeters.[45] While prioritising oneself over the regime was a Western idea, which shows the influence of the West on Soviet thinking, that did not mean a renunciation of all socialist values. Youths remained aware of poor worker conditions and US racist violence, so they did not desire Western-style capitalism. Soviet interest in Western products should not be equated with a manifestation of political dissidence – while they accepted imports, they did not engage with Western political ideology.

Despite this, Soviet authorities were wary of the Western presence in the daily lives and minds of Soviet citizens. Konstantin Azadovskii's and Boris Egorov's study of anti-Western propaganda campaigns proficiently concludes that the 'West' truly shaped Soviet internal policy.[46] Anti-cosmopolitan campaigns prove that the regime sought to limit Western influence on Soviet citizens. Although the campaigns were ill-planned, they tried to condemn many facets of Western influence.[47] For instance, the 'Campaign against Foreign Influences' targeted humanities' scholars like Aleksadr Vaseloskii and Isaak Nusinov, while editorials like 'On an Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatre Critics' targeted Jewish critics like Aleksandr Borshchagovskii and Abram Gurvich, condemning them

Figure 1: B. Prorokov, *Papa's 'Triumph'* (1954). Available at http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1954-2/stilyaga/stilyaga-images/#bwg138/770 [Accessed December 17, 2020]

of anti-patriotic ideas more generally.[48] Cartoons such as Prorokov's 1954 *Papa's Triumph* (Fig. 1) satirised such frowned-upon behaviour. Its title alongside the emblematic colourful tie mocks the Stilyagi and the influence of Western fashions, thus emphasising the latter's existence in Soviet society to begin with. The anti-cosmopolitan campaigns attacked a plethora of Western importations alongside Jewish minorities, revealing their failure to define the 'people's enemy'.[49] This shows that the regime acknowledged the far-reaching role that the 'West' played in Soviet society, but found it difficult to pin-point its origins and faults. Furthermore, words were renamed (camembert cheese was renamed a less foreign-sounding word: *zakusochnyi* – snack cheese) and redefined ('aviation' was deemed a Soviet invention) in the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* to reinforce Soviet superiority.[50] These anti-cosmopolitan campaigns and newspaper publications began symbolising the regime's desperate attempts to limit the soft power that the increasingly prevalent 'West' possessed over the lives of the Soviet people.

The Soviet regime, in an attempt to limit the broad societal appeal of Western culture, pushed back. They strove to create a supra-national identity and Soviet distinctiveness in order to compete with the 'West' both in the domestic and international cultural arenas. Rather than a history of crisis, in fact, the USSR's Early Cold War history can be seen as one of consolidation: consolidation of Soviet identity and nationalism. For instance, Soviet successes in international sporting events (chess tournaments and the Olympic games) were highly publicized. The West played the role of adversary in order to foster national pride and prove Soviet superiority. Beyond sport, we can also look at how the Soviet regime competed in the film industry. For instance, *The Cranes are Flying*, a key movie that emphasised the Thaw's beginning, won the 1958 *Palme d'Or at the Cannes*.[51] This international recognition was a huge success for the Soviet regime, undoubtedly creating national pride. Moreover, by trying to compete with the West on the international stage, they were involuntarily and gradually adopting Western film conventions and themes, such as an increased emphasis on individuals' emotions and suffering.[52] Therefore, the 'West' played both the role of adversary and of inspiration during the Thaw.

Apart from international competition, domestic competition with the West within the cultural and societal sphere also existed. Caroline Brooke argues that although composers like Ivan Sollertinsky thought 'Western culture was going through the final stages of degeneration', Soviet composers were nonetheless encouraged to create Western-inspired alternatives.[53] By doing so, Soviet culture was insidiously 'Westernised'. While Brooke focuses her analysis on music, we can also consider how, for example, French impressionism influenced Soviet artists to depart from socialist realism.[54] Khrushchev sought to keep up with – and oftentimes outdo – Western trends. Following the 1959 Kitchen Debates in which innovative Western appliances were displayed,

technological competition intensified.[55] For instance, the vacuum advertisement highlights that Soviet models clean 'dust from rugs, clothes, furniture and walls quickly and well' (Fig. 2), presumably better than American models. Such technological competitions revolutionised citizens' daily lives. Compared with art and sport, household appliances received little attention from scholars, but they are important case studies as they allow us to analyse Western influences on Soviet women and the private household sphere. Hence, we see how international and national competition turned the 'West' into an adversary. This emphasises the Soviet desire to keep-up with Western trends; and how, by doing so, it led to a gradual 'Westernisation' of Soviet culture.

The aforementioned competition fostered by the Cold War was accompanied by a darker strive to demonise the other side. Soviet authorities continuously highlighted preconceived stereotypes that Soviets might have had about the 'West'. Stalin's key theorist, Andrei Zhdanov, is just one example of an authoritative figure who regularly attacked Western influence and reinforced a negative 'imagined West'.[56]

Figure 2: O. Iensen, Vacuum Cleaner Ad (1954). Available at http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1954-2/whats-a-woman-to-think/whats-a-woman-to-think-images/#bwg142/789 [Accessed December 17, 2020]

Similarly, Khrushchev extensively used propaganda tools to vilify the 'West'. Pravda, for instance, repeatedly shed light on the sexual deviance of American bourgeois society, appalling Soviet citizens. Khrushchev sought to contrast such blasphemy with Soviet morality. Oleg Anisimov astutely remarked that there was an underlying paradox: the more Soviets found out about American ways of life; the more antagonism was raised towards capitalist values.[57] Although his work was written in 1954, it still provides sound evidence that foregrounds the 'blend of attraction and repulsion' that Soviets had towards the West.[58] Further aversion and repulsion of the Western lifestyle was also created by depicting the West as a racist and imperialist force. Soviet society was constantly bombarded with disturbing images and rallied with news of Western interventionist policies in Korea (1953), Vietnam (1955-1975), Cuba (1962), as well as the domestic Civil Rights Movement (1950s-60s). The Soviet regime sought to demonize the West while highlighting USSR's anti-colonial measures such as exchange programs with the Third World and the creation of the People's Friendship University in honour of Patrice Lumumba.[59] In this way, they could reinforce and redefine the identity of Bolshevism – what Stephen Kotkin fittingly called 'speaking Bolshevik' – against the Western capitalist enemy.[60] Shaw's and Youngblood's analysis of Cold War cinema supports Kotkin's analysis.[61] By studying film in an age when the cinema enabled mass participation, they convincingly argue that the cultural battleground presented a medium to express political rivalry to the wider society. We can consider the anti-Americanism prevalent in *The Meeting of the Elbe and Spring on Zarechnaya Street* as evidence of the demonisation of the West in Soviet culture.[62] Therefore, this shows that the Soviet regimes sought to create a negative 'imagined West' in the minds of Soviet citizens that would unite

them under a common Soviet identity.

Recent scholarship has shifted from a focus on the space race, economic competition, and political rivalry to a broader consideration of the informal cultural battlegrounds that the Cold War warriors employed. By considering various cultural mediums like art, literature, fashion, and sport, and a plethora of societal groups like the youth, women, and various minorities, we can acknowledge that the West's role cannot be reduced to a single adjective, and the lived experience of Soviet citizens was extremely diverse and almost opposes all convenient generalisations. This essay has argued that Soviets saw the West as both an innovative and fascinating example, but also a 'bogeyman'.[63] While Western imports and international cultural interactions appealed to Soviets, this did not translate into outright political dissidence as Soviets remained aware of the flaws in both capitalism and the West more broadly. Through a blend of censorship and anti-Western propaganda, the Soviet regime stigmatized the 'imagined West' to reinforce national patriotism in the Early Cold War's ever-present and multifaceted competition. While Western physical presence was appreciated, its psychological existence in the mind of Soviets remained somewhat distrusted. In other words, Soviet society could simultaneously desire Shakespeare on the theatrical stage and seek to retain socialism on the political one.[64]

References

[1] E. Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die: The Soviet Lives of Western Culture* (Massachusetts, 2018), p. 1.

[2] J. G. Richter, 'Perpetuating the Cold War: Domestic Sources of International Patterns of Behavior', *Political Science Quarterly*, 107:2 (1992), p. 271.

[3] N. Gould-Davies, 'The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy', *Diplomatic History*, 27:2 (2003), p. 210.

[4] W. Loth and M. R. Knight, 'The East-West Conflict in Historical Perspective: An Attempt at a Balanced View', *Contemporary European History*, 3:2 (1994), p. 193.

[5] Ibid.

[6] T. Momtaz, 'The Significance of the 'West' in Processes of Post-Soviet Russian Identity Formation (Societal and Cultural Perspectives)', *Arts Social Sci*, 7:5 (2016), p. 1.

[7] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, p. 2.

[8] Gould-Davies, 'The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy', p. 193.

[9] T. Shaw and D. J. Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (Kansas, 2010), pp. 1-11; G. Tsipursky, *Socialist Fun: Youth, Consumption, and State-Sponsored Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 1945–1970* (Pittsburgh, 2016), p. 1; Y. Karpova, 'The Stilyagi: Soviet Youth (Sub)culture of the 1950s and its Fashion,' *Master of Arts*, Central European University (2009), p. 3.

[10] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, p. 14.

[11] Ibid., p. 1.

[12] O. Anisimov, 'The Attitude of the Soviet People toward the West', *The Russian Review,* 13:2 (1954), p. 84.

[13] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die,* p. 119.

[14] S. J. Parker. 'Hemingway's Revival in the Soviet Union: 1955-1962', *American Literature,* 35:4 (1964), p. 488.

[15] Tsipursky, *Socialist Fun*, p. 28.

[16] E. E. Berry, *Anesa Miller-Pogacar, Re-Entering the Sign: Articulating New Russian Culture* (Michigan, 1995), p. 345.

[17] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, pp. 165, 207; V. de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Harvard, 2005), pp. 248, 32.

[18] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, p. 17.

[19] Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe*, p. 373; Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, pp. 189, 249.

[20] Momtaz, 'The Significance of the 'West' in Processes of Post-Soviet Russian Identity Formation (Societal and Cultural Perspectives)', p. 2.

[21] Tsipursky, *Socialist Fun*, p. 28; Anisimov, 'The Attitude of the Soviet People toward the West', p. 85.

[22] Tsipursky, *Socialist Fun*, p. 18.

[23] R. Hornsby, 'Gleb Tsipursky, Socialist Fun: Youth, Consumption and State-Sponsored Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 1945–1970', *European History Quarterly*, 47:4 (2017), p. 798.

[24] W. J. Risch, *Youth and Rock in the Soviet Bloc: Youth Cultures, Music, and the State in Russia and Eastern Europe* (Lanham, 2015), pp. 1-25; Tsipursky, *Socialist Fun*, p. 14.

[25] W. J. Risch, *Youth and Rock in the Soviet Bloc: Youth Cultures, Music, and the State in Russia and Eastern Europe* (Lanham, 2015), pp. 1-25; Tsipursky, *Socialist Fun*, p. 16; J. Von Gelder, "Stilyaga," *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*. Available at http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1954-2/stilyaga/ [Accessed December 17, 2020].

[26] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, p. 97; Hornsby, 'Socialist Fun', p. 798.

[27] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, p. 14.

[28] J. Von Geldern, 'International Youth Festival', in *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*. Available at http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1956-2/international-youth-festival/ [Accessed December 17, 2020].

[29] F. C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Cultural Offensive* (Princeton, 2015), pp. 28-98.

[30] Von Geldern, 'International Youth Festival'.

[31] Y. Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (Pennsylvania, 2003), p. 11.

[32] Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War*, p. 11.

[33] L. Bu, 'Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War', *Journal of American Studies*, 33:3 (1999), p. 394.

[34] S. Rosen, 'The USSR and International Education: A Brief Overview', *The Phi Delta Kappan*, 51:5 (1970), p. 247.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Gould-Davies, 'The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy', p. 194,

[37] J. L. Gaddis, *The Cold War* (New York, 2005), p. 6.

[38] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, p. 165.

[39] Tsipursky, *Socialist Fun*, p. 59.

[40] Von Geldern. 'International Youth Festival'.

[41] E. Kulavig, *Dissent in the Years of Khrushchev: Nine Stories about Disobedient Russians* (New York, 2002), p. 10.

[42] V. A. Kara-Murza, *They Chose Freedom*, 'Episode One: The Awakening' (2005). Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GEkkV7dInyQ&feature=emb_title [Accessed June 23 2020]

[43] J. Fürst. 'Liberating Madness: Punishing Insanity: Soviet Hippies and the Politics of Craziness', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 53:4 (2017), p. 842.

[44] Karpova, 'The Stilyagi: Soviet Youth (Sub) culture of the 1950s and its Fashion', p. 76.

[45] J. Furst, *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism* (Oxford, 2010), p. 248.

[46] K. Azadovskii and B. Egorov, 'From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism: Stalin and the Impact of the "Anti-Cosmopolitan" Campaigns on Soviet Culture', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4:1 (2002), p. 66.

[47] J. Von Geldern, 'Xenophobia', *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*. Available at http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1947-2/cold-war/ [Accessed December 17, 2020].

[48] Azadovskii and Egorov, 'From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism: Stalin and the Impact of the "Anti-Cosmopolitan"', p. 75.

[49] Geldern. 'Xenophobia'.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, p. 169.

[52] Ibid., p. 17.

[53] C. Brooke, 'Soviet Music in the International Arena, 1932–41', *European History Quarterly*, 31:2 (2001), p. 231.

[54] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, p. 231.

[55] Gould-Davies, 'The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy', p. 210.

[56] Geldern. 'Xenophobia'.

[57] Anisimov, 'The Attitude of the Soviet People toward the West', p. 85.

[58] Ibid., p. 89

[59] Ibid.

[60] S. Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (California, 1995), pp. 198-238.

[61] Shaw and Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War,* pp. 1-12.

[62] Ibid., p. 10.

[63] Gilburd, *To See Paris and Die*, p. 1.

[64] Ibid., p. 45.

Emma Chai

Soviet Religious Policy in the Age of Modernity

Religious belief is, and has been, a basic aspect in the lives of a vast proportion of the world's population. The inherent desire in man to understand his existential state means that historical research into any culture or society cannot escape discussions of religiosity. Nevertheless, Soviet society broadly presented itself as irreligious, in concordance with communist teachings. Karl Marx's infamous derision of religion – whereby religious belief was a temporary salve for a people suffering under class conflict – set the tone for the formulation and implementation of Soviet religious policy.[1] The fact that the Soviet Union was generally opposed to religious belief and formulated religious policy aimed at reducing Soviets' dependence on religious belief is undisputed among historians.[2] However, the history of religion in the Soviet Union has been largely left out of general narratives of Soviet history. This is not to say that religion in the Soviet

Union has gone completely unresearched; post-revisionist scholarship following the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 has shifted towards cultural history, providing a prime environment for the discussion of Soviet religion by historians such as Victoria Smolkin and Steven Merrit Miner. Yet even such work has remained on the fringes of general discussion about the Soviet Union, with religion being relegated to the category of 'special interest' or niche.

This essay will argue that the pursuit of modernity can explain the omission of religion in historical discussions of Soviet state and society. The dominant narrative of the Soviet Union as an atheist state and communism as an inherently godless philosophy has led historians of the Soviet Union to succumb to the very same 'modern' assumptions about religion made by the Soviet state. The growing irreligiosity of the West, where the vast majority of English-language

historical scholarship on the Soviet Union is produced, is an undeniable trend. Yet, the history of religion in the Soviet Union demonstrates the persistence of religious practice in the face of inconsistent, haphazard state policies aimed at reducing, if not eradicating, individual and collective piety.[3] The Soviet state's religious policy was based upon the assumption that religious belief was a backward psychological crutch for the masses trapped under imperial rule. As citizens were freed from their pre-revolutionary suffering and embraced communist ideals, it was presumed that they would naturally find religious faith superfluous. Atheism, it would seem, provided a more progressive understanding of their existence.

The failure of the state to effectively inculcate atheism in Soviet society demonstrates autonomy in Soviet individuals that runs counter to the totalitarianist argument, which claims that the regime either completely brainwashed their citizens to adhere to Soviet atheism or atomised them to the point that they distrusted their own thoughts and lost their ability to rationalise religious belief. However, the Russian Orthodox Church's collaboration with the regime as a means of survival points to a more post-revisionist conceptualisation of Soviet society in the vein of Stephen Kotkin's work.[4] This essay seeks to chart the narrative of Soviet religious policy under Stalin, examining the effect – or lack thereof – of such policies on religious practice throughout the Soviet Union. While religious policy in the Soviet Union was actively pursued after Stalin's death, the Stalinist regime was arguably the most instrumental in the construction of the Soviet state as the behemoth it came to be, the regime's attitude towards religion included. Overarchingly, this essay strives to demonstrate the centrality of religion to the Soviet experience, as well as prove that the history of religion in the Soviet Union provides significant insight into the mechanics of the Soviet state and society at large.

The Soviet state's hostility towards religion was fundamentally inherent to its communist ideology. Marx advocated the propagation of communism as a superior alternative to religious belief, viewing the former as a concrete conceptualisation of society that addressed what he considered the core plight of human civilisation – class stratification and corresponding social conflict.[5] Similarly, Lenin desired that communism enter the collective consciousness of Russian society and become the prevalent way in which people understood the world around them.[6] To both, atheism was a natural byproduct of communism – they were not personally offended by religion but considered it a backward belief system that could be completely replaced by modern communism. Yet, despite Lenin's claims that the state could remain indifferent to religion as long as it remained a private affair, the very fact that communism as an ideology made no provisions for religious belief meant that the state was unable to nationalise religion in the way it did the economy – there could be no communist churches and temples. However, Christianity (the foremost religion in Russia) inherently promotes proselytising. In 1923, Communist International declared in a resolution meant to address this very tension that 'the communist vanguard of the working class cannot and must not remain indifferent to ignorance, unenlightenment, and religious obscurantism'. Communists must 'have implanted in them the clear-cut and homogenous world outlook of Marxism, of which atheism is an essential part'.[7] It is plain that the inextricable conflict between communism and religion ultimately resulted in religious policies that effectively ignored citizens' supposed right to religious freedom and sought to eradicate religious belief and practice.

Religious policy in the Soviet Union under Stalinist rule can be broadly divided into two clear periods – pre-war and post-war.

The pre-war period, from 1929 to 1939, saw the state carry out a continuous and sustained anti-religious campaign. Anti-religious policy was pursued on all fronts, through the state's legislative, economic and social tools. The 1929 Law on Religious Associations banned the performance of religious rituals anywhere other than registered places of worship. Any other religious activity that did not fall under the category of 'ritual' was outlawed. This included religious education, evangelism, producing and distributing religious literature, fundraising for social and charitable causes, as well as gatherings of believers outside places of worship.[8] While such legislation against religious activity sought to destroy the structure of religious institutions, the regime also attempted to make religious occupations as undesirable as possible by making clergy subject to the astronomical private enterprise tax, meant for private peasants and shopkeepers. This tax continued into 1936, when the new constitution eliminated distinctions between working and non-working citizens.[9] In addition to such legal measures, state-sponsored anti-religious propaganda was widely propagated during this period. The League of Militant Atheists was committed to the eradication of religion throughout the Soviet Union, starting with the abolishment of all outward expressions of religion and leading to an atheistic education for all young Soviets. A vast amount of anti-religious literature was published by the League, from around 12 million printed pages in 1927 to 800 million in 1930.[10] This demonstrates how the Soviet religious policy was a systematic, wide and sustained assault on religious adherence within the state.

Most historians allude to a turning point in Soviet religious policy that occurred during the Great Patriotic War.[11] Indeed, the war and its aftermath saw a significant shift in the regime's attitude toward religion, though the laws of 1929 remained unchanged and anti-religious propaganda

continued. It is important to recognise that this seeming rapprochement was not an indication of the regime's acceptance of religion. Rather, both the state and religious institutions (and adherents) had turned their attention to the more pressing common enemy of Nazi Germany. It was then that the state recognised the potential of the Russian Orthodox Church to engender patriotism among the Soviet people, Orthodox Christianity being the main religion in Russia. Combined with a growing resignation to the fact that religious belief was persisting despite its best efforts, the state then sought to use religious institutions to its advantage.[12] The Council for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC) and the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC) were set up in 1943 and 1944 respectively in order to liaise between the state and religious groups. For a small measure of religious freedom, religious institutions were in return, expected to assist the state in their patriotic efforts.[13] However, such rapprochement was confined mostly to the Russian Orthodox Church, which helped the state consolidate the Soviet position in Easter European satellite states. Other Christian denominations that refused to comply with these demands and continued to evangelise were persecuted, as were other religious groups. In 1948, all Jewish social organisations and Yiddish publications were shut down.[14] Although legislation against religious gatherings eased, anti-religious propaganda still proliferated. While there were periods of rapprochement and cooperation with the Orthodox Church, the general attitude of the state towards religion was one of hostility.

Yet it is clear that the regime was unable to eradicate religion. Religious policy was haphazardly and ineffectively pursued, the stark tonal shifts indicating a general lack of understanding within the government of how to suppress religious devotion. Indeed, the persistence of religious

practice in Soviet society is a common thread that runs through the chronology of Stalinist religious policy. This was mostly evident in Christian denominations but also in other faiths, such as the Muslim and Jewish communities. In the first and only census that recorded religious affiliation in 1937, 56 percent of respondents declared themselves religious, a result that was suppressed.[15] Official state archives document bureaucrats' frustrating encounters with religious citizens while conducting the second census two years later. Apart from outright refusal to participate in the census, the archives also record an instance in which 'some nuns, apparently from Gorky area, who were visiting for a funeral said: "During the census pretend to be dumb, after last year's census they sent many people to prison now the same thing will happen again."' According to officials, playing dumb was 'one of the favourite ways of concealing a hostile attitude.'[16] Outright defiance of the state's heavy-handed efforts to identify religious adherents and eliminate religion is a clear example of the persistence of religion within the Soviet Union, but Smolkin's research makes it clear that even the state's attempts to offer alternative rituals to religious ones failed. In fact, they were often awkwardly implemented and roundly mocked.[17] She argues that socialist funeral rituals were an inadequate substitute for Christian rites, because the main advantage of the Church was that it was – already – a Church', suggesting that Soviet citizens turned to the Church, especially in times of death, because of the established rituals that the Church offered.[18] Furthermore, socialist rituals may have sufficed for the casually religious for births and marriages but not in death. Soviet socialism offered solutions to economic inequality and class conflict, but had no real explanation for the question of death, meaning that many were bound to continue to turn to Christianity and its promise of salvation and eternal life at the point of death. The religious revival that occurred during the Great War further points to the state's inability to prevent public religious confession when faced with the imminent threat of death, a massive indictment on the ineffectiveness of the Soviet state at influencing the mentalities of the people.[19]

Apart from illustrating the Soviet people's determination to continue practicing their religion even in the face of religious persecution, the threat religion posed to the state can be most aptly summed up in the account of an individual farmer who declared that she 'was not of the Soviet state, but of the Orthodox'.[20] Religious citizens were more likely to recognise the fundamental failing of the Soviet state – despite its claims, Soviet communism could not provide its own answers to all of life's questions and problems. Albert Boiter argues that the ineffectiveness of religious policy can be attributed to the state's fundamental failure to differentiate between ideology and religion. Communism was an ideology that sought to appeal solely to one's intellect, disregarding the concept of faith and inner life, a key part of religious belief.[21] Because anti-religiousness was built into the very fabric of communism, the failure of religious policy and persistent religious practice was not merely an inconvenient sign of backwardness among the people. Once the illusion of the socialist utopia was lifted, the very concept of the Soviet state was threatened, making the issue of religion and the general ineffectiveness of religious policy a menace to the Soviet state.

Establishing the clear persistence of religious practice within the Soviet Union despite the state's concerted efforts and the threat it posed to the concept of Soviet communism points to the significance of the study of Soviet religion to the wider field of Sovietology. For decades, the field of Soviet history has been characterised and factionalised by competing Western

interpretations - totalitarianism, revisionism and post-revisionism. All three rely heavily upon a unique understanding of the relationship between the state and the populace. Totalitarianism envisions the Soviet regime as having used every state control at its disposal to subjugate the masses. Hannah Arendt argued that 'the aim of totalitarian education has never been to instil convictions but to destroy the capacity to form any.'[22] This would preclude any kind of independent religious belief system, the people being so atomised that they were unable to differentiate between fact and fiction. The narrative of religion in the Soviet Union clearly runs counter to the totalitarian model, and suggests a more revisionist interpretation, which emphasises the autonomy of the proletariat and the inadequacy of the bureaucracy.[23] However, the relationship between the state and the religious was far too complex to be defined through a simplistic characterisation of the regime as effective or ineffective and the people as indoctrinated or independent. The interaction between the state and the religious was that of mutual negotiation. Soviet religious institutions and adherents compromised on the tenets of their faith, collaborated with the regime and were complicit in the repression of people throughout the Soviet Union. Arguably, by allowing Orthodox Churches and other religious institutions to function within a purportedly communist state, the Soviet regime also compromised on its core values. This relationship aligns more closely with the post-revisionist model, which moves away from the polemics of the totalitarian and revisionist schools and aims for a more nuanced reading of Soviet culture, especially due to increased access to information after the Soviet Union's collapse.[24]

The Russian Orthodox Church provides the clearest example of a religious institution that made significant compromises in order to continue to exist within the Soviet Union. The eventual head of the Council or the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC), Karpov, records the first meeting between Stalin and the three surviving active bishops of the Church in 1943. During the meeting, Stalin allowed the re-establishment of a synod and the election of a patriarch. They also discussed the setting up of CAROC, which the bishops readily agreed to. A published announcement in Izvestiya in September marked the first public declaration of collaboration between the state and the Church.[25] By agreeing to submit to the oversight of the state through CAROC, the Church became complicit in reporting violations of state laws on religion. For example, bureaucratic archives document the warning given to a priest for working without being registered with the local Council commissioner.[26] Given that state laws forbade practices central to the Christian faith (such as evangelism), and that the state was inherently hostile to the idea of religion, the Church effectively relinquished their religious freedom and accepted that their supreme authority was not God but the state. This conflict of interest was the subject of controversy even among contemporaries. 'Red priests', or clergymen that claimed to also be socialists in favour of the state, were considered traitors to the orthodox faith by some.[27] Collaboration between the Church and the state went beyond the rounding up of offending believers – in a mutually beneficial arrangement, the Russian Orthodox Church used its ties to the regime to annex independent orthodox churches and the Ukrainian Catholic Church during the Soviet Union's expansion of influence into Eastern Europe, thus creating a kind of religious hegemony in the Soviet sphere and expanding the Church's influence.[28] This act is particularly significant because it demonstrates that the Church went beyond mere collaboration in order to survive the regime intact. Its relationship with the state actively served to advance

its aims of expansion and domination over other Christian denominations. Effectively, the compromises the Church made created a new form of religious life under an atheist dictatorship that perhaps retained traditional rituals but bore little resemblance to the core tenets of its purported Christian faith.

However, it should be noted that underground Russian churches persisted through this period, comprised of Christians who were unwilling to compromise their beliefs in the way of the Orthodox Church. Such churches were primarily of other Christian denominations, such Baptists and other Protestant groups.[29] While this was a small minority group that was unable to effect any real change to Soviet society, the very existence of underground movements presented an actual threat to the Soviet Union by undermining the very premise of a communist state. In fact, the Initiator's Movement among Baptist churches in the 1960s was an outright protest against the state's religious policy.[30] As discussed above, this clear example of rebellion against the utopian norm was actively dangerous to the ideologically-atheist Soviet state and points to the larger role of religion in Soviet society.

While the Russian Orthodox Church accounted for the vast majority of religious believers in the Soviet Union, Jewish and Muslim minority communities were also susceptible to compromise under Soviet rule. Elissa Bemporad uses the production of kosher meat and the practice of circumcision in Minsk in the 1920s and 30s to draw conclusions about Jewish identity in the Soviet Union (outside Russia). Jewish religious practice was deeply embedded in daily life. While state persecution of Jews resulted in significantly fewer in rabbis and synagogues, Bemporad argues that it was this decline in religious authority that led to the stronger emergence of everyday Jewish rituals, and the 'transformation of Jewish identity from a religious to an ethnic category.'[31] Like

the Russian Orthodox Church, Muslim leaders demonstrated a ready willingness to praise Stalin's regime, despite the state's hostile attitude towards religion. In 1951, Mullah Shakir Khiialetdinov stated publicly that 'the world is divided into two camps, the camps of peace, headed by J. V. Stalin, and the camp of war, headed by the Anglo-American imperialists'. This was in response to several concessions made by the state, such as the reopening of theological training centres in 1948.[32] Yet the state remained committed to printing anti-Islam propaganda through Znanie (the replacement to the League of Militant Atheists).[33] The contradictions in Soviet religious policy stemmed from the tension between the purported freedom to practice religion privately and religion's fundamental clash with communist ideology. This lack of consistency meant that many religious groups in the Soviet Union created their own set of practices that were neither fully of their religion nor 'Soviet socialist', and in doing so ensured that their religious group avoided the worst of the regime's persecution.

Leading post-revisionist historian Stephen Kotkin argues in the chapter 'Speaking Bolshevik' of his monograph, Magnetic Mountain, that the Soviet regime was not entirely characterised by top-down oppressive policies. Kotkin uses examples of Soviet citizens adopting the language of the Bolsheviks as a sign that people recognised how to live as good citizens and did so accordingly. Rather than debating whether or not Soviet citizens bought into the ideology of communism, what mattered was that they accepted a certain way of life as a compromise with the regime, in return for increased autonomy in an authoritarian society.[34] Although Kotkin's research focuses on the speech of industrial workers and does not discuss religious practices, his theory of negotiation applies to religious Soviets attempting to carve out a place for their beliefs. By navigating the often

contradictory realms of Soviet religious policy, they were active participants in the creation of a unique Soviet civilisation. This did not mean that religious beliefs were not still repressed, but rather that religious people and institutions were cognizant of the need to adopt the language of the Soviet regime and hence compromised on their professed beliefs in order to avoid persecution. In doing so, they arguably created their own way of religious life that was neither fully Bolshevik nor Christian (or Muslim or Jewish).

Having established both the significance of religion and religious policy to the Soviet state, as well as the way in which the complex relationship between religious Soviets and the state nuances the historical debates surrounding the nature of the Soviet state as a whole, the question of why religion as a topic remains under-researched naturally arises. In particular, the absence of religion as a topic is notably lacking in general narratives of Soviet history. This section will discuss the treatment of Soviet religion in English-language historical scholarship over the decades, and in doing so examine how the concept of modernity has affected how historians have thought critically about the way religion and religious policy fits into Soviet history.

Early totalitarian historical writing on Soviet religion was heavily influenced by Cold War-era attitudes. The open hostility between the West and the Soviet Union in the 1950s and '60s characterised the period, and the lack of access historians had to primary sources meant that they were forced to rely heavily on accounts from Soviet defectors of life within the Soviet Union. Since defectors had clearly fled the Soviet regime, their memoirs and accounts were predisposed to be critical of the authoritarian nature and repressive tactics of the government. The notorious US National Security Council policy paper, NSC 68, stated of the Soviet Union: 'The system becomes God, and submission to

the will of God becomes submission to the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the system… for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and the individual would not be wholly submissive.'[35] This statement offers some insight into the Western perception of the Soviet regime – a monolithic entity that was committed to the complete atomisation of its people. Religious repression thus went beyond the promotion of atheism as part of the communist agenda and became about the establishment of Stalin's government as God, the only arbiter of right and wrong, the final answer to life's questions. Many totalitarian historians were also political scientists and held similar views to those espoused by the US government. As such, their research into religion in the Soviet Union – or life under the Soviet government in general – focused only on the repressive tactics that it employed, as narratives of defiance and resistance ran counter to the idea of an atomised population. One of the earliest monographs devoted to religion in the Soviet Union, edited by self-professed 'Cold Warrior' Robert Conquest in 1968, was an open and unabashed denunciation of the Soviet regime's hostility towards all religions.[36] As such, his work focused solely on listing the various aspects of the government's repressive tactics vis-à-vis religion. Without venturing into the response of the people to the regime, it was impossible to put forth a full interpretation of the evolution of religion and religious policy, resulting in criticism for merely rehashing widely-known information about the Soviet Union.[37]

As the field of Sovietology evolved, the totalitarian model came to be seen as backwards – a holdover from Cold War polemics. Revisionist and post-revisionist historians seized on the concept of resistance and the state's failures, but often ignored how religion fit into this model (especially in the case of the former). Pioneering revisionist

historian Sheila Fitzpatrick's *Everyday Stalinism*, in her own words, 'presents a portrait of an emerging social species, Homo Sovieticus, for whom Stalinism was the native habitat'.[38] This portrait's components were Soviet shopping habits, marital problems, economic privilege and police surveillance, among others.[39] Notably absent is any mention of how religion or religious beliefs fit into the daily lives of Russians in the 1930s, for all that the book is a detailed social history. Post-revisionism led to the revival of some interest in the study of religion along with a more cultural outlook. Stephen Merrit Miner's book, *Stalin's Holy War*, was published in 2009 and makes the case for religion pervading the state's decision-making process, 'to a degree not generally understood in histories of the USSR'.[40] Indeed, even among post-revisionists, most in-depth research has remained on the fringe of overarching histories. Ronald Grigor Suny's 1998 book, *The Soviet Experiment*, covers the fall of the Russian Empire all the way to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet even in the chapter 'Mind, Body and Soul', there is no discussion of religion at all.[41] In Stephen Lovell's *Soviet Union: A Very Short Introduction* – perhaps the first work perused by a new researcher of Soviet history – years of religious policy is condensed into a single statement: 'the Bolshevik state quickly nationalised church land and removed the church's control over education, birth and marriage'.[42] As previously discussed, Kotkin's extensive study of the city and people of Magnitogorsk does not draw any obvious parallels between religion and his theory of negotiation between people and state. The only tangential mention of religion occurs when he advances the theory that the communist party was akin to a theocracy because it attempted to interfere in every aspect of Soviet life.[43] In this way, Kotkin reduces the significance of religion in the Soviet Union to a mere analogous framework. Across the revisionist and post-revisionist models, there is a clear trend of general lack of interest in pursuing the history of religious experience.

This oversight can be explained through the way ideas about modernity have intersected with the secularisation of historical scholarship and academia in general, Modernity as a concept is particularly ill-defined, but generally alludes to positive progress and improvement. In 1956, James Hastings Nichols argued that modernity leads to 'a natural, necessary and continuous decline in religiosity', suggesting that faith hinders the progress of humankind and should be discarded in the modernising process.[44] It is true that the 1960s saw a marked decline in religious devotion in the West. Convent recruitment numbers in the United States dropped by tens of thousands by the end of the decade, and schisms formed within the Catholic and Protestant churches. More and more people disaffiliated from organised religion and declared themselves irreligious, a trend that has continued into the present day.[45] The advance of science and its perceived conflict with faith-based beliefs has led to attempts to find neuroscientific explanations for continued belief in God. 'Neurotheology', as the term goes, appeals to 'reasonable' people that there is a 'God spot' in the temporal lobes, and its malfunction explains religious experience.[46] Such research emphasises that the decline in formalised religious beliefs and practices is intrinsically tied to notions of progress, enlightenment and a triumph over irrationality.

This growing irreligiosity among the general population of the West corresponded with the rise of the 'secularisation thesis' among academics, or the idea that history demonstrates a linear decline in religion belief as society progresses culturally.[47] This 'metanarrative', as David Nash terms it, has plagued the field of late modern religious history.[48] Historians are far more susceptible to the assumption that the

twentieth century saw a linear decline in religiosity. The flaws of the secularisation thesis has manifested itself clearly in the study of Soviet religious policy. Because of the state's repressive religious policy, low participation rates in religious rituals have allowed historians to assume that religion played a marginal role in the Soviet Union, unwittingly accepting the Soviet regime's assertion that religious belief naturally died out with the progress of socialism. Where scholars themselves are irreligious, the idea that Soviet citizens were all too ready to give up their religious beliefs for a more progressive conceptualisation of the world – in this case, the Soviet socialist utopia – seems conceivable. Indeed, the parallels between the Soviet regime's attitude towards religion and the secularisation thesis should be noted – just as the regime failed to anticipate the endurance of faith long after the collapse of the Russian Empire, scholars of Soviet history have discounted the impact of religious belief on the Soviet state and its significance to Sovietology.

This essay has sought not only to examine the experience of Soviet religious policy under Stalin's government, but also analyse the place of religious studies in the historiography of the Soviet Union, as well as critique the current historiographical landscape. Throughout these discussions, a recurrent conclusion has emerged strongly – the centrality of religion to the Soviet Union. In light of this, how should we understand the narrative of Soviet religious policy? An easy and tempting reading of the facts is that of a state that systematically eradicated religious belief, then constructed a sham of a church as part of an outward façade of a functioning society. Such a thesis would mean that religious belief was incidental to Soviet society, no more than a moniker. If so, the relegation of scholarship on religion in the Soviet Union to the area of 'special interest', and not in the narrative of general histories, makes complete sense. This essay has sought to turn that assumption on its head. Religious policy in the Soviet Union was driven and changed by the persistence of religious belief among the Soviet people. The narrative is not one of top-down eradication but of continual negotiation between people and state for the right to practice religion. Neither side emerged unscathed (though Soviet people were not a cohesive unit – some compromised their beliefs and others chose to suffer and die for their convictions), but understanding the process is an instrumental part of constructing a picture of Russian civilisation under the Soviet regime. Scholars' oversight in this area is emblematic of the larger fallacy of secularisation within the historiography of religion. Yet it is clear that the study of religion in the Soviet Union deserves its place – at least a chapter – in the larger narratives about the Soviet Union. To Marx, religion may have been 'the sigh of the oppressed creature, the soul of soulless conditions… the opium of the people.'[49] But the dogged pervasiveness of faith and religious belief in a world where capitalism has prevailed over classical socialism paints a different picture. Between religion and communism, the modern doctrine may not be the one Marx envisioned.

References

[1] K. Marx, 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', in J. J. O'Malley (ed.), *Marx: Early Political Writings* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 57-58.

[2] A. Brown, 'The Bolshevik Rejection of the "Revolutionary Christ" and Dem′ian Bednyi's The Flawless New Testament of the Evangelist Dem′ian', *Kritika*, 2:1 (2001), pp. 13-14.

[3] V. Smolkin, *A Sacred Space is Never Empty: A History of Soviet Atheism* (Princeton, 2018), p. 20.

[4] S. Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization* (California, 1995), pp. 21-22.

[5] J. Raines (ed.), *Marx on Religion* (Philadelphia, 2002), pp. 167-168.

[6] Smolkin, *A Sacred Space is Never Empty*, p. 19.

[7] 'Resolution of the Third ECCI Plenum on the Communist Attitude to Religion (1923)', in J.

Degras (ed.), *The Communist International, 1919-1943, Documents: Volume II, 1923-1928* (London, 1959), pp. 37-38.

[8] P. Walters, 'A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy', in S. Petra Ramet (ed.), *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 13.

[9] Ibid., p. 14.

[10] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[11] A. Boiter, *Religion in the Soviet Union* (Beverly Hills, 1980), p. 17; B. R. Bociurkiw, 'The Formulation of Religious Policy in the Soviet Union', *Journal of Church and State*, 28:3 (1986), p. 429.

[12] Ibid., p. 17.

[13] Walter, 'A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy', pp. 16-18.

[14] Ibid.

[15] F. Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader* (Hampshire, 1996), p. 122.

[16] Ibid., p. 125.

[17] V. Smolkin, 'An Ordinary Soviet Death', in P. Nord, K. Guenther, and M. Weiss (eds.), *Formations of Belief: Historical Approaches to Religion and the Secular* (Princeton, 2019), pp. 127-132.

[18] Ibid., p. 149.

[19] D. Peris, '"God is Now on Our Side": The Religious Revival on Unoccupied Soviet Territory during World War II', *Kritika*, 1:1 (2000), p. 118.

[20] Corley, *An Archival Reader,* p. 126.

[21] Boiter, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, pp. 21-22.

[22] H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951), p. 468.

[23] S. Fitzpatrick, 'How the Mice Buried the Cat: Scenes from the Great Purges of 1937 in the Russian Provinces', *The Russian Review*, 52:3 (1993), p. 320.

[24] D. J. Raleigh, 'Doing Soviet History: The Impact of the Archival Revolution', *The Russian Review*, 61:1 (2002), p. 21.

[25] Corley, *An Archival Reader*, pp. 143-146.

[26] Ibid., p. 181.

[27] E. E. Roslof, *Red Priests: Renovationism, Russian Orthodoxy, and Revolution, 1905-1946* (Indiana, 2002), p. x.

[28] Corley, *An Archival Reader*, p. 156.

[29] W. C. Fletcher, *The Russian Orthodox Church Underground, 1917-1970* (Oxford, 1971), p. 3.

[30] M. Klimenko, 'Review of Michael Bordeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia (New York, 1968)', *Slavic Review*, 30:2 (1971), p. 405.

[31] E. Bemporad, 'Behavior Unbecoming a Communist: Jewish Religious Practice in Soviet Minsk', *Jewish Social Studies*, 14:2 (2008), p. 25.

[32] B. Childers, 'The Plurality of Soviet Religious "Policy"', *Master's Thesis*, The Florida State University (2012), p. 56.

[33] Ibid., p. 57.

[34] Kotkin, 'Magnetic Mountain', pp. 224-225.

[35] National Security Council, *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security a.k.a NSC 68* (1950), p. 8.

[36] M. Klimenko, 'Review of Robert Conquest (ed.), Religion in the U.S.S.R. (New York and Washington, 1968)', *Slavic Review*, 30:2 (1971), pp. 403-404.

[37] Ibid.

[38] S. Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (Oxford, 1999), p. 1.

[39] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[40] S. Merrit Miner, *Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945* (North Carolina, 2003), p. 2.

[41] R. G. Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States* (New York, 1998), pp. 269-290.

[42] S. Lovell, *Soviet Union: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2009), p. 46.

[43] Kotkin, 'Magnetic Mountain', pp. 293-294.

[44] B. R. Berglund and B. Porter-Szücs (eds.), *Christianity and Modernity in Eastern Europe* (Budapest, 2013), p. 25.

[45] M. Walsh, 'The Religious Ferment of the Sixties', in H. Mcleod (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Christianity: Volume 9* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 305.

[46] K. Guenther, 'Afterword: Belief in Science? On the Neuroscience of Religion', in P. Nord, K. Guenther, and M. Weiss (eds.), *Formations of Belief: Historical Approaches to Religion and the Secular* (Princeton, 2019), p. 239.

[47] D. Nash, 'Reconnecting Religion with Social and Cultural History: Secularization's Failure as a Master Narrative', *Cultural and Social History*, 1:3 (2004), p. 303.

[48] Ibid., pp. 303-304.

[49] Marx, 'Critique of Hegel', p. 57.

Toby Donegan-Cross
Religion, Politics and Anxiety in Meiji Japan

Upon concluding his landmark 1974 study *Japan: The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics*, Tetsuo Najita anxiously looked to the future and argued that in order to progress, Japan needed to redefine itself. To Najita, this did 'not mean searching for an "identity", which implies the Japanese suffer from lack of one. It mean[t] rather working out a relationship between conflicting identities.'[1] Turning the focus from Najita's future to Meiji Japan, c.1868-1912 - the period usually considered the beginning of the 'modern' period and the focus of the essay - we see the same anxious sense that Japan lacked a strong central identity. It was such a strong anxiety, in fact, that it was the defining motor of political and religious change, characterised by existential questions that often - but not always - had their origin in western language and ideas. Examples include the tension between monotheism and syncretism, the separation of 'politics'

and 'religion', and ideas of modernisation and westernisation. The large number of questions in this period defined the relationship between religious and political authorities, reflecting a pervasive anxiety about both the present and the future. Of course, there was not initially such an obvious demarcation in Meiji Japan between religious and political spheres (although Buddhists later introduced the terms *Shūkyō* and *Jikyō*), and we must be aware of this. In fact, one of the integral questions and developments of Meiji intellectual life was the questioning of the fluidity between 'secular' and 'religious' ideas and authorities in line with Western ideas and terms. Therefore, for our purposes, the terms 'religious', 'spiritual', and 'political culture' are defined very loosely, as rigid definitions would connote a problematically westernised, post-Enlightenment frame of reference.

In order to demonstrate the ubiquitous

anxiety over 'conflicting identities' that characterised Meiji Japan, we will consider four separate areas. We will begin with a historiographical discussion that challenges a postcolonial current of scholarship and considers some difficulties with narratives which take modernisation and secularisation as inevitabilities. Following on from this, we will argue that the influence of Christianity fundamentally upset the ancient syncretic order and challenged the assumption that religious authority could reinforce political power. Although Christianisation and secularisation should, on the face of it, be competing forces, in reality both developments compounded to challenge the growing nationalistic Meiji government and perpetuated deep-seated fears that Japan was not modern. These anxieties form our third section. Although we are primarily concerned with Japan's intellectual culture, we will also discuss how the relationship between state and society helps us to understand individual agency, tension, and a growing chasm between those with and without political and religious power.

The central argument of this essay – that anxiety, mainly from the 'west', drove both 'religious', and 'political' change (though the two spheres were not separate) – challenges the postcolonial current of scholarship. Put simply, this scholarship seeks to question significant western influence and frames of reference, and hence to see Japan's culture and peoples in their own terms. As Edward Said has influentially argued, 'from the beginning of Western speculation about the Orient, the one thing the Orient could not do was to represent itself.'[2] In the context of religious influence, Western scholars have struggled to accept the nature of religious life in Japan because Buddhism, Shinto and Confucianism do not conform to a Christian model.[3] Instead, they wrongly conclude that Japanese spiritual life was essentially 'pragmatic and relativistic.'[4] Conceding that there was any significant western influence – be it Christianity, the category of 'religion', or concepts of 'modernity' – has therefore become difficult territory for historians.

In recent years, however, revisionist historians have exposed a middle ground which neither 'orientalises' the East nor denies outright any western influence, a development for which there are worthwhile reasons. Firstly, we must acknowledge that such concepts were able to take root in Japan because of parallel indigenous concepts.[5] Buddhists equated Hegel's idea of pure reason with the Tendai concept of *ri*, for example.[6] Furthermore, the postcolonial perspective could potentially obscure the fact that western concepts were often self-imposed. It was Fukuzawa Yukichi, for instance, who introduced the idea of 'stages of civilisation' to Japan.[7] Other scholars have rightly pointed out that Japanese notions of the West have been 'as imprecise and encompassing as the term Orient was in English' - the generalisation goes both ways.[8] Finally, and perhaps most crucially, denying western influence in turn denies that western categories and ideas can have dynamic and changing histories of their own.[9] The most fruitful approach, therefore, centres around the idea that western notions of religion and philosophy were neither 'transplanted' nor 'invented' in Japan, 'but rather 'reconceived' there.'[10] Considering these developments in historiography is valuable insofar as it does not deny the profound anxiety prompted by encroaching western influence as a transformative force in society, nor does it overlook the importance of individual agency in Japan.

Two other historiographical paradigms worth challenging are the teleological tendencies to view the history of Japanese religion as a history of either secularisation or modernisation. Modern religious surveys typically return results which indicate that the majority in Japan participate in religious (typically Shintoist) ceremonies only as a formality.[11] According to Caldarola, 'their

content is not taken seriously,' and few believe in the notion of a 'soul.'[12] Viewing Meiji Japan in light of contemporary Japan would thus create an urge to expose inherent structural weaknesses in Shinto and Buddhism and potentially overemphasise these in order to explain the decline of religious policy to the present day. However, there was nothing inevitable about the decline in religious authority in Japan upon the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The binary distinctions between 'religious' and 'secular', between 'political' and 'religious,' were only beginning to be articulated in the late 1860s and 1870s, and the state viewed religious (or, more specifically, Shinto) authority as a pillar of state-building, even if there was some anxiety about its efficacy. Similarly, to view Meiji Japan through the 'modernisation' paradigm is to grossly over-simplify. In one respect, modernisation connotes a particularly western (and American) frame of reference, given its association with patronising ideas of 'development.'[13] Furthermore, when we speak of modernity in terms of a central thrust of society, rather than by defining it as a particular kind of society with certain characteristics, it becomes unclear how far the term is an objective rather than a subjective one.[14] Adhering to the teleological modernisation and secularisation historical paradigms therefore adds little to an understanding of the relationship between religious and political culture in Meiji Japan, even if fears of declining religious participation and Japan's regression were ubiquitous.

Japanese syncretic tradition – a 'spiritual mosaic', as Caldrola puts it – was an inherent strength of the political and social order, but the Meiji Restoration, despite the regime's best efforts, marked an acceleration of disharmony between spiritual groups which in turn weakened the use of syncretic spirituality as state apparatus.[15] Syncretism is perhaps best defined practically:

A typical Japanese is married in a Shinto shrine and his funeral is held in a Buddhist temple. During the course of his life, he may adhere to Confucian ethics, borrow from Christianity, and when convenient, participate in noninstitutionalized folk religious practices, and believe Taoist-related notions of good and bad luck.[16]

It is a 'mosaic' of various beliefs, all of which come together. What we must bear in mind, however, is that Shinto is indigenous to Japan, where Buddhism was introduced from India in the sixth century.[17] Despite Buddhism being a foreign religion, though, the 'theological flexibility and "fluidity"' of both meant that conflict was the exception and not the rule.[18] The practice of *shinbutsu-shūgo*, where Shinto kami were associated and comparable with Buddha, was a way - according to Rhodes - in which Shinto benefitted from its association with a foreign religion, and Buddhists furthered their own power.[19]

In this context, the Meiji government's early decision to rid their regime of 'the foreign religion' (Buddhism), and their ordering of the 'separation of Gods and Buddhas', demonstrates a major rupture in that the syncretic order, which was considered organic and natural, was now constitutionally defined and therefore political.[20] Potentially, this move was motivated by a desire to justify their new regime with reference to Ancient Japanese custom, or to distinguish themselves from the Edo administration that preceded them.[21] Nevertheless, contradicting what appeared natural raised and perpetuated uneasy questions about national identity, questions which were only intensified in light of Christianity, a monotheistic faith with a much stricter doctrine. To return to Najita's idea of 'conflicting identities', the Meiji government in this case had sought definition and picked a side, rather than seeking to reconcile potential conflicts.[22]

Although retrospectively it appears clear that allying with Shinto created and exacerbated anxieties about national identity, this is not to suggest that the architects of the Meiji restoration were clumsy or short-sighted in their policy towards spiritual life. Rather than paralysis, anxiety about a potentially declining spiritual life - and with it, the Japanese national identity - emboldened the Meiji State to try to subvert what appeared impending through the introduction of 'State Shinto.' This was not a technicality, but an all-out scheme of state-sponsored indoctrination. Significantly, Shinto was defined outside of the category of 'religion,' and therefore more concern was afforded to the 'secular' side of Shinto rather than notions of inner transformation.[23] State Shinto was essentially one component in a broader cult of the Meiji Emperor, and most Japanese people regarded Shinto as an imperial ritual rather than a religion.[24] 'Secular' activities included all citizens being ordered to belong to a particular shrine and being given a compulsory education on 'moral teaching', where Shinto priests were essentially made '*de facto* government officials.'[25]

Historians have disagreed on the precise nature, aims and success of State Shinto. Isomae has argued that it was 'neither "religion" nor "secular"… [and that it was] born out of trial and error.'[26] Similarly, Gluck has used a vast and impressive range of primary sources (including New Years' Songs and village plans) to argue that State Shinto was unsuccessful because the Japanese populace were not 'abject slaves' to a 'mythological fiction' and remained sceptical.[27] Conversely, Kittigawa has argued that State Shinto became the 'spiritual axis that would unite the nation.'[28] Kittigawa's history is concerned primarily with the longer-term history of secularisation, identifying the end of the pacific war as the key rupture, so perhaps his teleological angle discredits his view.[29] He certainly appears to have overlooked significant anxieties and tensions before 1945 in the history of Japanese religion, anxieties which had a transformative effect on both religious and political culture and helped to define the parameters between them.

If Shinto benefitted from Meiji policy, albeit in a roundabout way, Buddhists were - to their surprise - forced to confront the opposite fate. Faced with the anxious reality of a loss of influence, Buddhist priests displayed great ingenuity in their endeavours to restore the pre-restoration *status quo*. This involved both a revision of the Meiji view of history that saw them as a 'foreign' religion and, paradoxically, a successful attempt to rebrand Buddhism in line with 'western' and 'modern' notions of philosophy. In a background of growing nationalism, being called the 'foreign religion' reportedly 'shocked' many Buddhists 'to the bone', their religion having been in Japan for over 1300 years but being rejected by a strand of the Meiji regime as never fully naturalised.[30] However, by both dissociating themselves from the 'spiritually bankrupt' 'foreign religion' and ending the ban and persecution of Christians, the Meiji government provided Buddhists with a new 'foreign religion' to take their place as the outsiders.[31] Buddhist leaders managed to organise an alliance with Confucian and Shinto leaders in 'an all-out campaign against Christianity', illustrating that internal conflicts and anxieties paled in comparison with the altogether greater fear of the encroaching Christianising West.[32]

In the longer term, then, the Buddhist attempt to associate themselves with western categories and notions of 'modernity' was to have great significance, both being borne out of and perpetuating anxieties about Japanese identity. Two key figures in this development were Inoue Enryō and Shimaji Mokurai. Inoue was a Buddhist priest who had studied western philosophy at Tokyo University and embarked on three world tours.[33] In

1881, he gave up his status as a priest and began using the western title 'philosopher' (*tetsugakusha*), with the aim of assuming 'the voice of universal rationality.'[34] Inoue introduced the idea of *Seikyōsha* with his work, a simple but compelling idea that Buddhism should be the basis of Japan's future because of its 'long connection' with Japan's history and culture.[35] Mokurai's approach was slightly more technical, as he aimed to clarify the distinction between 'religion' and 'secular' spheres so as to define Buddhism as superior to non-religions - in particular Shinto.[36] This technicality is significant as it both undermined Shinto as an effective way to construct national identity and removed any potential competition between Buddhism and Shinto.[37] The *shinbutsu bunri*, the Meiji's separation of Shinto and Buddhism, thus became foundational for their recovery as a regime, though it was initially a 'shock' to Buddhists.[38] Ironically, demarcating the religious and secular spheres went some way to restoring Buddhism's political power. Beyond intellectual debates, superficial structural changes such as the formation of Sunday schools and introduction of Buddhist wedding ceremonies echoed western practices and gave Buddhism added kudos. High or low, the ubiquitous fear of declining influence often materialised in terms and debates prompted by western influence or in line with western terms.

If Buddhism's formal influence evaporated upon the Meiji restoration, Christianity enjoyed a qualitatively different fate. Even if numbers of Christians showed little improvement, the 'objective, absolute, universal, and dualistic terms' propounded by the Christian faith contributed to a process of 'subjectification', fundamentally challenging the ancient syncretic order and inflaming anxieties about modernization and the West.[39] As has been discussed, the concept of 'religion' itself emerged from a Judeo-Christian model.[40] The proliferation of the term *Shūkyō* - the Japanese term meaning 'religion' - was not a superficial linguistic change, but rather a symptom of a broader shift in how Japan conceived of its own culture, the cultures outside its borders, and even the relationship between the state and spirituality.[41] This shift is epitomised by the so-called 'Uchimura Incident' in 1900, when Uchimura Kanzō, the most prominent Christian leader of the day, refused to bow to a portrait of the Meiji Emperor.[42] The incident was significant because it asserted the differences between 'secular' and 'religious' spheres and between the syncretic state Shinto and monotheistic Christianity. Furthermore, politically, it highlighted an authority beyond and potentially superior to the Emperor. Although Uchimura denied the compatibility of Christianity as a pillar of Meiji authority, he made attempts to harmonise other aspects of Japanese culture with Christianity. For example, the gospel of Jesus was associated with the concept of Bushido – a code of the Samurai class – with Christ and his disciples regarded as 'models for the warrior (*bushi*)'.[43] Whether Christian authorities denied the compatibility of Japanese culture with their doctrine or not, most considered it in any case a source of anxiety.

Beyond doctrinal and issues of authority, Christianity was, in another sense, a symptom of wider anxiety about westernisation and modernisation, although there was a counter culture which downplayed its threat. As Caldarola has rightly suggested, many people were 'anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Christian', since it was believed 'that all three go together'.[44] Similarly, there was a notion that to convert to Christianity was to accept 'Western thought… symbolism… organisation [and]… a way of life.'[45] There were different ways in which intellectuals responded to these broader and more existential anxieties. Mokurai argued that there was 'no direct link… between Christianity and the development of civilization in Europe'.[46] Similarly, Inoue

went further by arguing that rather than Christianity in fact impeded development, despite being the crux of it in Europe.[47] A less common view was one that downplayed any threat from Christianity. In a commentary on the 1890 Imperial Rescript which had guaranteed 'freedom of religion', Ōnishi Hajime argued that Christianity would never 'imperil our country' and could not be deemed 'anti-state' because the Christian doctrine was riddled with contradictions and its proponents inclined to excess.[48] Whichever perspective one accepts as dominant, what is clear is that anxieties surrounding modernisation, westernisation and Christianisation were inherently linked, and formed a major component of public discourse and debate in Meiji Japan.

Uchimira's refusal to bow before the Meiji emperor was particularly bold, since the state had fixated on the place of the emperor as a central tenet in the building of nationalism, even though nationalism seems to be less a show of strength and more a reflection of deep-seated anxiety. Fixating on the emperor placed Meiji Japan in line with Japan's ancient rule, as the historic framing of their right to rule seems to have given them added legitimacy.[49] The development of *Tennesōi* (nationalistic) ideology, in this context, is best understood as an attempt to plaster over conflicting ideologies by focusing on the emperor.[50] Elements of this 'cult', to use Caldarola's term, employed religious language and imagery. For example, the emperor was called an *ikigami*, or 'living Kami'.[51] Furthermore, the Imperial Rescript of 1890 had employed the Confucian concept of filial piety to try and make the emperor seem like the father of the nation, and ultimately to build the concept of a *Kazoku kokka* ('family state').[52] However, given the anxiety which attached itself to religious discourse, there were also attempts to separate the emperor from contemporary disputes. In the debate over the demarcation of 'secular' and 'religious' spheres, the Imperial Rescript of 1890 aimed to elevate the emperor outside of these two categories. His existence 'as a living god… [supposedly exceeded] morality and religion.'[53] The strength of this nationalism, and by extension its ability to reconcile and iron out anxiety, has raised serious and worthwhile questions about why it was so quickly deconstructed after 1945. One valuable suggestion comes from Gluck, who posited that nationalism is an inherently weak ideology and thus never took hold in the way that is suggested. Furthermore, historians who have reinforced *Japan's Modern Myths*, to use the title of Gluck's seminal 1985 book, were often intent on justifying America's post-war occupation of Japan.[54] If we dismiss both the idea of deep-seated nationalism and Masao's assertion that the Japanese had been kept 'in slavery for so long', then, our impression of nationalism becomes less of a thing that reconciled Japan's multiple identities and more of a short-term mask for Japan's ubiquitous anxiety.[55]

Historiographical debates on nationalism typically include at least some mention of the 1890 Imperial Rescript, but more often than not the importance and clarity of the Rescript is over-emphasised. The Rescript was a hotly contested document which clarified the government's policy on education. It was to have great significance in the building of nationalism and State Shinto, since all students were required to study and memorize the text.[56] Kittigawa believed the text to be predominantly Confucian in its influence.[57] More specifically, Sekiguchi argued that Mencius's commentary on the Confucian five ethical relations had served as its basis.[58] The key passage used to reinforce this argument was 'Ye, Our Subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true.'[59] Caldarola agreed that the Rescript was Confucian, but also suggested Shintoist emphasis.[60] None of these arguments

are wrong, but neither is entirely right. As they all touch upon, the Rescript is best understood as evidence of the deep conflicts and anxieties that characterised intellectual life. As Nolte has suggested, 'the power and pity of the Rescript was that it could mean nearly anything.'[61] Within its 315 words, there is evidence of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shintoism, as well as a growing interest in Western Constitutionalism.[62] Ōnishi, ever a shrewd commentator, commented at the time that 'even utilitarian ethical theory, in my opinion, cannot be said for certain to contradict the Imperial Rescript.'[63] Despite its ambiguity, the Rescript is still useful in revealing the inherent anxiety – in part as a result of the West, but also as a result of internal discrepancies – that pervaded government policy. In aiming to mean everything, the Rescript actually came to mean nothing.

The Rescript's commandment to 'pursue learning and 'cultivate arts' echoes the 1868 declaration to 'go out and learn from the world'.[64] The desire to pursue knowledge from beyond the Archipelago reflects the concern that Japan lagged behind the West in terms of modernity. As has been noted, the term 'modernity' is inherently ambiguous insofar that it does not clearly refer to particular characteristics, as opposed to a general 'thrust' or trajectory of society.[65] A key debate was whether Japan needed to conform to a westernised model in order to modernise or if it could instead progress by following an 'indigenous' model.[66] Snodgrass has argued that the West was 'recognised as both model and measure of modernity,' meaning that Western standards would be the yardstick by which Japan's progress was measured no matter how Japan developed, even if such a judgement was internally imposed.[67] The place of religion was, of course, central. This is because Christianity was, for some, synonymous with the West in the same way that Shinto was integral to Japanese culture.[68] If Christianity was the key to the West's modernisation, this meant that Japan's indigenous religions impeded their progress.

Mokurai's view, as has been discussed, was that there was no deep link between Christianity and the West's progress.[69] However, the crucial contribution of the West was the separation of *kyō* and *gaku*, as in, the 'secular' and 'religious'.[70] This reflects Mokurai's broader view that while Japan should reject western values, they could learn from 'its methods'.[71] The separation of methods from values, and 'secular' from 'religious', reflects the infusion of Enlightenment ideals and practices in Japan.[72] The proliferation of the term *bunmei kaika* ('civilisation and Enlightenment') also reflects the growing interest in the European Enlightenment, and in particular a fascination with values of progress and modernity.[73] On the ground, this interest materialised in the form of new journals, newspapers, memorials and societies, the exemplar being the White Lotus Society which was established by Mokurai in 1875.[74] Deneckre has convincingly challenged the notion that the *bunmei kaika* was a duplicate of the Western Enlightenment, instead employing Conrad's idea of 'multiple Enlightenments' by which geographical particularities are considered and the Japanese Enlightenment is not simply an 'offshoot' of the European one.[75] Nevertheless, the existence of notions of modernity, civilization, progress, and Enlightenment reflect a period of introspection within Japan surrounding national identity, and the place of religion formed an important component of the discourse.

Inevitably, our discussion of Japanese religion and political culture has been disproportionately preoccupied with high culture, usually concentrated around Tokyo. In order to gain a fuller picture, however, it is worth considering the way in which these debates and anxieties percolated down the social scale, transforming social space, education, and the way in

which individuals related to one another. This approach can also restore local agency, revealing that the way in which the state related to individuals was not only an imposition, but, to some extent, a dialogue. Toyoda and Tanaka have argued that the policy of State Shinto actually led to 'decreased popular participation.'[76] The pace and nature of change enforced by the government appears drastic, the obvious example being the ordering of the 'separation of Gods and Buddhas' in spite of more than three hundred years of the syncretic tradition.[77] Since the majority of shrines were typically dedicated to both Buddha and kami, this move aimed to transform how the masses perceived social space.[78] However, it seems unlikely that this move would have been blindly accepted, particularly at the beginning of the Meiji rule. Fukuzawa, whose work had an exceptionally large audience, reflected the chasm between high and low culture by talking about how, in order to progress, Japan needed not only to transform its 'visible exterior' but also its 'inner spirit'.[79] The tension here between correct practice (orthopraxy) and sincere belief (orthodoxy) reveals an anxiety about the ability of the Meiji State to truly interfere and affect change in their peoples. Tesuzo, in talking about Japanese 'national character' in the 1960s, talked about the common perception that, whilst strong, it was impervious to change.[80] Although it is now rightly considered tenuous historical practice to talk of 'national character', if this perception was as widespread as Tesuzo implies this would have contributed to wider anxieties about a growing chasm between a radical Meiji state and a populace with agency and opinions. On top of anxieties about the nature of government policy towards religion, there were added doubts about its efficacy.

Thus, we can see that the key motors of religious and political change in Meiji Japan were questions, not answers. The ubiquitous presence of anxiety, in large part as a result of western influence, raised existential introspection in intellectual culture about the ancient syncretic order, Christianisation, modernisation, and the strength of nationalism. New categories of 'secular' and 'religious' forced inorganic definitions of Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism, and created unfamiliar hierarchies between them. These anxieties were compounded with a suspicion that accessing the 'inner spirit' of Japan was difficult, if not impossible. In terms of historiography, nervousness about emphasising western influence as a prime mover in East Asian History has previously forced historians into paralysis. The postcolonial narrative offered significant contributions, in particular by discussing Japanese 'religion' and 'politics' on its own terms rather than through a post-Enlightenment framework and by not assuming secularisation and modernisation are fixed and inevitable analytical categories. However, more recently, scholars like Krämer and Snodgrass have pioneered a new approach which reveals a dialectical relationship between the East and West which does not emphasise 'orientalising' difference.

References

[1] T. Najita, *Japan: The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics* (Chicago, 1974), p. 148.

[2] E. Said, *Orientalism* (London, 2003), pp. 1-2.

[3] T. Tanigawa, 'National Character and Religion', *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, 1:2 (1960), p. 14.

[4] C. Caldarola,, 'Japan: Religious Syncretism in a Secular Society', in *Religion And Societies: Asia And The Middle East* (Berlin, 1987), p. 630.

[5] H. M. Krämer, 'Reconceiving the Secular in Early Meiji Japan: Shimaji Makorau, Buddhism, Shinto, and the Nation', *Japan Review*, 30 (2017), p. 65.

[6] J. Snodgrass, 'The Deployment of Western Philosophy in Meiji Buddhist Revival', *The Eastern Buddhist*, 30:2 (1997), p. 187

[7] M. Deneckere, 'The Japanese Enlightenment: A Re-Examination of its Alleged Secular Character', *Global Intellectual History*, 1:3 (2016), p. 220.

[8] Snodgrass, 'The Deployment of Western

124

Philosophy', p. 175.
9 Krämer, 'Reconceiving the Secular in Early Meiji Japan,' p. 65.
10 Ibid., p. 74.
11 Caldarola, 'Japan: Religious Syncretism in Secular Society', p. 634.
12 Ibid., p. 640.
13 R. E. Ward, 'Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan', *World Politics*, 15:4 (1963), pp. 569.
14 Ibid., p. 570.
15 Caldarola, 'Japan: Religious Syncretism in Secular Society,' p. 629.
16 Ibid., p. 634.
17 J. M. Kitagawa, *On Understanding Japanese Religion* (Princeton, 1987), p. 214.
18 M. A. Toyoda and A. Tanaka, 'Religion and Politics in Japan', in T. G. Jelen (ed.), *Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, The Few, and The Many* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 268.
19 R. F. Rhodes, 'Shin Buddhist Attitudes Towards the Kami: From Shinran to Rennyo', *The Eastern Buddhist*, 27:2 (1994), p. 54.
20 S. Tyler, 'Honji Suijaku Faith', *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 16:2 (1989), pp. 227-29.
21 K. Antoni, 'The "Separation of Gods and Buddhas" at Ōmiwa Jinja in Meiji Japan', *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 22:1 (1995), p. 154.
22 Najita, *Japan*, p. 148.
23 J. Isomae, 'Deconstructing "Japanese Religion": A Historical Survey', *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 32:2, p. 240.
24 J. Isomae, 'The Formative Process of State Shinto in Relation to the Westernization of Japan: The Concept of "Religion" and "Shinto"', in T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Religion and the Secular: Historical and Colonial Formations* (London, 2007), p. 101
25 Kittigawa, *On Understanding Japanese Religion*, p. 168.
26 Isomae, 'The Formative Process of State Shinto', p. 101.
27 C. Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, 1985), pp. 1-3.
28 Kittigawa, *On Understanding Japanese Religion*, p. 214.
29 Ibid., pp. 1-15.
30 Kittigawa, *On Understanding Japanese Religion*, p. 215; H. M. Krämer, 'How "Religion" Came to Be Translated as Shūkyō: Shimaji Mokurai and the Appropriation of Religion in Early Meiji Japan', *Japan Review*, 25 (2013), pp. 97.
31 Kittigawa, *On Understanding Japanese Religion*, p. 166.
32 Ibid., p. 216.
33 Snodgrass, 'The Deployment of Western Philosophy', p. 176.
34 Ibid., p. 176.

35 Ibid., p. 189.
36 Krämer, 'Reconceiving The Secular in Early Meiji Japan', p. 70.
37 Ibid., p. 90.
38 Antoni, 'The "Separation of Gods and Buddhas"', p. 139
39 Isomae, 'Deconstructing "Japanese Religion"', p. 241
40 C. Bell, 'Paradigms Behind (and Before) the Modern Concept of Religion', *History and Theory*, 45:4 (2006), pp. 27-8.
41 Krämer, 'How "Religion" Came to Be Translated as "Shūkyō"', p. 97.; Isomae, 'The Formative Process of State Shinto', p. 94
42 Tetsuzo, 'National Character and Religion', p. 12.
43 Ibid., p. 13.
44 Caldarola, 'Japan: Religious Syncretism in Secular Society', p. 646.
45 Ibid., p. 647.
46 Deneckre, 'The Japanese Enlightenment', p. 233.
47 Snodgrass, 'The Deployment of Western Philosophy', p. 196.
48 S. H. Nolte, 'National Morality and Universal Ethics: Ōnishi Hajime and the Imperial Rescript on Education', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 38:3 (1983), pp. 293-4.
49 Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, p. 4.; Kittigawa, *On Understanding Japanese Religion*, p. 166.
50 Ibid., pp. 1-6.
51 Caldarola, 'Japan: Religious Syncretism in a Secular Society', p. 645.
62 Ibid., p. 634.
53 Isomae, 'The Formative Process of State Shinto,' p. 97.
54 Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, pp. 145-7.
55 M. Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (Oxford, 1969), p. 1.
56 S. Sekiguchi, 'Confucian Morals and the Making of a "Good Wife and Wise Mother": From "Between Husband and Wife there is Distinction" to "As Husbands and Wives be Harmonious"', *Social Science Japan Journal*, 13:1 (2010), p. 101.
57 Kittigawa, *On Understanding Japanese Religion*, p. 168.
58 Sekiguchi, 'Confucian Morals and the Making of a "Good Wife and Wise Mother"', p. 105.
59 Ibid., p. 101.
60 Caldarola, 'Japan: Religious Syncretism in Secular Society', pp. 635-6.
61 Nolte, 'National Morality and Universal Ethics', p. 285
62 Ibid., p. 284.
63 Ibid., p. 289.
64 T. J. Rimer, 'High Culture in the Showa Period', *Daedalus*, 119:3 (1990), p. 265.
65 Ward, 'Political Modernisation and Political

Culture in Japan', pp. 569-70.

[66] Snodgrass, 'The Deployment of Western Philosophy', p. 175.

[67] Ibid., p. 173.

[68] Caldarola, 'Japan: Religious Syncretism in Secular Society', p. 646.

[69] Deneckre, 'The Japanese Enlightenment', p. 233.

[70] Ibid., p. 231.

[71] Kramer, 'How "Religion" Came to be Translated as "Shūkyō"', p. 90

[72] Bell, 'Paradigms Behind (and Before) the Modern Concept of Religion', p. 33.

[73] Deneckre, 'The Japanese Enlightenment', p. 222.

[74] Ibid., pp. 225-230.

[75] Ibid., p. 223.

[76] Toyoda and Tanika, 'Religion and Politics in Japan', p. 276

[77] Antoni, 'The "Separation of Gods and Buddhas"', p. 141.

[78] Krämer, 'How "Religion" Came to Be Translated as Shūkyō', p. 95.

[79] Deneckre, 'The Japanese Enlightenment', p. 231.

[80] Tetsuzo, 'National Character and Religion', p. 12.

Hazel Laurenson

Confucianism and Inequality in Chosŏn Korea

Although Confucianism did play a role in perpetuating inequality and social divisions in Chosŏn Korea (1392-1910), it was not a major factor independently. Ill-defined and interpreted in numerous ways, Confucianism was ripe for distortion by the *yangban*, the elite minority who monopolised society. Whilst not necessarily insincere in their devotion, the elite *yangban* utilised Confucian ideology to limit the power-sharing pool, and thus it was their interests that were most significant in continuing and hastening inequality.[1] It is also important to recognise the agency of change over time, as the transition from the Koryŏ period (918-1392) was substantial.[2] Confucianism and *yangban* interests were constantly in conversation with, and influencing, one another. Therefore, overlap is inevitable, but the latter ultimately supplants the former since it activated Confucianism's divisive potential. These ideas will be explored by discussing Confucianism's relative agency and *yangban* desire for social security.

It is important to note the undeniable restriction of freedoms which accompanied Confucianism in Korea, as emphasised by several historians.[3] Multiple aspects of women's status shifted, and the freedom of movement enjoyed by elite women in the time of the previous kingdom was curbed by Confucianism's prescription of a rigid patrilineal structure and an ideal of female domesticity.[4] By the mid-seventeenth century, *yangban* daughters had lost their roles in ritual heirship and equal share of property inheritance. A shift in marriage practices meant that filial piety towards parents-in-law grew to be expected of wives. Furthermore, it became unacceptable for high-ranking officials' wives to travel in open palanquins, and under King Sejong

(r. 1418-1450) their statuses were made apparent by paint colours on the exterior.[5] Clear lines were also drawn between wives and concubines, who came to be described as 'primary' and 'secondary' wives respectively, and whose sons' statuses differed significantly from one another.[6] Confucianism-induced gender inequality can be clearly seen through the tenet of chastity as well, which further subordinated women. Chastity determined women's individual dignity and integrity, that of her family, and her whole community.[7] The widespread dissemination of the Confucian moral handbook *The Illustrated Guide to the Three Bonds* (1432), which devotes a section to biographies of chaste women and targets female audiences, and the publishing of similar texts by elite families from the seventeenth century, demonstrates the prominent and invasive nature of female chastity.[8] This evidence gives some insight into the substantial extent that Confucian ideology heightened gender inequality, however, as I will explore later, Confucian gender values were often manipulated by *yangban* for self-serving purposes and it was the selective use of tenets of Confucianism that really magnified social divisions.

There are many arguments that show how Confucianism alone was a limited influence on hastening and continuing social divisions. Firstly, the adoption of Confucianism was not immediate: the belief system took time to become entrenched. Duncan emphasises the lack of a clear point at which Confucianism replaced Buddhism as the dominant ideology. Early Chosŏn kings, for example, such as T'aejo (r. 1392-1398) and Sejong, believed in Buddhism, and Confucian scholar-officials were known to write eulogies for dead Buddhist monks. Moreover, the *Veritable Records* show instances in which prominent monks were brothers of high-ranking Confucian officials: Kwŏn Kŭn's elder brother was a Monk Supervisor.[10] Thus, anti-Buddhist sentiment did not become widespread

instantaneously, and the early Chosŏn was a period of experimentation in which the yangban somewhat revamped institutions to reconsolidate the social order to their advantage. It is therefore imperative that change over time is considered when examining social divisions in Korea. Ideological transitions, by nature, are not finite and thus the perpetuation of inequality throughout the entire Chosŏn cannot be singularly attributed to Confucianism, as its reach at the end of the dynasty was far greater than in 1392.[11]

In addition, the meanings attributed to, and manifestations of, Confucianism varied significantly, limiting its role in causing social divisions.[12] Palais has rightly pointed out that Confucianism contained contradictory emphases and influences, and that there were many different ways in which Confucianism was interpreted and displayed.[13] He highlights the distinction between Practical and Idealistic Confucianism. Practical Confucianism was followed by those who bought service in the state bureaucracy, whereas Idealistic Confucianism was advocated by intellectuals disappointed by the compromise of Confucianism they observed around them.[14] Groups of these intellectuals opposed the excesses of hereditary aristocracy and despotic royal authority, and overlapped with the Sirhak school.[15] Yu Hyŏng'wŏn (1622-1673) was one such scholar who wanted to abolish hereditary slavery by converting slaves to commoner smallholders. Sirhak scholars, however, were in the minority, and unable to overcome the views of the educated majority who regarded hereditary status as the true manifestation of Confucianism.[16] This narrative reflects the contested ideological nature of Confucianism. The absence of clarity, and the inherent contradictions, which characterised Chosŏn Confucianism therefore consolidate the argument that Confucianism lacked independent agency to perpetuate inequality. Its increasing departure from Confucius' original lessons

ultimately made it liable to exploitation and susceptible to deliberate perversion for self-serving means.[17]

Confucianism was not just limited as a factor in perpetuating inequality, but also provided avenues for individuals to exercise unprecedented agency. This is a train of thought which Kim has explored and has led her to argue that the state's attempts to organise society based on gendered Confucian norms were inconsistent.[18] She provides convincing evidence to support her argument, demonstrating how restrictive Confucian doctrine simultaneously increased liberty in some realms. It was a Neo-Confucian principle, for example, that all subjects, regardless of gender or status, had the legal power to appeal to the sovereign regarding grievances not satisfactorily addressed in lower courts. This is particularly noteworthy as it extended to female slaves.[19] The Neo-Confucian vision that the monarch's mandate to rule relied upon hearing the people's grievances thus gave women scope to exercise agency outside the realm of domesticity. The seizure of this opportunity is reflected in female petition-writing.[20] There are around 600 records of women's petitions from the Chosŏn dynasty, and according to Han Sang-gwŏn's study, 4,427 petitions were submitted to the king between 1776 and 1800.[21] This activity is especially remarkable as, although women were expected to seek male help and submit petitions in classical Chinese, many wrote them unaided and submitted them in vernacular Korean. Ch'ŏlbi, the daughter of a royal clan, was one such woman who challenged the male-dominated public literary space in this way, submitting a petition in vernacular Korean in 1509.[22] The fact that Confucian doctrine gave previously legally powerless social strata even limited capacity for legal expression is evidence that it did not only perpetuate inequality. Instead, under its umbrella of lessons, Confucianism permitted scope for certain measures of equality under the law.

Thus far, I have explored arguments suggesting Confucianism was not a major force in perpetuating inequality. I shall now turn to show that it was yangban manipulation of Confucianism which brought its divisive potential to the fore. The yangban's desperation to preserve their social hegemony as the ruling class was ultimately the most significant contributor to the perpetuation of inequality in Chosŏn Korea.

Yangban interests deserve the greatest consideration for many reasons. As Confucianism became entrenched amongst the elite, the yangban recognised that certain tenets could be selectively deployed to serve their class interests.[23] In short, such interests equated to the preservation of the stratified social class system, with them at the top of the hierarchy and with unchallenged access to power.[24] An increase in social mobility throughout the dynasty, precipitated by lowly men gaining access to wealth through land ownership, forced the yangban to find new, and emphasise existing, ways of maintaining their prestige.[25] As described by Kyung Moon Hwang, this included conscious discrimination by the yangban against 'secondary status groups', including the hyangni, sŏŏl, chungin, and sŏbugin, and perpetuated inequality.[26]

Widow chastity was an element of Confucianism that was embraced by the yangban as a tool to demonstrate the honour of their kin group, protect their social positions, and reinforce the inequalities which favoured them at the expense of others. This practice not only promoted gender divisions, but class ones. Throughout the Chosŏn, chastity came to be associated with suicide, as widows who simply remained unmarried were not interpreted as sufficiently honourable.[27] The state posthumously rewarded widows who committed suicide by erecting memorial arches and upgrading the official

positions of their sons.[28] A case study of *yangban* misuse of widow chastity for self-preservation purposes is Madam Chang's suicide in 1841, and the ensuing legal disputes between her parents-in-law, the Sin family, and the non-elite widow Ms. Ŭn, her neighbour. Amidst the confusion surrounding the suicide, the Sins burnt down Ms. Ŭn's house. In order to prove their credibility as local elites and recover their honour and respectability, they were eager to present Chang as having committed suicide out of Confucian devotion.[29] It is significant, however, that the chronology of events suggests Chang's suicide was not due to sincere widow chastity, but slander from Ms. Ŭn.[30] This demonstrates how the Sin's overriding concern was presenting Chang as genuinely prescribing to Confucian doctrine, as having an officially honoured family member would elevate their moral reputation, regardless of her true motivation.[31] This example strengthens the argument that yangban interests were the main factor in the perpetuation of inequality by illustrating how, in some circumstances, *yangban* only endorsed Confucianism when it advantaged them. In the Sins' instance, they did so to conceal their own misconduct and renew their standing within the community at the expense of Ms. Ŭn, whose wrongdoing is debatable.

The significance of the interests of the *yangban* class is further demonstrated in their relentless emphasis on the importance of heritage and descent in status-making. This directly precipitated the marginalisation of certain populations and perpetuated inequality by essentially making social mobility impossible. Counter to the arguments of nationalist South Korean historians, the aristocracy of the Koryŏ dynasty were not seriously challenged by new socioeconomic groups at the dawn of the Chosŏn dynasty, and the fact that the *yangban* was largely synonymous with this aristocracy helps to explains the highly structured patrilineal descent

groups of the Chosŏn. The *yangban*'s meticulous genealogies were intended to prove descent group membership, and appear substantially from 1600.[32] The value of 'pure' lines of heritage, however, was complicated by *sŏŏl* (secondary sons). This issue came to the fore when legislation differentiated between the status of primary and secondary wives from 1413.[33] *Sŏŏl* were prohibited from claiming the privileges of primary sons to prevent them competing with legitimate *yangban*. In 1471, the *Kyŏngguk taejŏn* (Great Code of Administration) blocked *sŏŏl* from entering the central bureaucracy through the prestigious civil service examinations, and this was extended to *sŏŏl* descendants in 1485.[34] Even when a royal edict was passed in 1553 declaring *sŏŏl* eligible for inclusion in the civil exams, the agency of oppositional *yangban* limited the edict's effectiveness. To uphold social divisions, examination papers and certificates had to clearly indicate the examinee's *sŏŏl* status, which was a significant handicap for an official career. Deuchler is thus correct to assert that the edict did not represent a radical policy change, as throughout Myŏngjong's reign (r. 1545-1567), only two *sŏŏl* passed the examinations.[35] Later reforms loosened rules further, but *sŏŏl* nevertheless remained institutionally marginalised in practice.[36] Kim has added further complexity to the discussion of factors which precipitated inequality by noting how *yangban* interests and Confucianism conflicted over the issue of *sŏŏl*. This is because the doctrine of paternal love provided legal justification for the manumission of slave-status *sŏŏl*, despite the social and economic advantages slave ownership awarded the *yangban*.[37] The fact that Confucian doctrine allowed scope for expressions of fatherly passion in this way strengthens the argument that Confucianism did not majorly induce inequality. It proves the divergent potential of Confucianism, as it could be interpreted as somewhat sanctioning the intermingling

of social classes.

Elite sub-stratification in the Chosŏn, and the resultant increasingly exclusive power-sharing pool, is another way the *yangban* perpetuated social divisions. This is an idea explored by Park, who has suggested that, despite sub-stratification, the central civil official, central military official, and local elite families continued to constitute one *yangban* status group.[38] The point of interest here is Park's implication that divisions occurred within the *yangban* class itself, indicating micro, as opposed to macro, social divisions. This was the case as, throughout the Chosŏn, it became apparent that different *yangban* groups possessed different interests.

The marginalised elite's efforts to consolidate networks of aristocratic localism demonstrate how conflicting *yangban* interests manifested in internal social class divisions. The marginalised elite were *yangban* families alienated from central political power and under constant threat of losing their local prestige due to intra-elite competition for local resources.[39] The majority resided in the countryside, in provinces such as P'yŏngan, which saw a significant increase marginalised elite population size.[40] They became clearly differentiated from the central military and central civil elite groups in Seoul, who somewhat established a symbiotic relationship to exclude provincial *yangban* from official power circles.[41] The marginalised elite, institutionally discriminated against and excluded from the examinations, turned to cultural activities to sustain class divisions and legitimise their *yangban* status. These activities were especially significant considering the penetration of genealogical records called *hyangan* from the seventeenth century by secondary status groups, who undermined their exclusivity.[42] As recent Korean scholarship has rightly contended, local literati established *sŏwŏn* (private academies) as a means to defend their status against other local groups.[43] Engagement with edifices and *sŏwŏn* thus became markers of local aristocratic membership. The Sosu academy was the first to be chartered in 1550, and under King Sukchong (r. 1675-1720) 368 *sŏwŏn* were built.[44] With respect to these developments, Haboush has argued that, over time, the local *yangban*, who were *sŏwŏn* scholars and students, transferred their dependence on the state for status privileges to these cultural activities and symbolic behaviours.[45] This reinforces the theory that *yangban* interests were critical to the maintenance of social stratification, as the marginalised elite adapted to the changes permeating society and re-orientated their energy to new mechanisms in order to protect their positions.

Park also highlighted the contribution of non-elite inclusion to the Chosŏn's relative longevity and stability. Through the military examinations, non-elites were accommodated within the state apparatus, thus permitting the fulfilment of their social aspirations, but, crucially, continuing their exclusion from political power.[46] The main explanation for non-elite exam inclusion was military threat. In the sixteenth century, fears of Japanese and Jurchen invasion were widespread, and the Imjin War (1592-1598) made the need for more manpower imminent. Subsequently, anyone who could pass a martial skill test was given a military degree.[47] Yu Hyŏng'wŏn claimed, in *Pan'gya surok* (*The Jottings of Pan'gye*), that most military exam candidates were 'coarse and base people'. This was undoubtedly an exaggeration, but nevertheless demonstrates that candidates were of diverse backgrounds.[48] Moreover, it is significant that military officials were politically subordinated to civil officials. This is evidenced by the fact that military men serving as the central Military Division commanders were key members of the Border Defence Council, but the Council's key commissioner was usually an influential civil official.[49] This

element of Park's theory thus clarifies the purposes that widening exam eligibility served. It not only met defence needs but, by giving them a degree, also satisfied non-elites' social ambitions, whilst maintaining a limited number of power-holders. This evidence demonstrates the rationale behind the suggestion that *yangban* efforts to protect their own interests were a major factor in the perpetuation of inequality. Sub-stratification and the opening of military exams to non-elite classes were prices *yangban* were willing to pay to maintain their social hegemony. The class exhibited intellect in their selective deployment of Confucian principles to make their marginalisation of other groups ideologically palatable. Alternative explanations of inequality perpetuation can thus largely be traced back to the *yangban*.

In conclusion, Confucianism was too riddled with inconsistencies - of ideology, interpretation, and practice – to be deemed a major factor in the perpetuation of inequality and social divisions in Chosŏn Korea, and greater consideration must be given to *yangban* desires to protect their own interests. It is important to recognise, however, that the reactions of the lower classes to Confucianism are difficult to deduce due to source scarcity. Moreover, referencing the '*yangban*' as a singular entity throughout should not be misinterpreted as suggesting the group was homogenous, as this was not the case. Spatial limitations have restricted the number of examples explored in this study, meaning only those which are most relevant have been included. The issues raised in the story of the Filial Daughter, the institution of slavery, and the principle of sage kings, for instance, have not been explored.[50] Overall, despite reformist challenges from the seventeenth century, divisions were largely upheld as a result of yangban harnessing the prevalent worldview to serve their self-centred agenda. The new order created in the Chosŏn was dominated by the *yangban*, who were both products and producers of social norms.

References

[1] M. Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 12; S. J. Kim, 'Fragmented: The T'ongch'ŏng Movements by Marginalized Status Groups in Late Chosŏn Korea', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 68:1 (2008), pp. 136-137.
[2] Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea*, p. 6.
[3] K. Chizhova 'Bodies of Texts: Women Calligraphers and the Elite Vernacular Culture in Late Chosŏn Korea (1392-1910)', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 77:1 (2018), p. 59; Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea*, pp. 6-14.
[4] M. Peterson, *Korean Adoption and Inheritance: Case Studies in the Creation of a Classic Confucian Society* (Ithaca, 1996), pp. 53-60; J. Kim, 'You Must Avenge on My Behalf: Widow Chastity and Honour in Nineteenth-Century Korea' *Gender & History*, 26:1 (2014), p. 130; Chizhova, 'Bodies of Texts', p. 59.
[5] Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea*, p. 260.
[6] Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea*, p. 260; J. Kim, 'Women's Legal Voice: Language, Power, and Gender Performativity in Late Chosŏn Korea', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 74:3 (2015), p. 672; M. Deuchler, 'Heaven Does not Discriminate: A Study of Secondary Sons in Chosŏn Korea', *The Journal of Korean Studies*, 6 (1988-89), p. 123.
[7] Kim, 'You Must Avenge', p. 130.
[8] Ibid., pp. 130-131.
[9] J. Duncan, 'Confucianism in the Late Koryŏ and Early Chosŏn', *Korean Studies*, 18 (1994), p. 81.
[10] Duncan, 'Confucianism in the Late Koryŏ and Early Chosŏn', p. 84.
[11] J. K. Haboush, 'Confucian Rhetoric and Ritual as Techniques of Political Dominance: Yŏngjo's Use of the Royal Lecture', *Journal of Korean Studies*, 5 (1984), p. 41.
[12] Duncan, 'The Problematic Modernity of Confucianism', p. 37.
[13] J. Palais, 'Confucianism and the Aristocratic/ Bureaucratic Balance in Korea,' *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 44:2 (1984), pp. 432-434.
[14] Ibid., pp. 457-458.
[15] Ibid., pp. 464-466.
[16] J. Palais, *Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyŏngwŏn and the Late Chosŏn*

Dynasty (Seattle, 1996), pp. 272-273.

17 Deuchler, 'Heaven Does not Discriminate', pp. 121-122.

18 Kim, 'Women's Legal Voice', p. 682.

19 Ibid., p. 667.

20 Ibid., pp. 667-669.

21 Ibid., pp. 674-676.

22 Ibid.

23 J. K. Haboush, 'Filial Emotions and Filial Values: Changing Patterns in the Discourse of Filiality in Late Chosŏn Korea', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 55:1 (1995), p. 131.

24 E. Wagner, 'Social Stratification in Seventeenth-Century Korea: Some Observations from a 1663 Seoul Census Register', *Occasional Papers on Korea*, 1 (1974), pp. 53-54.

25 S. Shin, 'Economic Development and Social Mobility in Pre-Modern Korea, 1600-1860', *Peasant Studies*, 7:3 (1978), pp. 188-190; Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea, p. 242; Kim, 'Fragmented: The T'ongch'ŏng Movements', pp. 136-137.

26 K. M. Hwang, as cited in Kim, 'Fragmented: The T'ongch'ŏng Movements', pp. 136-137; Shin, 'Economic Development and Social Mobility', p. 191.

27 Kim, 'You Must Avenge', p. 131.

28 Ibid., p. 135.

29 Ibid., pp. 133-138.

30 Ibid., pp. 140-141.

31 Ibid., p. 131.

32 Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea*, pp. 6-7.

33 Deuchler, 'Heaven Does not Discriminate', pp. 122-123.

34 Kim, 'Fragmented: The T'ongch'ŏng Movements', pp. 144-145; Kim, 'My Own Flesh and Blood', p. 6; Deuchler, 'Heaven Does not Discriminate', p. 137.

35 Deuchler, 'Heaven Does not Discriminate', pp. 139-141.

36 Ibid., pp. 150-153.

37 Duncan, 'The Problematic Modernity of Confucianism', p. 1.

38 E. Park, 'Military Examinations in Late Chosŏn: Elite Substratification and Non-Elite Accommodation', *Korean Studies*, 25:1 (2001), p. 1.

39 Sun Joo Kim, *Marginality and Subversion in Korea: The Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812* (Seattle, 2009), p. 7.

40 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

41 Park, 'Military Examinations in Late Chosŏn', p. 21.

42 F. Kawashima, 'A Study of the Hyangan: Kin Groups and Aristocratic Localism in the Seventeenth-and Eighteenth-Century Korean Countryside', *The Journal of Korean Studies*, 5 (1984), p. 15; Kim, *Marginality and Subversion in Korea*, pp. 28-29.

43 Duncan, 'The Problematic Modernity of Confucianism', p. 45.

44 Kawashima, 'A Study of the Hyangan', pp. 20-23.

45 Haboush, as cited in Duncan, 'The Problematic Modernity of Confucianism', p. 44.

46 Park, 'Military Examinations in Late Chosŏn', p. 1.

47 Ibid., pp. 3-5.

48 Ibid., p. 29.

49 Ibid., pp. 12-13.

50 Sixiang Wang, 'The Filial Daughter of Kwaksan: Finger Severing, Confucian Virtues, and Envoy Poetry in Early Chosŏn', *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies*, 25:2 (2012), pp. 175–212.

Rohit Kumar

Aboriginal Artists and the Repurposing of Archival Photography

Europeans invented photography during the early nineteenth century. From Europe, photography was transported to the four corners of the world by imperialists who wanted to capture the imperial territories, its role changing in this period through the influence of popular discourses such as Social Darwinism.[1] In Australia, this led to the photographs of Indigenous peoples being used as a tool by imperialists to negatively construct the colonial 'Other'.[2] In the 1960s, academics who were spurred on by the political counterculture which rose in popularity due to governmental failures in the United States tried to analyse the societal forces that preserved hierarchies that favoured white males. The intellectual change brought about by the prevailing political climate led to the establishment of fields of critical studies. The theoretical framework that emerged allowed contemporary Aboriginal artists and communities to repurpose and draw upon imperial archives to construct their history – these artists took negative depictions of imperial photographs and transformed them into celebrations of their history. Such historical repurpose of photographs thus allowed Aboriginals to shift their historical narrative from a passive to an active one.

Above all else, Aboriginal artists have repurposed imperial archives by highlighting how Western imperialists constructed the colonial 'Other' in Australia. To understand how contemporary artists have repurposed imperial photographs, though, historians must understand what purpose photos served within the imperial landscape. Photography played a vital role in expanding imperialism by providing a medium used to create imagined geography shaped by imperial concerns. The postcolonial scholarship which grew out of critical studies, epitomised by Edward Said's *Orientalism*, has explored how the

Figure 1 – *Aboriginal Australian with Boome-rang* (1907), Museums Victoria Collections. Postcard. Available at https://collections.mu-seumsvictoria.com.au/items/1557689 [Accessed 15 June 2021]

Figure 2 – J. W. Lindt, 'Postcard', from his *Album of Australian Aboriginals* (1873), avai-lable at https://www.britishmuseum.org/col-lection/object/EA_Oc-A7-12 [Accessed 30 June 2021]

construction of the 'Other' depended on imperialism and oppression.[3] Orientalised Aboriginal Australians were presented in the photographic dialogue as a dying race, perpetually relegated to being depicted as a hunter-gatherer society frozen in time. The viewer can observe this through the depictions of Aboriginals with hunting gear as seen in Figure One: a postcard of an Aboriginal man holding a boomerang. The caption tells the viewer how on the slightest offence, he would use the 'boomerang' to split their 'ear into two.' Thus, the Aboriginal man is constructed as barbarous; completely juxtaposed to the 'civilised westerner' who wrote the postcard. In a similar vein, John William Lindt's 1873 *Album of Australian Aboriginals*, one image from which can be seen in Figure 2, tried to capture the 'traditional Aboriginal life' by portraying Indigenous men with spears and shields.[4] Aboriginal artists and communities have criticised Lindt's use of terms such as 'traditional' because they indicate that he was attempting to portray Aboriginal culture as simple, unchanging, and on the verge of extinction. By recognising how imperialism used photography to undermine Aboriginals, subsequent

Aboriginal artists have tried to destabilise these stereotypes through drawing on and repurposing them in their photos. Through challenging the constructed binary of 'Orient' versus 'Occident', contemporary Aboriginal artists have repurposed the imperial archive.

The exploration of binary dichotomy - epitomised by the Orient/Occident distinction - has led to questions about identity and agency, in turn driving the reinterpretation of imperial photographs by contemporary Aboriginal artists. It has led to attempts at retrospective exploration and reinterpretation of pictures for the sake of highlighting Aboriginal agency. Historians like Alana Harris, for example, have argued that colonial portraiture serves a more positive function because it provides a 'unique record' where the 'direct eye contact' of the subject gives them an identity of a 'real people'.[5] Critically, however, Harris' assessment of the imperial photographs is flawed, as she has projected this sense of agency onto the picture retrospectively. The work of Aboriginal artists like Fiona Foley in her exhibition *Native Blood* addresses the theme of agency of Aboriginal women in imperial photographs in a different way by

recreating them and using herself as the subject.[6] She played on imperial pictures that constructed Aboriginal women as the exotic 'Other' by photographing women adorned with 'traditional' artefacts such as grass skirts and beads, with her breasts bared (see Fig. 3). Such pictures are remarkably similar to how Lindt photographed women with their breasts bared despite Aboriginal women typically covering their breasts. However, Foley's photos repurpose a familiar trope by giving the subject agency. The viewer gets the sense that the model is consenting because she makes eye contact with the camera, whereas women photographed by Lindt curiously did not and were often depicted looking away. The subject also seems dignified and elegant despite the situation which is in stark contrast with other media.

Tracy Moffatt also repurposes the portrayal of Aboriginal people in imperial photography. Image '#4' of Moffatt's *Some Lads* (Fig. 4), shows a pair of Aboriginal dancers with a strong-willed sense of humour.[7] The painted studio backdrop hearkens back to the imperial photographs taken by photographers like Lindt. It reminds the viewer that Europeans used a controlled studio environment to create their images. Unlike Lindt's subjects, Moffatt's males are not stiff and lifeless: they are characterised as more positive active individuals characterised as having fun. This is in stark contrast with the morbid suggestions of the photograph's subtext. The photograph draws attention to young Aboriginal men's deaths through poverty that they are born in by depicting the men playing with a noose around their neck. This stark reminder makes the viewer think of the connection between colonialism and poverty and the historically high mortality rate in the Aboriginal population.

Another way in which contemporary Aboriginal artists have repurposed the imperial archive is through 'recovering' forgotten people from the archives. One such artist that has helped to recover old forgotten photographs of Aboriginal is Leah King-Smith.[8] King-Smith's work addresses the displacement of Aboriginal history by the imperialists as they took vestiges of Aboriginal history and locked them up into archives beyond the average Aboriginal individual's reach. She brings attention to old photographs by taking colonial images

Figure 3 - A photograph from Fiona Foley's exhibition *Native Blood* (1994), available at https://benallaartgallery.com.au/benallacol-lection/collection-view/1053112/ [Accessed 27 June 2021]

Figure 4 - Tracy Moffatt, '#4', from her exhibition *Some Lads* (1984), available at https://www.roslynoxley9.com.au/exhibition/so-me-lads/fdu72 [Accessed 26 June 2021]

from the State Library of Victoria and relocating them into her artwork, allowing her to address the imbalance of power in the ethnographic archive. Her works in the series *Patterns of Connection*, including 'Untitled #3' (Fig. 5) show the combination of nineteenth-century photographs with colour photographs of Victorian landscape and paint. In doing so, King-Smith has recovered the archive photographs by updating them, making it easier for younger generations to interact with them and their history. Christian Thompson's 2012 work, *We Bury Our Own*, also recovers forgotten people from the imperial archive of the Pitts Rivers Museum in Oxford through 'spiritual repatriation' and self-portraiture. Thompson makes use of his own ever-changing transcultural identity and blends it with references to ethnographic portraiture. His work entitled 'Down and Under' (Fig. 6), shows this by referring to photographs taken by ethnographers such as Tindale because only his head-and-shoulders are in the frame, which is reminiscent of how scientific photos of Aboriginal people were taken. However, this colonial scrutiny is upturned because Thompson is photographed wearing Oxford academic dress. The use of crystals to cover his eyes stems from the Aboriginal belief that crystal contact allows the spirits to channel into the physical world. The use of metonymy to engage with the past, through the concept of presence-in-absence, allows Thompson to refer to the imperial archive without placing it at the forefront. Presence-in-absence refers to an idea developed by Eelco Runia, where metonymy refers to a 'thing that isn't there' but can still be 'present' through it.[9] Thompson and King-Smith's work rightfully points out that the repatriation of Aboriginal history mainly engages with physical items such as skeleton remains and has otherwise ignored intangible cultural items such as photographs.

This essay will now continue by discussing how Aboriginal communities have drawn on or repurposed imperial archives and photographs such as these in an attempt to reclaim their identity. Aboriginal communities have drawn on and repurposed imperial archives to fill gaps in their history by searching out pictures of their ancestors. Such gaps in the accounts of Aboriginal communities exist through the 'stolen generation', which is the name given to the generations of children of mixed-race couples taken away from their family as an attempt to

Figure 5 - Leah King-Smith,'Untitled #3', from her series *Patterns of Connection* (1991), available at https://www.vizardfoundationar-tcollection.com.au/the-nineties/explore/le-ah-king-smith/ [Accessed 26 June 2021]


Figure 6 - Christian Thompson, 'Down and Under', from his series *We Bury Our Own* (2012), available at https://michaelreid.com.au/art/down-under-world/?v=322b26af01d5 [Accessed 26 June 2021]

assimilate Aboriginal children into western colonial society.[10] Implementation of official policies of removing 'half-caste' children began in the late nineteenth century and lasted as late as the 1970s.[11] Such policies were popular in the north where the Chief Protectorate of Aborigines, Dr Cecil Cook, argued that the state needed to 'convert the half-caste into a white citizen,' using the Aborigines Act 1905. The Chief Protector of Aborigines in 1915, Auber Neville, then used his position to pursue a policy of assimilation.[12] He promoted such an approach using the *Three Generations* series (Fig. 7). This photograph, produced by the state, tracks the process of 'changing' Aboriginals through biological assimilation by boldly claiming that only the 'freckles' give away the children's 'trace of colour'.[13] These policies left families broken and have caused Aboriginals in Australia to seek out their ancestors and kin. While photographs of Aboriginal Australians were underutilised until the 1990s because they represented deep anxiety for the curators stemming from their troubled history, the pictures have come to be viewed in a positive light that can be used to heal scars from colonialism.

Aboriginal communities have actually recontextualised photographs like this, taken by colonisers, to help construct the 'Other' and bridge their personal history with visual representation. Shauna Bostock-Smith, who is part of the 'stolen generation,' knew her ancestors through official records but had never had the opportunity to see them. That was until she discovered the photograph of her Great-Great Grandaunt, Mary Ann of Ulmarra, through a television show that was showcasing pictures taken by Lindt mentioned earlier in this essay. Bostock-Smith recalls seeing the photo of Mary as a moment that altered her 'perception' of her ancestor as it transformed the 'abstract' name into 'real-life'.[14] By repurposing the imperial archive to connect with personal history, the Aboriginal individuals have

Figure 7 - A. O. Neville, *Three Generations* (1947), Museums Victoria, available at https://collections.museumsvictoria.com.au/items/1496210 [Accessed 26 June 2021]

changed imperial photographs from a negative into a positive due to the ability of photographs to connect them with their past. These photographs are no longer the visible testimony of Indigenous people's presumed decline; instead, it now serves as evidence of ancestral networks, land claims, and local knowledge.

The ancestral land claim is readily evident in photographs of Aboriginals. When Robert Garlett of the Aboriginal Noongar tribe was shown a postcard with the picture of his great-great-grandfather, he asked if the photograph showed 'the Perth Hills in the background'.[15] This identification shows how a photo can not only reconnect with a person's ancestors but also can reconnect with an ancestral link to the land. Individuals can connect with their ancestor's photos through the assistance of contemporary Aboriginal artists and community members, who, through exhibitions, have tried to recreate the contact between the Aboriginals and the imperial archive. The Ara Iritija Project, which translates to 'stories from a long time ago,' started in 1994, has repatriated 'lost' archival photos for Aboriginals living in central Australia.[16] The project electronically records photographs along the axes of gender, seniority, and 'sorrow,' which allows Aboriginals living in central Australia to browse its collection quickly. Similarly, *Returning Photos: Australian Aboriginal Photos from European Collection* has repatriated photographs

Figure 8 - W. B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, 'Binbinga' (1901), *Museum Victoria*, available at http://spencerandgillen.net/objects/50ce72e-d023fd7358c8a8a4 [Accessed 26 June 2021]

from museums such as Oxford's Pitt Rivers Museum to Australia.[17]

Aboriginal communities have also repurposed photographs taken by colonists, originally intended to construct Aboriginal people as 'Others', to bridge their communities' history with lost practices. We see one such example with the Yanyuwa tribe. Colonial ethnographers Spencer and Gillen travelled to central and northern Australia to photograph the Yanyuwa people.[18] However, when they took photographs of individuals, they neglected to write their names - the subjects' identities were lost to history. Don Miller, a Yanyuwa elder, lamented how these photographed 'poor things' could not be situated into their ancestry because 'whitefellas' did not write their name down.[19] While discussing one photograph taken by Spencer and Gillen, the Wawukarriya man's photograph (Figure 8), men from his tribe in 1984 identified him as the 'rainmaker'. Anna Karrakayn told the interviewer about how using the pictures of the 'rainmaker' would allow them to 'teach [their] grandchildren' about his story.[20] It shows how Aboriginal people were able to repurpose the imperial archive's photographs to serve a historical purpose and create their definition of history. Yanyuwa people view history

in a more oral fashion embedded with social memory than the west's view of it as a detailed objective.[21] It demonstrates how the repurposed image can inform new understandings that influence the collective sense of self.

As demonstrated in this essay, then, both Aboriginal artists and Aboriginal communities have drawn on and repurposed imperial photographic archives to construct the past on their own terms. While Aboriginal artists have raised awareness of colonial injustices, Aboriginal communities have drawn on imperial archives to fill their personal and collective historical gaps. Reinterpreting imperial photographs in this way has allowed Aboriginal communities to have an active voice in their history and reinstate their own perspectives in the archives. By analysing how Aboriginal people have repurposed photographs in the imperial archives and created new forms of art, historians can engage more closely with Aboriginal concerns and their history. In doing so, they are participating in a growing wave of celebration of Aboriginal culture and history.

References

[1] P. Prodger, *Darwin's Camera: Art and Photography in the Theory of Evolution* (Oxford, 2009).

[2] M. Aird, 'Growing up with Aborigines' in C. Pinney, and N. Peterson (eds.), *Photography's Other Histories*, (Durham, 2003), p. 27.

[3] E. Said, *Orientalism* (London, 2003), pp. 49-73.

[4] K. Orchard, 'J. W. Lindt's Australian Aboriginals (1873-74)', *History of Photography*, 23:2 (1999), p. 167.

[5] C. Cooper, and A. Harris, 'Dignity or Degradation: Aboriginal Portraits from Nineteenth Century Australia', in J. Annear (eds.), *Portraits of Oceania* (Sydney, 1997), p. 20.

[6] A. Loxley, 'Artist profile: Fiona Foley,' *Museum Contemporary Australia* [website], available at https://www.mca.com.au/artists-works/artists/fiona-foley/ [Accessed 15 June 2021].

[7] H. Ennis, 'Artist Profile: Tracey Moffatt,' *Museum Contemporary Australia* [website], available at https://www.mca.com.au/artists-works/artists/tracey-moffatt/ [Accessed 15 July 2021].

8 H. Fink, 'Explore the Work of Australian Artist, Leah King-Smith,' *Potter Museum of Art* [website], available at https://www. vizardfoundationartcollection.com.au/the-nineties/explore/leah-king-smith/ [Accessed 15 June 2021].

9 E. Runia, 'Presence,' *History and Theory,* 45:1 (2006), pp. 1-29.

10 P. Read, 'The Stolen Generations: The Removal of Aboriginal Children in New South Wales 1883 to 1969,' *The Wayback Machine* [website], available at https://web.archive.org/web/20060820150941/http://www.daa.nsw.gov.au/publications/StolenGenerations.pdf [Accessed 15 June 2021].

11 J. Lydon, 'Introduction', in J. Lydon (ed.), *Calling the Shots: Aboriginal Photographies* (Canberra, 2014), p. 4.

12 A. Haebich, *Broken Circles: Fragmenting Indigenous Families 1800-2000* (Fremantle, 2000), p. 121.

13 J. Lydon, 'Photography and Critical Heritage: Australian Aboriginal Photographic Archives and the Stolen Generation', *The Public Historian*, 41:1 (2019), p. 24.

14 S. Bostock-Smith, 'Connecting with the Cowans' in J. Lyndon, and S. Braithwaite with S. Bostock-Smith, 'Photographing Indigenous People in New South Wales' in J. Lydon (ed.), *Calling the Shots: Aboriginal Photographies* (Canberra, 2014), pp. 61-65.

15 C. Morton, 'The Ancestral Image in the Present Tense,' *Photographies*, 8:3 (2015), p. 255.

16 D. Dallwitz, J. Dallwitz, and S. Lowish, 'Ara Irititja and Ara Winki in the APY Lands: Connecting Archives to communities through Mobile Apps on Portable Devices', *Archives and Manuscripts*, 47:1 (2019), pp. 35-52.

17 J. Lydon, ''Real Photos': Transforming Tindale and the Postcolonial Archive', *Public History Review*, 23:1 (2016), p. 58.

18 J. Bradley, P. Adgemis, and L. Haralampou, ''Why Can't They Put Their Names?': Colonial Photography, Repatriation and Social Memory,' *History and Anthropology,* 25:1 (2014), p. 49.

19 Ibid., p.55.

20 Ibid., p. 68.

21 F. Delvin-Glass, 'An Atlas of the Scared: Hybridity, Representability and the Myths of Yanyuwa Country,' *Antipodes*, 19:2 (2005), pp. 127-140.

Lorna Cosgrave
The Metropolis through History

The genesis of the modern European city, often known as the "metropolis", has brought the emergence of many methodological and thematic approaches encompassing typologies of scale, function, and ideology. These approaches have evolved greatly since their first appearance. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such approaches focused on questions surrounding the modernity of cities and whether they signal shifts in human history, epitomised by Georg Simmel's tendency to equate urbanity with modernity.[1] Interwar approaches, particularly notable in Max Weber's *The City*, began to explore the history of urban environments from a holistic, sociological standpoint, including comparative approaches that used ancient and medieval cities.[2] Groups dedicated to urban history arose as these approaches became increasingly interdisciplinary, seen in the establishment of the Chicago School and the rise of H. J. Dyos.[3] Literature stemming from the Cold War and cities across the Iron Curtain also featured prominently in urban history.[4] Today, the field is witnessing new approaches focusing on gender and sexuality, revealing previously marginalised perspectives of the modern European city.[5]

The modern European city as a concept first arose in the nineteenth century as industrial urbanisation saw the unprecedented proliferation of urban environments, naturally encouraging historiographical interest in these new or evolved settlements.[6] But what is the modern European city? This question lies at the heart of these diverse approaches, and each historian who tackles the question reaches a different conclusion. That being said, there is universal consensus that a modern European city is a settlement that facilitates change. Scholars across the century have argued for the city's power as an agent of change using various approaches, from Georg Simmel, to Max Weber, to the Chicago School and H. J. Dyos.[7]

Urban history as a field of historiographical research was founded in the late nineteenth century. Brantz, Disko and Wagner-Kyora have credited Georg Simmel's *The Metropolis and Mental Life* as the

text that properly established the modern metropolis as an object of study in Britain and the US, and this certainly seems to be the case.[8] Simmel spearheaded much of the urban history on both sides of the Atlantic, questioning the modernity of the metropolis, and argued that the man of the metropolis was synonymous with modernity.[9] Modernity was a key thematic component of the foundation of urban history, therefore: historians like Simmel were concerned primarily with the effects of cities. Reflection was also key to the study of urban history. Contemporaries reflected upon the effects that cities had, with a variety of writers like Elizabeth Gaskell and Alexis de Tocqueville all writing about the consequences of cities on society.[10] Charles Dickens, for example, wrote extensively on urban poverty and wrote of walking through London's 'back-slums'.[11]

While many looked to the past in reflection to find answers concerning the metropolis, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw some look to the future, albeit in a way that stemmed from nostalgia. Ebenezer Howard's *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, for example, saw an urban planning concept for families living in a detached house with a garden, with a prominent green belt named a 'garden city'.[12] The main interests in the period 1880-1900 thus revolved around the modernity of a metropolis, its consequences upon society, and whether it was right for society. Howard's writings demonstrate a societal anxiety over the decline of rural living, very much looking to the past to ensure that the future would be sustainable for humanity. On the other hand, Simmel was looking to the metropolis as the acme of modernity for man.[13] The diversity of approaches even in the very beginnings of the field shows the validity of these questions, but there were significant limitations to these approaches. They did not uncover individual perspectives of experiences, for instance, nor were other disciplines regularly consulted.

An interdisciplinary approach to urban history was founded in the early twentieth century, beginning with the introduction of statistics, economics, and demographics to the study of the metropolis. Statistical approaches are demonstrated primarily by Adna Ferrin Weber's *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century: A Study in Statistics*, with Ferrin Weber subscribing to Social Darwinism and believing that cities naturally attracted people because they provided more opportunities than villages ever could.[14] Urban historians concerned with modern European cities used their conditions and demographics to understand their processes. Charles Booth, for example, was a pioneer in this respect with his famous mapping of poverty in London in the 1890s, a study which relied heavily on statistics.[15] He set the tone for an investigative interdisciplinary approach to urban history, and further placed emphasis on the consequences of industrial urbanisation. After all, he did argue at the Royal Statistical Society that 'we need to begin with a true picture of the modern industrial organism…'.[16] The methodology that Booth used was relatively straight-forward, but extremely meticulous, bringing together the early approaches surrounding the consequences of the city's existence and this new interdisciplinary approach with a staunchly comparative perspective.

Interwar approaches particularly focused upon comparisons of the modern European city with their medieval and early modern counterparts. Max Weber's *The City* is the most famous for this methodology, as he believed that all urban settlements have common features across time, such as markets or fortifications.[17] Weber defined the city as a 'fusion of fortress and market', highlighting its economic importance.[18] More disciplines were being considered as part of urban history by this time, with Spencer writing that Weber considered capitalism, economics, and politics, all whilst being a theoretical sociologist.[19]

Weber was greatly influential, considering the common sociological approaches of the late nineteenth century, and compared cities to their previous incarnations of existence. He recognised that any city, London for example, would echo previous parts of itself while adapting to new forms that made the settlement a modern European city. However, he did not go so far as to isolate cities as case studies, which is what the Chicago School sought to rectify.

The Chicago School was sociological in nature, applying urban theories to Chicago, and explored greater social trends. Theirs was originally a study of Chicago by the University of Chicago, mapping common patterns into theoretical models to produce comparative studies of modern cities - crucial for the development of interdisciplinary urban history in North America.[20] Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Louis Wirth were integral to the School, deriving their ideas in part from the work of Simmel but seeking to go further as they focused on the social, ethnic, and cultural integration of city dwellers.[21] Park often differed from Simmel, describing the modern metropolis as a 'big city of warm nests' in contrast with Simmel's 'cold big city', as did the rest of the Chicago School. Thus, they positively impacted the field of urban history, going beyond previous schools of thought by utilising microhistories in their attempts to understand the modern metropolis. Their work even led to the foundation of the *Journal of Urban History*, an influential historical periodical, in November 1974.[22] However, the School was primarily sociological, specialising in social change and social practices, thus omitting many parts of the field that make urban history such as individual perspectives. Whilst the sociological capabilities of the School were an asset to urban history, it also produced limitations, with the literature suffering from a lack of individual experiences of cities.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Britain was experiencing the "Dyos Phenomenon". H. J. Dyos became the figurehead of urban history, writing iconic studies which include *The Study of Urban History* (1968) and *The Victorian City: Images and Realities* (1973).[24] In these studies, Dyos generally analysed from a social, economic, and migration point of view, studying cities contextually while remaining aware of the limitations of that approach. Dyos believed the entire nation should be considered to understand the metropolis and its society.[25] Cities did not exist in isolation, as they were affected by and reflected the processes of an entire nation. In *The Victorian City*, for instance, Dyos remarked that all which was 'permanent and essential' should be studied to understand the metropolis and its society.[26] He favoured a contextual approach, particularly one that highlighted themes of society, economics and migration, and occasionally governmental, intending these elements to produce the most complete picture of a city. This is not to say that Dyos is universally accepted, however. Some have criticised the approach, with Mandelbaum notably emphasising that Dyos suffered from relegating economic analysis to his periphery rather than placing it at his forefront.[27]

Dyos' work was certainly limited by its traditionality; in it, he gave little thought to histories of gender, sexuality, or environmentalism. These approaches have still yet to be fully explored, but Dyos rarely considered the city from the perspective of an individual that did not conform to contemporary societal expectations. He placed emphasis primarily on class, rather than exploring those that were excluded from traditional presentations of class, such as women. However, Dyos was the architect for urban history in twentieth-century Britain and his approaches significantly furthered the field of urban history. He argued that urban history should be a field, rather than

a discipline, and he can certainly claim at least some responsibility for it being so today.[28]

Political events of the twentieth century also shaped the field of urban history, with urban history moving to focus on socialist cities beyond the Iron Curtain. Socialist cities, such as Moscow, often displayed distinctive patterns due to careful urban planning. Kotkin notes that these arose from pre-revolutionary anxieties that cities were an abnormal development; they were later embraced by the post-revolutionary regime, as they sought to use urban settlements to maximise engagement of the population with the nationalist socialist narrative.[29] Here, cities played a distinct part in the continuation of the regime and were used as political tools. Iron Curtain urban histories recognised the importance of cities in modern life, seeing them as a way to wield power. This is what socialist cities particularly demonstrated, and therefore what their scholarship has largely acknowledged. Urban planning was essential to the Russian regime, which initially designed communal living in the residential zones but then shifted to one-family apartments intended to increase the birth rate.[30] The governmental approach to socialist cities can easily be seen by scholars, in fact, as Kotkin linked birth rate to urban planning - an interesting observation which reflected the advancement in the interdisciplinary field of urban history.

Although Kotkin was writing in 1996, some five years after the collapse of the USSR, he represents much of the Cold War urban scholarship of the time.[31] The scholarship recognised the relationship between cities and power, but was also susceptible to anti-Russian bias of the period, and could be exaggerated. It was unlikely that cities were feared as anomalies, for example, as cities were key to modern living from their foundation in Russia, with St. Petersburg and Moscow being prominent parts of Russia for centuries.[32] Cities were not a modern phenomenon, but had existed for centuries, as Weber investigated in *The City*.[33] However, the continuity of cities was placed at the periphery of Cold War urban history, which has limited scholarship's understanding of exactly how the cities functioned.

Technological advancements of the last decades have left their mark on urban history as well. The concept of "global cities", for instance, was first introduced in the 1990s by John Friedman and Saskia Sassen.[34] The rise of information technology and increased connectivity of populations formed the idea of cities becoming hubs of global politics and networks, holding together the global economy.[35] Sassen believed that we have moved into a 'global age', so to properly understand cities in this context she believes that it is important to investigate the interdependence of cities and also study their components in isolation, then as a whole.[36] The approach is sound and avoids the limitations of Dyos' approach as it both considers the city in context and isolation. However, can we really consider all cities "global"? Are metropolises really "global cities"? The concept of "global cities" raises more questions than it has answered, and it suggests that cities are moving beyond their categorisation to something newer. Indeed, "global cities" theory is limited by its failure to properly investigate the experiences of citizens from different perspectives. Much of the current literature is based on economic terms, such as capital and labour, rather than a human viewpoint of the change that was witnessed in cities.

Another shift in the field of urban history's thematic approaches is the increased spotlight on non-traditional perspectives, such as observing the experiences of cities through citizens who were marginalised because of their sexuality, gender, or identity. New experiences of modern European metropolises have emerged with the use of the histories of

gender and sexuality. The general trend in historiography previously omitted women's interactions within the city, simply dropping in women rather than interrogating their presence and experiences. However, studying from a marginalised perspective, such as from women or LGBT+ individuals' viewpoints has revealed a great deal about the city. In Houlbrook's *The Man with the Powder Puff in Interwar London*, Lyons' Strand Corner House and the Coliseum have been identified as queer meeting places.[37] Here, space has been given a secondary meaning: these locations were co-opted to form another function. The city seems to have enabled marginalised groups to be able to engage in events that were prohibited, and thus Houlbrook allowed for another version of the city to be studied by utilising the history of sexuality. London is one of the most famous examples of a modern European city which has been studied using many approaches. Utilising the lens of gender history, as the recent historiography has done, the struggles of gender politics can be seen reflected in the cityscape. Rappaport's writings on female interactions with new London department stores at the turn of the twentieth century has shown a societal masculine anxiety that serving female bodily needs (such as, toilets and in-store restaurants) would lead to unregulated fraternisation between the sexes.[38] Rappaport has exposed the anxieties imposed by men onto women, illustrating that they were a reaction to the rapid growth in consumerism and highlighting how this became a political issue. For some men, it represented a problematic empowerment and independence of women to be in control of their finances, with some even going so far as to fear kleptomania would arise as a result.[39] One journal, *Graphic*, even wrote that department stores were 'dangerous in the highest degree' because of this.[40] These shops were increasingly common, but perceived to be harmful, as they were symbols of change and reflected the increased visibility of women in society. Although Rappaport omitted it, women's suffrage was increasing their visibility at the time: the movement was very much based within the city.[41] London as a modern European city was a breeding ground for progress of women's position in society, and we see this from the urban perspective.

We cannot see these inferences based on gender studies methodologies in Dyos' histories of London. Dyos focused on the socio-economic conditions of the urban poor in *The Slums of Victorian London*, but did not uncover individual perspectives of marginalised demographics, preferring a contextualised approach.[42] He found that Dickens wrote of London's 'back-slums' in 1840, the term 'slum' also being used in a letter to *The Times* in 1845, but these did not represent any newly explored viewpoints of marginalised groups.[43] Dyos remained detached from his urban histories, and often used a statistical approach, for example when he detailed Bethnal Green's slums.[44] While Dyos noted the ironic bias of the dichotomy of the 'deserving poor' and the 'undeserving poor', he largely only highlighted well-known socio-economic conditions of London, omitting those with less of a voice.[45]

Two different versions of London can be seen when we compare Dyos' socio-economic analysis with Rappaport's gendered political study. Applying Dyos' approaches gives a true reflection of socio-economic conditions of London and its perception: the number of those living in poverty and opinions on the urban poor by contemporary commentaries in the media. It presents an image of utter misery being experienced by some in slums, with harsh Victorian attitudes to those who experienced it. London was shown as a vehicle for poverty to flourish and for those to judge. On the other hand, Rappaport's approach to understanding London reveals the gender anxieties and discrimination toward women, even in terms of financial

presence in society.[46] She also shows the city to be a place that saw both change and resistance to that change. Both understand London, despite utilising different historiographical and sociological approaches. The two approaches demonstrate a good understanding of the modern European city and add value to the field of urban history, just in different ways.

There is thus a great diversity in methodological and thematic approaches used by historians to try and understand the modern European city. The field of urban history is still changing, continually becoming more interdisciplinary. The first methodological approaches used helped define urban history as a field of study, with the questions and reflections of modernity, particularly by Georg Simmel, becoming key themes and inspiring further study. These approaches paved the way for the field to become more interdisciplinary, with statistics being the first discipline utilised by scholars like Adna Ferrin Weber.[47] Without the introduction of other disciplines to study urban history and understand the modern European city, the field would not have progressed so far, as statistics, economics, and sociology have all left their mark. Max Weber's comparative studies of cities encouraged the interdisciplinary and comparative methodology of the field. The Chicago School particularly benefited from the previous works of Simmel and Max Weber, using them to further their studies of social, ethnic, and cultural processes of cities.[48] H. J. Dyos introduced the most comprehensive contextual methodology in understanding a modern European city; rather than exploring the city's past like Max Weber, he explored the city's endogenous and exogenous processes.[49] Scholarship after the fall of the Iron Curtain highlighted the relationship between the metropolis and power, manifested particularly through urban planning.[50] As technological advancements took place, cities began to be understood as a "global" environment:

a hub of global connections, with each city integral to the fabric of global society and economy.[51] Urban history has now started to analyse perspectives of those not typically included in a city's narrative, including women and LGBT+ individuals, uncovering new versions of the city and different uses of space.[52] Applying gender studies and histories of sexuality advanced the interdisciplinary nature of urban history. The many approaches used by historians to understand the modern European city have been interdisciplinary interrogations, gradually revealing a fuller image of the modern metropolis.

References

[1] S. Ewen, *What is Urban History?* (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 17-18.

[2] M. E. Spencer, 'History and Sociology: An Analysis of Weber's 'The City'', *Sociology*, 11:3 (1977), pp. 509-10.

[3] Ewen, *What is Urban History?*, pp. 19-23.

[4] S. Kotkin, 'The Search for the Socialist City', *Russian History*, 23 (1996), p. 233.

[5] E. D. Rappaport, ''The Halls of Temptation': Gender, Politics, and the Construction of the Department Store in Late Victorian London', *Journal of British History*, 35:1 (1996), p. 72.

[6] Ewen, *What is Urban History?*, p. 17.

[7] Ibid., pp. 17-29.

[8] D. Brantz, S. Disko, and G. Wagner-Kyora, 'Introduction'. in D. Brantz, S. Disko, and G. Wagner-Kyora (eds.), *Thick Space: Approaches to Metropolitanism* (Bielefield, 2012), p. 10.

[9] Ewen, *What is Urban History?*, pp. 17-18.

[10] A. Lees, *Cities Perceived: Urban Society in European and American Thought, 1820-1940* (New York, 1985), pp. 10-11.

[11] C. Dickens, *Correspondence* (November 1840); H.J. Dyos, D. Cannadine, and D. A. Reeder. *Exploring the Past: Essays in Urban History* (Cambridge, 1982), p. 131.

[12] A. Akkerman, *Urban Archetypes of Jane Jacobs and Ebenezer Howard: Contradiction and Meaning in City Form* (Toronto, 2020), pp. 22-24.

[13] Ewen, *What is Urban History?*, pp. 17-18.

[14] Ibid., p. 18.

[15] L. Vaughan, *Mapping Society: The Spatial Dimensions of Social Cartography* (London, 2018), p. 67.

[16] C. Booth, 'The Inhabitants of Tower Hamlets (School Board Division), Their Condition and

Occupations', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 50:2 (1887), cited in Vaughan, *Mapping Society*, p. 69.

[17] Ewen, *What is Urban History?*, p. 18.

[18] Spencer, 'History and Sociology', p. 509

[19] Ibid., pp. 509-10.

[20] Ewen, *What is Urban History?*, p. 19.

[21] H. Reif, 'Metropolises: History, Concepts, Methodologies', in Brantz, Disko and Wagner-Kyora (eds.), *Thick Space*, p. 41.

[22] R. A. Mohl, "Editorial", *Journal of Urban History,* 1:1 (1974), p. 1.

[23] Ewen, *What is Urban History?*, pp. 21-22.

[24] S. J. Mandelbaum, 'H.J. Dyos and British Urban History', *Economic History Review*, 38:3 (1985), p. 438.

[25] Mandelbaum, 'H.J. Dyos', p. 443.

[26] Ibid., p. 438.

[27] Ibid., pp. 443-444.

[28] Ibid., p. 441.

[29] Kotkin, 'Socialist City', p. 235.

[30] Ibid., pp. 240-2.

[31] Ibid., p. 247.

[32] M. D. Steinburg, *Petersburg Fin de Siècle* (New Haven, 2011), p. 10.

[33] Spencer, 'History and Sociology', p. 510.

[34] Reif, 'Metropolises', pp. 43-6.

[35] Ibid.

[36] S. Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Oxford, 2008), p. 404.

[37] M. Houlbrook, 'The Man with the Powder Puff in Interwar London', *The Historical Journal*, 50:1 (2007), p. 147.

[38] Rappaport, "Halls of Temptation", p. 72.

[39] Ibid., pp. 75-82.

[40] 'Lunch with the Linendrapers', *Graphic* (August 3, 1872), p. 98, cited in Rappaport, "Halls of Temptation", p. 74.

[41] J. Richards, 'Model Citizens and Millenarian Subjects: Vorticism, Suffrage and London's Great Unrest', *Journal of Modern Literature*, 37:3 (2014), p. 1.

[42] Dyos, *Cannadine and Reeder. Exploring the Past*, p. 130.

[43] C. Dickens, *Correspondence* and Unknown, *The Times* (1845), cited in Dyos, Cannadine and Reeder, *Exploring the Past*, p. 131.

[44] Ibid., p. 144.

[45] Ibid., p. 136.

[46] Rappaport, "Halls of Temptation", p. 72.

[47] Ewen, *What is Urban History?*, p. 18.

[48] Reif, 'Metropolises', p. 41.

[49] Spencer, 'History and Sociology', pp. 509-10.

[50] Kotkin, 'Socialist City', pp. 235-45.

[51] Reif, 'Metropolises', pp. 43-6.

[52] Houlbrook. 'Powder Puff', p. 147.